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ABSTRACT

Seapower can be an ambiguous concept, difficult to understand and research, because it
is composed of a number of factors across specialized areas, which mutually affect each
other. It is a difficult duty for governments, which need national support to weave the
components of seapower into a national engine for the sake of developing seapower in
defence of national interests.

It can be said that alliance strategy can exert a strong influence on a state. In the Japan
context, there are a lot of benefits and risks brought by an alliance. For sea powers, it
may be no exaggeration to say that whether to contribute to maritime-oriented coalitions
as a member nation seriously influences the fate of the nation. Each state is able to
increase mutual trust thorough the operation of maritime coalitions. It would reduce the
possibility of conflicts over maritime interests between member states and contribute to
good order at sea. There are several external sources of instability for the Japanese
islands from neighbouring countries. The location of Japan is on the frontline facing the
rimland of the Eurasian Continent in which the great sea power and the great land
power have to stand face to face. The United States, as the offshore balancer, has thus
placed special emphasis on Japan and its geopolitical location.

The security frameworks of maritime coalitions that Japan joins or even leads are
effective tools in the fight against various threats to the Japanese islands and its sea lines
of communication (SLOC). The Japanese government is currently forming maritime
coalitions through the activities of its navy and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), but a fact
that Japan is unable to exercise the right to collective security and places legal
limitations on its maritime forces’ operations are major stumbling blocks in efforts to
establish and develop the firm bond of maritime coalitions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The oceans are indispensable for the national strategy of all states, even those which are
landlocked. The concept of seapower has been studied extensively and it has been
pointed out that seapower serves as an important national strategic tool for a maritime
state. Today, the ever-increasing significance of seapower is in little doubt. The ocean
and its strategic consequences have shaped political cultures and the details of historical
development of states, including Japan. In modern history, Japan’s geo-strategic
orientation has been a key factor in Japan’s international political status, its national
power and its strategic environment. It has been most successful when it has pursued a
maritime orientation involving cooperative engagement with other maritime partner
states. For maritime states, appropriate geopolitical and alliance polices are essential
when considering grand strategy. This is particularly the case for a sea-girt state like
Japan, because ocean space cannot be controlled by a single power, and maritime states
must calculate the strategic relationship between landpower and seapower for their
security and defence, as discussed in Chapter 2. Japan is currently undergoing some
change in outlook, as it expands its maritime orientation beyond just its close alliance
relationship with the Unites States to develop relationships with other security
partnerships and to play a greater role in protecting the international maritime system
upon which it so greatly depends. This thesis is the first study that takes an integrated
approach to the theory of seapower and maritime-oriented coalitions with respect to
Japan, and does so at a propitious time, as Japan’s maritime diplomacy widens and its
international engagement grows.

Background
Sea and Power
Two essential features of the Earth are the existence of life and the existence of the sea. 1
Approximately 71 per cent of the Earth’s surface is covered by the sea, of which the
surface area is 361 million square kilometres. Life arrived on the Earth over one billion
1

Ryouhei Murata, Umi ga Nihon no Shourai wo Kimeru [The Sea Decides Japan’s Future],
SeizandōShoten, Tokyo, 2006, p. 2.

1

years ago, 2 and it still depends on the oceans; and the natural circulation of water has
directly or indirectly had a strong influence on the natural environment and the quality
of life for human beings. In particular, humankind has utilized the oceans since ancient
times for nutrition, to carry goods, communicate and conduct political activity,
including engaging in conflicts and wars.

War has often been tied closely to the sea, which has acted both as a means and a cause
of conflict. In spite of this, in strategic studies, “power from the sea” rarely had been
discussed in detail until the American naval officer and theorist of seapower, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, began to publish in the late nineteenth century what were at the time
very popular books in praise of the strategic value of seapower. At any rate, in
contemporary circumstances, a large number of sovereign states have devoted
themselves to developing both their naval power and maritime strategy, as there is a
growing recognition of the benefits, and even necessity, of enhancing national seapower.

As a matter of fact, it has been decided already who has ownership of the land territory
of the Earth, except for Antarctica, and it is difficult to change the geopolitical structure
of the continents. In contrast, the world’s ocean space has not been very clearly defined
in a way similar to that which pertains on land. The waters of the world’s oceans and
seas surround all the continents, providing a three dimensional space for strategic
activity: that is, on, under and over the sea. In regard especially to strategic and
economic factors, the value of the sea has increased to a greater extent than ever before,
and this value will only increase further in the future. 3 Today, the significance of
seapower has been widely recognized in the international community. Some of the main
reasons for this trend include the increasing strategic value of marine resources; the
importance of being able to advance the projection of national influence at and from the
sea; the high dependence of global trade on maritime transportation; and the influence
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). With this growing
importance, the number of states that intend to concentrate on national activity related to
the sea and develop corresponding maritime strategy is also on the rise, leading to an
almost inevitable consequence that competition among countries has become more
2
3

Ibid.
Geoffrey Till,, Seapower a Guide for the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 351-378.

2

intense in the seapower development race. An island state such as Japan can hardly be
immune from these pressures.

Japan and the Sea
Japan is an archipelago of islands located off the eastern edge of the Eurasian continent.
The home islands of Japan comprise the four principal islands of Hokkaido, Honshu,
Shikoku, and Kyushu. Including small and isolated islands, totally, Japan consists of
over 6,800 islands. 4 Japan’s total land area is about 380,000 square kilometres (only the
world’s 61st largest in extent), yet it has a territorial sea of about 430,000 square
kilometres, and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is as large as 4,489,000 square
kilometres, 5 the world’s sixth largest. Japan’s twelve nautical mile territorial sea, its
claimed 200 nautical mile EEZ, as well as its disputed island territories are set out
below in Map 1.

Japan’s land territory is marked by irregular highlands with associated clusters of
volcanoes. Japan is made poor in terms of strategic or industrial resources by this
topography, which imposes special conditions on its inhabitants due to the instability of
the land itself. This insecure land with its 500 volcanoes provides an average of 1,500
earthquakes per year, 6 and only 16 per cent of its total area can be cultivated. 7 More
importantly for this thesis, Japan is not only a sea-girt country poor in natural resources,
it is highly dependent upon imports of natural resources and food from around the globe.
As a serious matter of fact, the sea lines of communication (SLOC), which Japan’s trade
relies upon, are a huge and fragile network. In addition, having the ninth largest EEZ in
the world of course has created some international issues with its neighbours over both
island territories and maritime jurisdiction. Taking this geo-strategic environment into
consideration, there is little doubt that seapower is essential in determining the fate of
Japan’s security. However, Japan has to confront a huge menu of challenges in order to
maintain sufficient seapower because of various elements of uncertainty regarding the
4

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Homepage, available at
http://www.mlit.go.jp/crd/chirit/ritoutoha.html.
5
Japan Coast Guard Homepage, available at
http://www1.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/JODC/ryokai/ryokai_setsuzoku.html.
6
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Diang Chu, and Ardath W. Burks, Burks, Ardath W., Diang Chu, and Paul M. A.
Linebarger, Far Eastern Government and Politics China and Japan, D. Van Nostrand Company, New
York, 1954, p. 266.
7
Ibid., p. 267
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security of ocean space in the Asia-Pacific region, and due to its unique domestic
political circumstances which place constraints on national action uncommon to other
major powers. These factors are recurrent themes throughout this thesis.
Map 1. Japan and Its Maritime Zones

Historically, Japan was able to keep a distance from its huge mainland Asian neighbour,
China, because of the sea separating them. This geography proved conducive to the
development of a unique culture, even though Chinese civilization was influential
throughout the region. 8 Borrowing Chinese pictograph characters for written language,
its administrative system, Buddhism and Confucianism from China, the Japanese people
8

Naoko Sajima, “Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads,” in Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds.,
Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, Macmlilan Press, London, 1999, p. 69.

4

maintained their own language, their warrior culture and their indigenous religion,
Shinto. 9 The sea allowed the Japanese to retain a certain distance from Western
civilization as well. In general, Japan can academically be regarded as perhaps the only
country that does not share its civilization with others. 10 As a matter of fact, for instance,
the Japanese language is unique, isolated from other languages. 11 Shinto also is unique
and deeply shapes Japan’s national character and its peoples’ way of life. 12 Japan can be
summed up thus:
An island nation further from the continent than England, with a homo
generous population and few material resources, Japan was shaped by its
geography as well as the unique history that was the legacy of this geography,
and its modern outlook on world affairs reflects that. Japan was a natural
nation-state, not one forged by drawing lines on a map or constructed from
common beliefs. 13
Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan had had only a few experiences of waging war
against countries from across the sea, even though war broke out frequently within the
Japanese islands. Japanese were not accustomed to war against other peoples or defeat
in “total” war.

Japan, Geopolitics and the Maritime Coalition
In the early 20th century, compared to Britain, the United States and Russia, Japan and
Germany were not self-sufficient countries, which needed to import a few extremely
necessary goods. In response to this, it could be said that Japan and Germany adopted
geopolitical perspectives, 14 as a measure that provided a potential breakthrough to their

9

Robyn Lim, The Geopolitics of East Asia: the Search for Equilibrium, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 5.
See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Simon and Shuster, New York, 1996, p. 45.
11
Shuzo Koyama, “Shinto”, in Tadao Umesawa, ed., Seventy-seven Keys to the Civilization of Japan,
Sogen Sha, Osaka, 1985, pp. 65-68.
12
Ibid., pp. 77-80.
13
Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: the Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, The Century
Foundation, New York, 2007, p. 49.
14
The difference between geography, geopolitics and geo-strategy can be defined in the following way:
“Geogarphy is the physical reality, composed of mountains, rivers, seas, wind patterns, and so on. It
describes the geological features of the earth, the physical attributes of the land, sea, and air
enviroments”; “Geopolitics is the human factor within geography. It is the geographic distribution of
centers of resources and lines of communication, assigning value to locations according to their strategic
importance. The geopolitical situation is the result of the interaction of technology broadly defined and
geography, which alters the economic, political, and strategic importance of locations”; and “Geostrategy
is the geographic direction of a state’s foreign policy. More precisely, geostrategy describes where a state
concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity”, Jakub J.
10

5

situations. 15 Anglo-American geopolitical concepts have been influential for many
Western maritime states, whilst German geopolitics obviously focused on continental
state preoccupations. While, in the geopolitics of a maritime state, national strategies for
the freedom of maritime transportation and trading are considered essential, continental
states tended in history to aspire for a more autarkic system to control vast land areas,
such a political and economic system through land-based internal lines of
communication. In Germany’s case this involved expansion and occupation of a larger
areas as lebensraum or living space for the German continental state. 16

Japan initially increased its national strength based on a maritime model of geopolitics
during 1890-1915, yet an Imperial Japanese Army chief of staff centred-group was
fascinated with German geopolitics. 17 The thought of the greatest authority on German
geopolitics, General Karl Haushofer, had a strong influence over Japanese. 18 As a result,
Japan’s pursued an illogical national strategy, contradictory to its national geo-strategic
circumstances that appear to have become a major component in the failure of Japan’s
strategy of expansion on the Asian mainland. 19 Learning from history, it can be asserted
that Japan must cooperate with the rest of the world and make the core of its existence
as a maritime nation, not a continental nation. It is a central argument of this study that
applying a strategy of developing as a maritime state is crucial for Japan, focusing in
particular on developing a maritime alliance or coalition strategy.

Alliance with Anglo-Saxons
After Imperial Japan won the war against the Qing Dynasty in 1895, great powers
learned the reality of the weakened Chinese dynasty and then advanced, dismembering
Chinese land. The continental empire of Russia was attempting to seize Manchuria and
the rest of northeast Asia through the pressure of its armed forces. On April 23 1895,
Russia, France, and Germany demanded that Japan retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula to
the Qing Dynasty. The incident known as the Triple Intervention made Japanese fully
Grygiel,Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006,
pp. 21-22.
15
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Kougyō Shinbumsha, Tokyo, 1977, p. 26.
16
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19
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aware that Japan was isolated and too weak to compete against great powers. 20
Additionally, Russia behaved aggressively for the control of the Korean peninsula,
including sending military and financial advisers, securing leased territory to build a
military base, and crossing the Yalu River to harvest timber. 21 Domination of the Asian
continent by Russia would have been a great threat to the newly emerging Japan. At the
same time, for Britain, its interest in the Far East was endangered. As a result, Japan and
Britain formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a maritime alliance on the grounds of
this common interest. 22 Moreover, even though the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stipulated
that each country stood neutral when the other went to the war, Britain contributed a lot
to the Japanese victory over Russia by effective support, such as providing military
information, helping procurement of war expenditure, using diplomatic pressure on
Germany and France to make them remain aloof from the conflict, and nurturing
international opinion favourable to Japan. 23

By the time of the war against Russia, the Japanese Navy totally had procured 152 ships
(251,700 tons). Since Japan did not have enough shipbuilding skills for large warships,
it placed orders for large naval vessels with foreign countries. Over 80 percent of the
fleet was either constructed by Britain or relevant to Britain; especially, all six
battleships were made in Britain. 24 Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese
empire received great support from the British. Especially, the Russian Baltic Fleet had
to make a 20,000-mile journey to Japan due through the Mediterranean, where Britain
placed a number of bases. Britain also controlled the Suez Canal. 25 Such a long journey
consumed Russian sailors and made them lose their fighting spirit. 26

Advocating the Open Door Policy for China, the United States also supported the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and cooperated with Japan’s policy, which can be seen in the
Portsmouth peace negotiation. As the background of the victory, the framework of
20
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22
Makoto Iokibe, “The Japan-US Alliance as a Maritime Alliance”, pp. 137-199, in Kenichi Itō ed,
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Japan-Britain-U.S. cooperation as tripartite maritime coalition of Asia, Europe and
America was formed. 27 Nevertheless, Japan never completely became a maritime state
or consented to join a larger maritime alliance at that time. Geo-strategically, if the
Korean peninsula had become hostile to Japan, it would have been driven into a corner.
In order to avoid such a desperate situation, Japan even initiated the Sino-Japanese War
and the Russo-Japanese War. 28 The period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance covers three
treaties of alliance. All three alliances seem to be counted among the successful
alliances of history. 29

Nevertheless, the result of the dispute between America and Japan over their individual
interests in China did irreparable harm to their relationship. In addition, Britain and the
United States rejected Japan’s statement of racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919 and forced Japan to limit its navy to three fifths of the size of the U.S. and
British navies at the Washington Naval Conference from 1921 to 1922. This led to the
termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the Washington Conference System. A
series of incidents accelerated Japan’s isolation from the maritime coalition. However,
not content with seizing an advantageous position on the Korean peninsula, Japan was
driven recklessly to rush towards continental power by first directing itself towards the
annexation of Manchuria and northern China. After the “Manchurian Incident,” Japan
endeavoured to become “a continental nation,” and it joined the Axis powers as an antiAnglo-Saxon alliance to change the situation. 30 Japan’s presence and colonization of
continental China antagonized two great naval powers: Britain, which had had a huge
economic interest in China since the Opium War, and the United States which also
pushed the Open Door Policy in China. 31 Finally, the Japanese Empire began to wage a
tragic war in the Asian region and the Pacific Ocean. It is said that she ran after two
hares but could catch neither. Geopolitical theorist, Nicolas Spykman, explained:
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They have, however, had to contend with one great problem because of the
fact that, since 1941, they have both been involved in two types of warfare,
continental and amphibian, waged on two different fronts. Russian and
Chinese land power and the sea power of Great Britain and the United States
have forced both Germany and Japan to wage war on two fronts and in two
elements at the same time. 32
As has been noted, the Japanese Empire was torn between becoming a maritime state
and a continental state. Since the end of the Second World War, and throughout the
Korean and the Vietnam Wars, the United States became preoccupied in East Asia with
confronting the Soviet Union and other communist states. Fortunately, Japan could
rebuild its economy, thanks to its geographical situation, and received war-time “special
procurements” and the great help of the United States, which had a strong influence on
the world’s sea lanes as the greatest maritime state throughout the second half of the
20th century. From 1950 to 1952, about 70 per cent of Japanese exports were related to
the war-time special procurements boom. 33 Japan rushed toward economic prosperity
due to the industriousness of the Japanese people and American global strategy. If it had
not been for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, concluded in 1951, Japan would not have
been able to advance its economic prosperity without possessing a blue water navy.
Instead, the United States has consistently been the world’s sheriff to guard not only its
own the merchant fleet but also those of its allies and friendly nations since the end of
the Second World War. As long as Japan’s alliance with the United States was
maintained, Japan could focus on promoting its recovering economy and building its
huge merchant fleet in place of a first-class navy. 34

Meanwhile, sharing identities with allies is one of main factors to maintain alliances.
This is one of main points of reason why this research topic has been chosen. Although
close alliances or coalitions are essential for Japan’s survival, Japan is a lonesome
nation in terms of identities such as religion, language, and culture, as well as its
geographical location. On the basis of geopolitics, however, Japan could be classified in
the group of maritime nations, and shares strategic identities and interests with
32
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democratic maritime states who value the benefit of free trade, even though Japan has
been isolated in terms of anthropology. This point is of importance in consideration of
its national strategy.

Japan and the Maritime Coalition in the Asia-Pacific Region
The end of the Cold War brought the emergence of strategic change in the world. As the
influence of the Cold War has diminished with time, Asian countries increasingly have
pursued their own security policies. As a result, power relationships in Asia are
becoming instable. Many Asian nations have the political motivation and economic
resources to improve their military power. It seems that Asian conceptions of war and
strategy are broader and more profound than the Western conception. 35 The diversity of
Asia is extraordinary. There are so many differences among the states, such as their
political systems, economic power, size and geographical nature, culture and historical
experience.

Meanwhile, “The Asia-Pacific has emerged as the maritime strategic hub in the 21st
century.” 36 In terms geography, the defining feature of the region is the intersection of
the vast continent of Asia with the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean connected by the
Asian littoral, or as Spykman would have called it, the rimlands of Asia, complicated
further geopolitically by often contested maritime boundaries. 37 The geo-strategic
environment of the Asia-Pacific region features three great landpower states: China,
India, and Russia, and the seapower states of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the countries
of peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and the
South Pacific islands nations 38; yet the most important player is the United States as the
external “super” power, a maritime state with vast national territories which maintains a
massive military presence in the region.
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The significance of the geopolitical characteristic of the Asia-Pacific region as the
maritime strategic hub is rising along with the globalization of economic activities.
There are numerous issues concerning the security environment surrounding Japan in
the Asia-Pacific region. 39 the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD),
ballistic missiles and relevant technologies from Northeast Asia to the other regions;
international terrorism in the region; China’s radical military expansion focusing on its
navy and air force; antagonistic military relationships on the Korean peninsula and
across the Taiwan Strait; territorial disputes over resource-rich islands; troubles brought
mainly by Chinese naval activities; and transnational and organized illegal activities,
particularly acts of piracy.

Regarding the significance of seapower and the security environment, naturally, naval
construction in the Asia-Pacific region could escalate into a chain reaction of arms
competition. According to U.S.-based naval consultancy AMI International, global
spending for building naval platforms over the next two decades should reach US$640
billion, 40 Dominated by states of the Asia-Pacific. For example, Asia-Pacific nations
such as Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan could purchase as many as 80-100 new submarines over
that period. 41

Meanwhile, since the end of the Cold War, the world has been rapidly becoming
borderless and globalized, whereas people have been becoming more and more
appreciative of their national traditions and values to keep them from becoming lost
within the stream of globalization. Likewise, Japanese should establish its own identity
as a genuine maritime state and understand its role in the world, based on the
development of a grand strategy for the future focused on seapower. In the context of the
global trend, analysis of habitual behaviour of a strategic community as strategic culture
is becoming popular among researchers. Analysis of seapower, which will heavily
influence Japan’s future, means exactly “know yourself.” For Japan, in order to survive
39
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and achieve a more prosperous future in the international arena, it should
enthusiastically contribute to the creation of a well-functioning security framework in
the Asia-Pacific region by promoting effective maritime coalitions. A strong maritime
alliance and new coalitions could enhance mutual interests both during peacetime and
hostile times. These are arguments central to this thesis. Yet it has been difficult for
people to study strategy and military affairs in Japan. Above all, it seems that to study
geopolitics has been a sort of taboo, since, after the defeat in the Second World War, the
concept of geopolitics was pushed out of Japan’s academic sphere by occupation
policy. 42 Colin Gray emphasises, however,

Humans may not think accurately about geography, but even geographically
inaccurate thought is still geographical. Strategy and politics must be done
within geography. They cannot help but be influenced by ideas, and
physical constraints, that reasonably are termed geographical. Geography is
inescapable. 43
Even though Japan needs to respond to the current situation, this thesis takes the view
that Japan has indulged in “a dream of pacifism”. According to Andrew L. Oros, there
exist central tenets of Japan’s postwar security identity of domestic antimilitarism: “no
traditional armed forces involved in domestic policy making”; “no use of force by Japan
to resolve international disputes, except in self-defence”; “no Japanese participation in
foreign wars”. 44 On the basis of these tenets, there have been some common thoughts on
Japan’s security in Japanese society: unrealistic pacifists, including anti-Japanese
groups who aim to curtail Japan’s military power, insisting that Japan should assume an
unarmed neutrality and who are utterly opposed to the revision of the Japanese
constitution’s Article 9 and the exercise of the right of collective defence; people who
wish to invoke Japan’s right of collective defence because “cheque book diplomacy”
has a number of limitations, but who do not want to revise Article 9; and people labelled
as extreme rightists by some media and left wingers who strongly insist on invoking the
right of collective defence, revising Article 9, or scrapping the post-war constitution.
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Unless something dramatic happens, however, there is no sign of the breakdown of the
status quo. 45

Although a large number of Japanese people cannot shed their post-War pacifism based
on Article 9 of the constitution, there are serious potential threats from the sea that
might cause great conflicts around the Japanese islands in Northeast Asia, and also
Japan’s SLOC, as its economic artery in the Asia-Pacific region, are potentially highly
vulnerable. It is extremely questionable that a genuine sea-girt state Japan can stand up
against innumerable threats alone: no single nation is able to protect and control the
world’s ocean space alone. Therefore, coalition-building among maritime states has
emerged as being indispensable for international security. Seapower requires maritime
states to form coalitions for their mutual security.

Meanwhile, considering the globalized world, maritime coalitions can be diverse, with
the role of each member becoming quite specialized. From a realist perspective, the root
meaning of alliance is “shedding blood together”, 46 but being dragged into the morass
of long conflicts could bring ruin upon maritime states, especially commitments to any
prolonged continental conflict. Although healthy military relations should be built
between sea powers, open-ended, unconstrained alliance commitments thus need to be
avoided.

47

In this respect, maritime-oriented states need to keep a sense of

comprehensive strategic balance.

For Japan, a traditional maritime state, alliance or coalition policy is without doubt a
matter of life or death.

Research Questions
Based on this background, the thesis seeks to answer the following questions:
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What is Seapower?
While being a main factor to increase the national power of a maritime state, the concept
of seapower is ambiguous. It has to be made clear to discuss the security and the geostrategy of Japan as a maritime state.

What Has a Coalition among Maritime States Meant?
The strategy of alliance and coalition are indispensable when considering international
relations. In particular, it has to be significant for a maritime state to form maritime
coalitions, because of the features of seapower and the significance of the
interdependence network of the sea and globalization.

How Have Japan and Its Seapower Been under Threat?
In the context of discussing Japan’s maritime-oriented coalition, the seeds of threat
facing must be demonstrated and how they relate to Japanese seapower. In practice, the
security environment of Japan is in a critical state.

How Have Japan and Its Maritime Coalitions Worked for Security?
It can be demonstrated how maritime coalitions to which Japan belongs function
effectively for the sake of the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and how
Japan can contribute to its maritime coalitions and the international order.

Sources, Structure and Method
This study will be divided into three parts. The first part is on the theory of seapower and
the roles of coalitions for maritime states. In Chapter 2, firstly, in order to
comprehensively understand modern seapower, the components of modern seapower are
outlined by referring to traditional maritime strategic thinkers such as Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, and modern seapower experts. Even today, the
importance of Mahan’s strategic thought, advocated in The Influence of Sea Power upon
History, 1660-1783, remains unchanged. Meanwhile, Corbett’s strategic thought insisted
in his classic, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, is more appreciated than ever. His
broader and flexible vision can be put to practical use in modern strategy.
14

Secondly, alliances and coalitions formed by maritime states focusing on seapower are
reviewed in the context of American geo-strategic thinking on the significance of
alliance and coalition strategy for maritime states, including the complexity of relations
between seapowers and landpowers. The discussion of geo-strategic coalitions is based
on Colin S. Gray’s works, and subsequently, maritime coalition building is focused on
Chris Rahman’s arguments as a conceptual pillar. Thirdly, whether the United States has
a suitable qualification to be a builder of a maritime coalition or not is examined by
looking at its national strength, naval power, national interests, alliance strategy and
maritime strategy. The last section of this chapter focuses on how to integrate a number
of factors into strategically meaningful seapower. Important keys are the people’s
awareness of ocean space, and spreading and sharing a sense of common purpose and
strategy. For the sake of such a difficult task, a theory, including universality to
sufficiently convince opponents, is required. It could be a general strategy, suggested by
Joseph C. Wylie in his great work, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power
Control.

The second part examines potential threats facing Japan. Chapter 3 looks in particular at
possibilities of menace brought by potential adversarial countries in Northeast Asia.
China is a traditional great continental power and is radically expanding its naval power
with maritime interests in mind. Russia is building a continental coalition with China
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a grouping of Eurasian
continental states. Also, importantly, Japan has a number of maritime territorial and
jurisdictional disputes with its neighbours, which are discussed in detail as further
influencing the need for Japan to build up its capacity for seapower. Chapter 4 analyses
non-state threats to Japan’s SLOC in the Asia-Pacific region posed by piracy and
maritime terrorism.

The third part discusses Japan’s alliance and maritime coalition building as
countermeasures against a large number of potential threats from various actors. Firstly,
Chapter 5 discusses characteristics of Japan’s alliance with the United States and
describes the background of Japan’s post-War pacifism the strong influence of the U.S.
Navy and its strategy over the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the feature
15

of the alliance based on navy-to-navy relations between the U.S. Navy and the JMSDF,
taking U.S. global strategy into account.

Secondly, Japan’s maritime alliances and coalitions other than the alliance with United
States are considered with particular emphasis on the process of building security
frameworks, strategic interests and measuring Japan’s contribution. This has included
building new security relationships with the likes of India and Australia, increasing its
multilateral engagement with new security partners and taking a leadership role in
developing regional arrangements to counter piracy.

The thesis develops and applies theories of Anglo-American geopolitics: Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s geopolitical concept that insists the significance of naval power and maritime
transportation capability; Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s geopolitical concept that describes
historical confrontations between sea power states and land power states; and Nicholas J.
Spykman’s geopolitical concept that develops the significance of the Eurasian rimland,
as outlined above. In addition to taking a unique focus on Japan’s slow development of
seapower strategies to ameliorate its security concerns and build its own interests, it also
makes extensive uses of Japanese language sources. Although there is very little
Japanese literature on the direct subject of the development of seapower and geopolitical
thought, the incorporation of Japanese language sources nevertheless provides some
insight into the thinking of Japanese commentators into some of the wider security
problems facing Japan, and its perspectives on the outside world.
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CHAPTER 2
Seapower and Coalitions

Introduction
This chapter will discuss the concept of seapower, paying particular attention to the
components of seapower, and the relations between maritime states and coalitions. The
first section will review the concept of seapower by introducing definitions by
prominent experts on this subject and discuss the elements of modern seapower. The
second section discusses the role of alliance and coalition formation in decreasing or
managing the degree of the risk posed by different types of threats in the context of
seapower and geo-strategy. The third section elucidates the most significant aspects of
seapower and maritime strategy, and then confirms, in the main, the importance of
combined forces, alliance strategy, from the perspectives of geopolitical and cultural
factors, for the development of maritime strategy. The fourth section assesses the role of
U.S. seapower as a maritime coalition builder.

Seapower
Definition of “Seapower”
The term, “seapower” (originally “sea power”), was coined by an American naval
officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, in his famous work, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History, 1660-1783, as a strategic concept, in 1890. At one time, seapower briefly
meant in a sense the total sum of naval power and maritime transportation capability.
Mahan coined the term “seapower”, but did not summarize his strategic thoughts in
clear and succinct terms. 1 Besides, there are a few similar terms such as “maritime
power” and “sea power”. In truth, this ambiguity has intermittently created confusion.
This thesis employs the use of “seapower” as a single word and as a strategic concept. A
“sea power” (two words) is used as a country. This is the way it is used in Geoffrey
Till’s works, the leading contemporary thinker on the subject. 2 One of the most wellknown statements on the definition of seapower is provided by the former Royal Navy
officer, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond:

1

Joseph C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, Rutgers University Press, New
Brunswick N.J., 1967, p. 39.
2
See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp. 1-6.
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Sea power is that form of national strength which enables its possessor to
send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean
which lie between his country or the countries of his allies, and those
territories to which he needs access in war; and to prevent his enemy from
doing the same. 3
Seapower includes a broader area than before as a consequence. Currently, the concept
of seapower involves more diverse areas than in the past eras. Till states: “A final
advantage of using the word ‘seapower’, even if in this cautious way, is that it is a
reminder of the fact that is a form of power that derives from the attributes of the sea
itself.” 4 At the present time, the maritime economy, including marine resources, is also
regarded as part of seapower. In the broad sense, seapower is part of national strength;
is vital for securing national interests for maritime states; and is a national strategic tool
that can be attained by utilizing ocean space effectively. In regard to “maritime power”,
according to Till, “For all its imperfections and ambiguities it seems best to follow the
common practice of using the labels ‘maritime power’ and ‘seapower’ interchangeably.”
Additionally, “Either phrase should be taken to incorporate naval interactions with the
civilian/marine dimension on the one hand and with air and ground forces on the other,
since all of these can have a major impact on the behaviour of others.” 5

Meanwhile, in the matter of what constitutes “a sea power state”, according to Colin S.
Gray, “a sea power” can be conventionally defined:

Traditional usage has it that a sea power is a country with a maritime, as
contrasted with a continental, orientation in its strategic outlook and that
depends critically upon maritime communications for its economic wellbeing. Such a country therefore requires a healthy measure of naval control
of maritime communications for national security and has an influential
sea-oriented community for the advancement of maritime aspects of the
national interest. 6

3

Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1947, p. ix.
Till, Seapower, p. 6
5
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York, 1992, pp. 6-7.
4
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Gray also states that “a naval power is simply a country with a strong navy.” 7 He
explains, although Rome, Sparta and Macedonia came to be strong naval powers, they
were not true or “natural” sea powers. 8 Furthermore, there are some confusing
terminologies in regard to “power” and “strategy” in any study of seapower. These are
illustrated based on strategic layers, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 on the next page.

Seapower’s Basic Structure
Mahan defined the concept of seapower indirectly, in a broad sense, stating that it
“includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by
force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military
fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.” 9 It is essential to
identify the basic structure of seapower to comprehensively explain the concept of
seapower. Most importantly, seapower is composed of a large number of reciprocal and
complementary factors. Some people depend on numerical judgments and prefer to
assess seapower and maritime effectiveness with the rough and ready method, and are
unable to see the whole picture. Such people cannot answer the needs of the times when
the utility value of the oceans is increasing. 10 Mahan claims that there are six principal
conditions affecting the seapower of nations: Geographical Position, Physical
Conformation, Extent of Territory, Number of Population, National Character, and
Character of the Governments. 11 Figure 3 shows “Seapower’s Basic Structure”,
including the elements of modern seapower, based on the strategic thought of Mahan
and Corbett, and modern experts’ works. 12
7
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Figure 1.Level of Power as a Maritime State

Figure 2. Levels of Maritime Strategy

Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No. 23, Sea Power Centre-Australia, Canberra, 2008, pp. 143 and
152.
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Figure 3. Seapower’s Basic Structure
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Table 1. Types of Control of the Sea by Area and by Time

13

1. Absolute Control (Command of the Sea)
Complete freedom to operate without interruption. Enemy cannot operate at all.
2. Working Control
General ability to operate with high degree of freedom. Enemy can only operate with
high risk.
3. Control in Dispute
Each side operates with considerable risk. This then involves the need to establish
working control for limited portions for limited times to conduct specific operations.
4. Enemy Working Control
Position 2 reversed
5. Enemy Absolute Control (Command of the Sea)
Position 1 reversed.

The circulation of seapower, set out diagrammatically in Figure 3 above, is based upon
the interaction between four pillars of seapower: Maritime Forces based on the navy and
coast guard as a core factor together with marines and other joint operational
capabilities for the maritime and littoral theatres of operations; Sea Control in ocean
space; Strategic Influences on diplomatic power, trading, the marine economy, and
homeland security; and Economic Strength, as a measure of the collective productive
and technological capacity of the whole nation. This has been the main engine of a
maritime state for the accumulation and maintenance of wealth and power. According to
Peter Bender, neither maritime-oriented super states, Rome and the United States, were
dependent on military genius for their imperious status. Neither relied upon a conqueror
in the mould of Alexander, Ghengis Khan, or Napoleon, whose empires drastically rose,
and fell, in short order following their deaths or defeats. Rome and the United States, on
the other hand, had gradually and steadily accumulated and reserved their power until
they were unrivalled. 14

Sir Julian S. Corbett indicates that the purpose of naval warfare is required to directly or
indirectly secure the command of the sea, or to prevent the opponent from securing it. 15
Corbett stated, “Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of
maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of
13
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naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the
conquest of territory.” 16 The fundamental difference between the object of operations at
sea and at land is the point of the strategy. The former is to control maritime
communication, the latter is to seize, occupy, and possibly exploit particular, specific
territory. 17 The essential difference between the sea and the land in terms of command
is that of the significance of using of the sea for movement as “a dynamic medium”, not
for possession of the sea. 18 In the case of command of land, troops should permanently
be stationed in the area which they need to take charge of securing, possibly with
fortification. 19 Maritime strategies cannot be implemented in order to continuously
achieve complete control of all sea communications. Actually, without an uncontested
triumph in total war, it seems impossible to establish such comprehensive command,
and geo-strategy indicates where and how command of the sea is strategically most
important in the conflict. 20

In respect of strategic advantages, deploying decisive military power at sea and its
power projection afterwards has in past experience brought strategic success to sea
powers. 21 The management of crucial chokepoints and littorals by navies has been
considered more important for maritime states rather than using armies to seize land
territory, in order to protect transportation and commerce.

Ken Booth insists, in his work Navies and Foreign Policy, that the role of a navy is not
only to carry out military, warfighting functions, but also the diplomatic and the
policing roles. 22 It could not be said that the outcomes of such roles always directly link
to sea control but these impacts have significant effects as strategic influences on
national strategy, including economic activities. J.C. Wylie simply summarizes
maritime strategy as consisting of two major parts: the establishment of control of the
sea, and the exploitation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on the
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land. 23 Capable maritime forces can thus influence not only the strategic environment of
the sea, but also that of the land. Maritime strategy functions not only as a war strategy:
ultimately, successful maritime strategy would directly or indirectly bring advantages
that could control various strategic levels in peacetime as well. The influences of being
able to wield enough sea control can bring, or at least, protect, sources of national
wealth for a maritime state. The military function of navies could defend the homeland
and its territories from an enemy, yet still provide sufficient diplomatic and police
power for less daunting circumstances. Diplomatic power, based on a sufficient level of
sea control or simply potentially coercive naval presence, enables a government to
negotiate terms in territorial disputes and in defending national maritime security
interests. Naval policing activities can secure lives and property, including the ability to
exploit marine resources. 24 Even a naval leader of a major continental power, former
Soviet admiral of the fleet, Sergei Gorshkov, stated that “sea power emerges as one of
the important factors for strengthening its economy, accelerating scientific and technical
development and consolidating the economic political, cultural and scientific links of
the Soviet people with the peoples and countries friendly to it.” 25 Eric Grove asserts,
“The fundamental fact of twentieth-century sea power is that a country’s naval
capability is a direct reflection of its sheer economic power in all senses and that that
power inevitably reflects it control and exploitation of large land masses.” 26

The significance of a navy has been rising while the world’s tendency to depend on
international shipping and marine resources has also been increasing. On the other hand,
now, as in history, building ships takes many years and a huge amount of money.
Developing, producing and purchasing large or expensive weapon platforms such as
warships can potentially make a nation squander its national treasuries. Gray states,
“ultimately the sea power, land power, air power and space power of a state is bounded
by the relevant economic potential and political culture...Whether a great power is
primarily maritime or continental in strategic orientation, its military strength must
derive from its overall economic vitality”. 27 In particular, naval weaponry that has the
23
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potential power to alter the course of battles and strategic influence, such as aircraft
carriers, advanced surface combatants like destroyers or cruisers using the advanced
Aegis combat system, and nuclear powered submarines, represent possibly some of the
most expensive pieces of machinery a state can buy. In addition, the innovation and
institutions needed to develop, build, operate and maintain advanced navies require a
substantial supply of skilled workers. Any significant maritime power must therefore be
at the forefront of science and technology, which in turn requires considerable wealth
and comprehensive economic capacity; and never more so than in today’s world of high
defence inflation and rapid technological change.

The importance of coast guards also has witnessed a remarkable rise as new menaces
such as piracy, terrorism and various transnational crimes at or related to the sea have
come to be globally recognized as significant threats to national interests and regional
and international order by governments. However, a number of governments have
suffered from a lack of finances to secure enough manpower and equipment for coast
guards. For joint operations, undertaking manoeuvres can be costly, as well as the cost
of equipment itself. Establishing military forces and conducting any operations,
including military operations other than war (MOOTW), cannot help but be expensive
projects in our times.

Throughout history, many of the most powerful Western great powers, such as the
Greeks, Romans, Vikings, Venetians, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dutch, British, and
Americans, as a common feature rising to the surface, successfully employed the
influence of seapower as an important tool of their national (or imperial) strategy. 28 In
spite of being small countries with limited populations and resources, the likes of
Portugal, the Netherlands and England were able to gain rich profits by the development
of maritime transportation and trade. In practice, maritime forces and economic strength
must be like two sides of the same coin. Naval power and economic strength inherently
depend on each other.

An adequate, not to say overwhelming, world naval force which utilized a
whole host of bases and protected an ever-growing global trade; an
28
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expanding formal empire which offered harbour facilities for the navy and
focal centres of power, together with a far larger informal empire, both of
which provided essential raw materials and markets for the British economy;
and an industrial revolution which poured out its products into the rest of
the world, drew large overseas territories into its commercial and financial
orbit, encouraged an enormous merchant marine, and provided the material
strength to support its great fleets. 29
The Royal Navy that emerged as the ultimate example of a blue water navy in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a creature of the Commercial Revolution and
the expanding international trade around that time. Meanwhile, Britain’s world power
was maintained until her navy went into decline because of her relative economic
erosion during the twentieth century. 30 The economic system of a maritime nation
heavily relies on protection provided by the maintenance of an adequate level of sea
control by its navy. According to Gray, “Historically, sea powers have tended to be
commercial civilizations whose attitudes toward war have been much influenced by
calculations of economic risk and of the likely balance of financial gain and loss”. 31 The
relationship between economic strength and naval strength is one of strong
interdependence, and they are linked by the degree to which a navy can exert sea control
when needed.

Thus, a navy is produced by a certain level of economic strength. Maritime
communication is the bloodstream for the economic activities of a maritime state.
Formidable navies ought to be able to secure a sufficient quality of sea control. This
circulation has been the engine of a maritime state and it has been composed of a large
number of integrated elements reflected by technological, geopolitical and community
aspects. According to Corbett’s strategic thought, a key factor for the success of the
national strategy of a maritime state is how seapower and a variety of constituents and
conditions which influence seapower can be combined: “…the notion that Britain’s
success as a first-rate Power had involved the combined interplay and exploitation of
her naval, military, economic and diplomatic resources in a comprehensive policy“. 32
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New Elements and Power Integration
Five factors in Figure 3 support and contribute to make the “circulation” more energetic
and smooth. In this chart, Geographical Position largely includes, Geographical
Position, Physical Conformation, and Extent of Territory, as explicated by Mahan.
Technological Capability is classified into the Community Factor, because posture
toward technology could be considered to come from the capacity and culture of the
people. Sea Laws have always had an influence upon international relations and
maritime strategy, even before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC) was enacted in 1982. Since the agreement of the LOSC this influence has only
grown. International law is extremely relevant to the operation of maritime activities.
Any nation pursuing its maritime interests and maritime power has to face legal
restrictions and claims from coastal states, while the jurisdiction over merchant shipping
is also restrictively limited on the ocean to flag states (that is, the state in which a ship is
registered and whose flag a ship flies). Protecting national interests at sea largely
depends on how a nation approaches and uses the law of the sea.

In comparison with Mahan’s era, the modern era, with its constant technological
breakthroughs, has witnessed the emergence of new geo-strategic dimensions which are
regarded as significant influences on navies and strategic factors, more generally. Such
factors include the air, space and cyberspace dimensions of strategic activity. For
sovereign nations, it is difficult to harmonize and integrate each component, but they
have to do so for their own national security.

Major differences between Mahan’s elements of seapower and the elements of modern
seapower as identified in Figure 3 above are the Power Integration and Alliance Factor
aspects. Power Integration, originally mentioned by Corbett in terms of army-navy
cooperation, has been one of the most vital aspects of modern seapower. Indeed, the
modern naval strategist is required to have knowledge and intelligence to understand
and explain the function of a navy in both peace and war, within the context of a given
geo-strategic situation and mutual cooperation with other military services for joint
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operations. 33 Importantly, modern naval battles have been, and are likely to be in the
future, conducted not only on the surface of the water, but also under water, in the air
and in space and cyberspace. Each geographical dimension of strategy, including space
power, supports each other. Nevertheless, taking each geo-strategic aspect into
consideration, there are difference strategic world views among military professionals.
For example, “Where the sailor and the airman are almost forced, by the nature of the
sea and the air, to think in terms of a total world or, at the least to look outside the
physical limits of their immediate concerns, the soldier is almost literally hemmed in by
his terrain.” 34

Spacepower is an essential component for national strategy and war in our current times.
Unquestionably, the maritime strategy of advanced modern seapowers heavily relies on
the strategic benefits which accrue from the use of outer space. Orbiting satellites can
offer undisturbed global communications. Navigational satellites can provide the
precise position of naval forces and guidance data to missile systems. 35 Presently,
navies are dependent on space power for communications, navigation and targeting,
intelligence gathering, and meteorology. 36 “No longer can a navy defend its ‘high
ground’ with air power alone.” 37 However, in spite of changing political communities
and technologies, and in addition to the emergence of airpower and space power, the
long-standing antagonistic relationship between great seapowers and land powers has
not altered, even as the strategic environment has been growing more complicated. 38

The Alliance Factor
In order to fully ascertain the entire picture of seapower, multidisciplinary or integrated
research is without doubt indispensable. Above all, the characteristics of alliances and
coalitions in the theories of international relations and geopolitics must be appraised. In
this study, it should be noted that an essential point in the characteristics of seapower
and maritime strategy has been “interdependence”: alliance strategy and the integration
33
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of factors. Surely, in the modern age, compared with Mahan’s era, integrating different
players in the international arena, and powers and concepts in strategic studies is
especially worthy of attention inasmuch as it potentially increases the effect of seapower.
As mentioned above, following Booth’s conception, navies can be mainly used for three
purposes. In the diplomatic role, for a maritime state, navies are capable of playing a
leading role in the construction and maintenance of alliances and in coalition building. 39
In fact, it is a key strategy for maritime states to deal with such issues: building alliances
and coalitions is absolutely essential for sea powers, taking into account one
determining feature of ocean space, which is that it is impossible for a single power to
control unilaterally.

The Concept of Alliance
The concept of “alliance” has been one of the most crucial elements of the composition
of international political society. George Liska insists that “It is impossible to speak of
international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name.
For the same reason, it has always been difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances
on the plane of general analysis.” 40 The study of alliances has been shaped by recent
international relations studies of coalitions, organizations, integration, and community
building. Moreover, the necessity to research the logical connection between national
and international politics has been pointed out, 41 and is the approach taken in this study.

Glenn Snyder defines alliances in the following way: “Alliances are formal associations
of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against
states outside their own membership.” 42 Also, “Alliances obviously are cooperative
endeavours, in that their members concert their resources in the pursuit of some
common goal”. 43 Most alliances are formed in order to unite the members’ national
capabilities collectively, for their common interest. However, the nature of different
alliances and the ways of collaboration can vary. For instance, according to Stephen
39
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Walt, an alliance may be offensive or defensive: that is, “intended either to provide the
means for an attack on some third party or intended as a mutual guarantee in the event
that another state attacks one of the alliance members.” 44 Walt continues by adding that
an alliance can also be symmetrical or asymmetrical “depending on whether the
members possess roughly equal capabilities and take on broadly identical commitments
to each other.” 45 Further, an alliance may be an expedient coalition between states with
very different regimes and political values, such as the World War II alliance of mutual
necessity between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet Union; or it may
be united by states not only with similar strategic interests but also with similar
ideological principles, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 46

Moreover, the difference between alliances and alignments should become clear. Snyder
insists that the terms “alliance” and “alignment” are interchangeable, but “The broader
and more fundamental term is alignment, defined as expectations of states about
whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions.
Alignment includes alignment “against” as well as “with”; it identifies potential
opponents as well as friends.” 47 Notably, although alliances bring benefits to member
countries, the relationship of alignment also requires alliance members to pay the costs
of membership when they are called upon to do so. These costs may be in terms of
financial contributions or costs related to defence preparedness or armed conflict,
political costs of alignment with a particular state, whether those costs are domestic or
international, and potentially a cost in the lives of one’s own service personnel. It was
an irony that the collective defence provisions of some U.S. alliance systems established
by the United States to protect its allies and clients against Communist encroachment
during the Cold War were first formally implemented in response to an attack on the
United States itself, in the aftermath of 9/11. Alliance maintenance may have been at
least as important a reason to join Washington in the war against terrorism for many
U.S. allies as was a sense of moral outrage or strategic necessity. Allied states must
therefore calculate political pluses and minuses, and as long as they need the stability
and preservation of their alliances, must take a toll in some way. This is a very basic and
44
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primary premise for independent states in order to ensure national survival in the fluid
world order.

There are “rational” and “irrational” factors that cause alliances to collapse or endure. If
one or more members can no longer justify membership in terms of an assessment of its
interests, an alliance may collapse as a rational response to a new security environment
or changed political circumstances. On the other hand, there are “irrational” reasons that
can lead to an alliance collapsing. 48 At the same time, in spite of new conditions, an
alliance could endure because the same international security environment may seem
more dangerous to a state standing outside of an alliance than it would if that state
remained inside, under the alliance’s protective umbrella. 49

According to Stephen Walt, there are several main factors that can lead alliances to
collapse, as follows: 50 changing threat perceptions, declining credibility, and domestic
politics (influenced by demographic social trends, domestic competition, regime change,
and ideological divisions). Meanwhile, obvious reasons for the endurance of alliances
and coalitions are hegemonic leadership, the preservation of credibility, domestic
politics and elite manipulation, institutionalization, and ideological solidarity, and
shared identities, including within “security communities”. Statesmen and bureaucrats
must know and recollect such factors to adjust alliance policies to match the actual
security environment leading to a desired outcome for national security interests. Such
policy adjustment can be an important factor in deciding whether a nation prospers
peacefully or even survives. In addition, benefits and costs of alliance have to be
carefully considered to achieve a balance of interests when considering national security,
especially when diplomatic factors must be taken into account.

It is important at this point to compare the concept of “coalition” with that of “alliance.”
For example, the U.S. Department of Defense defines an alliance as: “The relationship
that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for
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broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.” 51 In the
meantime, the term “coalition” is defined as “An ad hoc arrangement between two or
more nations for common action.” 52 Also, “coalition action” is “Multinational action
outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer
cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.” 53 According to Snyder, larger
alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the alliance against
Napoleonic France can be called “coalitions.” 54 Snyder also states the anticipated
duration of alliances:

Most formal alliances specify a duration.... Less formal arrangements, such
as ententes, typically do not specify duration. In the case of ententes, that is
because the conflict settlements that form the basis of the agreement are
assumed to be permanent. There is also a class of ad hoc temporary
arrangements, formed for a specific purpose, which are presumed to last only
until that purpose is accomplished…. On a larger scale coalitions organized
during wartime for the specific purpose of blocking a major aggressor ― for
example, the shifting coalitions against Napoleonic France. By contrast,
“alliances,” as defined above, have a contingent rather than an immediate
purpose: they are formed to deal with a specified event that may or may not
happen at any time during their life, rather than a situation that is already
occurring. 55
To put it briefly, it could be said that a coalition is a subset of alignments, which is
relatively less formal, usually larger-sized and a shorter-period association than that of
an alliance.

51

U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/a/9313.html.
52
Ibid., available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/8682.html.
53
Ibid., available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/99.html.
54
Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 12
55
Ibid., p. 16.

32

Table 2. Snyder’s List of Benefits and Costs of Alliances

56

Security Benefits of Alliances
1) to strengthen deterrence capability against attack on oneself
2) to strengthen defence capability against attack on oneself, with combination of aid from the
allies or successful defence when the ally’s help is forthcoming
3) to strengthen deterrence capability against attack on the ally
4) to prevent alliance or alignment between the partner and the rival
5) to exclude the possibility of attack by the partner
6) to reinforce influence on the partner

The Principal Costs of Alliances
1) the possibility of unnecessary assistance offered by the ally
2) the possibility of walking into a trap by the ally to participate in war
3) the possibility of a counter-alliance
4) to exhaust alternative alliance options.
5) to restrict freedom of action in order to cater to the needs of the ally

Maritime-led Coalitions against a Great Continental Power as a Traditional
Threat
In Sun Tzu’s phrase, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you
will never be in peril.” 57 When a state faces off against a great foe, it has to form wellbalanced alliances or coalitions, taking characteristic features of each member’s
geopolitical aspect and strategic culture into consideration, and focusing on wellbalanced combinations of landpower and seapower.

Rivalry between Sea Powers and Land Powers
So as to explain the significance and relations between seapower states and alliances or
coalitions, it is important to review a traditional, and the greatest, threat to maritime
states. It has been exceedingly unusual for a nation to attain military potential that
possesses both great maritime and continental power at the same time. Although
countries can be classified as being primarily sea powers or land powers, mostly they
56
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are both to some extent.58 Although the mid and late Roman Republic and then Empire,
and Byzantium in the tenth and early eleventh centuries could attain both first-class
seapower and landpower prior to the modern period, such cases are rare exceptions. 59 In
fact, two major land powers, France in the 1680s and Germany in the early 1900s
fleetingly achieved success in building formidable first-class navies in modern history.
For them, however, simultaneously maintaining great military power on land and at sea
was an empty dream. In practice, in those times, Britain changed its perception of the
principal enemy from the Dutch to the French, and from the French and Russians to the
Germans, due to aversions of the strengthening of the continental state’s navy, while
using a balance of power strategy and economic warfare enabled by the use of flexible
diplomacy; one of the special skills of a supreme maritime power. 60

Thus, any significant naval challenge led Britain to become increasingly hostile to the
rising sea power. 61 “The terms of dependence between sea power and land power are
always specific to the geostrategic condition of the adversaries and the political
character of the war as defined by the objectives of the belligerents.” 62 Britain had
enough power to be able to choose to develop significant landpower, and potentially
could survive and prosper even if a continental state achieved close to continental-based
hegemony. However, continental-based naval power on a broad scale in the long run
caused strategic problems, in both political-diplomatic and military terms. British
statesmen understood that continental hegemony would always be faced with a problem
with sustaining complementary naval power. 63 In modern times, at least, the outstanding
continental state of the day has failed to successfully promote the improvement of its
geo-strategic condition sufficient to secure a continental base for the building of a firstclass navy. 64 As a result, the most formidable states - that is, the great powers - can be
roughly classified into either category of being primarily a maritime or continental
power.
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According to Gray, the linkage relevant to seapower between rivalries of particular
states and coalitions has been influenced more by geopolitical background than
technological development. 65 In history, it is a well-known fact that major wars between
great maritime powers and great continental powers often broke out, since there has
been a traditional strong rivalry between geopolitically opposed powers. 66 Continental
states therefore often have had an intention to expand out into the sea, and maritime
states, on the other hand, have had the intention to contain the continental power’s
ability to exploit the sea strategically in order to protect their own maritime-based
interests, from the sea: “the great geographical realities remained: land power versus sea
power, heartland versus rimland, centre versus periphery, an individualistic Western
philosophy versus a collective Eastern doctrine rooted in a communal past.” 67

Because of the influence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the contemporary infestation of
pirates in some regions and globalization, there is a tendency to forget what the great
threat to a seapower state is, but historical rivalry between maritime and continental
states should not be passed over unnoticed. There are a number examples of sea power
versus land power relationships that have been identified as an historical pattern: for
example, Persia versus the Greeks, the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta,
Rome versus Carthage, the defence of the Byzantine Empire, the rise and fall of Venice,
England versus Spain, Britain versus France, the Crimean War, the American Civil War,
the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. 68 It has been
recorded in ancient, medieval and early modern history that continental powers
consistently attained enough power to control highly strategic coastal areas in the
Mediterranean, and thus to defeat maritime states. 69 Maritime powers such as Athens,
Carthage, Persia and Byzantium were defeated by continental powers such as Sparta,
Rome, Macedon, and Ottoman Turkey in ancient and medieval times; nevertheless,
Gray insists that these cases show how land powers learn to use the sea and threaten
maritime allies, so as to counterbalance and overcome a genuine seapower, rather than
65
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demonstrating any inherent advantage of landpower over seapower. 70

With the passage of time, the balance between landpower and seapower has altered
owing to drastic changes in technology and tactics witnessed over the past five centuries.
These changes have brought clear advantages to maritime-oriented powers as strategic
tools for defeating their land power antagonists. 71 In modern times, post-1500 AD, to
the contrary, great seapowers or sea-oriented coalitions have never lost a major war
against continental foes. 72 Actually, “the modern states-system has grown up on a
continent surrounded by the ocean.” 73 This environment favours maritime states. Also,
although it was possible for continental powers to attain the persistence of seapower
necessary to some extent to defeat its opponents, no land power state has been able to
adequately achieve an ability to seize an opponent’s centre of strategic gravity at sea
sufficient to win a major war against a maritime power.

Seapower as a Watershed
In spite of some drastic changes in transportation technologies in modern times,
superior seapower has made it possible for its possessors to form alliances to increase
total strategic capability in order to be able to confront the threats posed by an
opponent’s supreme continental power. 74 A sea power or a maritime coalition is
conferred considerable strategic advantages against a continental foe that cannot acquire
sufficient seapower. Sea powers can make use of the sea as a barrier, or as a highway
due to the global continuity of the sea that provides a tremendous mobility and agility
for navies and merchant shipping. 75

The sea has been a vital component of major wars in the modern era: “Although great
wars are usually fought and won on land, they are often decided at sea.” 76 On the
outcomes of wars between sea powers and land powers, Colin Gray comes to the
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following conclusion regarding maritime strategy: “First, a continental power can win a
war by securing military command at sea, by achieving sea denial, or even just
disputing command at sea very vigorously.” 77 In light of history, a continental power
has often shown the capability to develop or rent (via allies or clients) a quality and
quantity of naval power sufficient to prevail over a maritime opponent in war. But
unless badly damaged or defeated through a naval battle, seapowers generally would not
lose such wars. 78 Second, Gray argues, “for a sea power or a maritime-dependent
coalition, command at sea provides the strategic conditions indispensable for success in
war.” 79 As it turned out, whichever state was able to achieve its own sufficient level of
sea control marked a particular watershed in major wars. The key strategic factor of war
between a sea power and a land power is thus the battle over command of the sea, which
is “an indispensable enabler for eventual victory in war as whole.” 80 Although airpower
and spacepower have emerged in the modern age, the essential elements of geopolitics
are always landpower and seapower, the finisher and the enabler in war.

Continental Ally
Traditionally, sea power states have needed alliances or coalitions formed and sustained
by the advantages of maintaining the capability for sea control. Building an effective
maritime coalition is the key to success for sea powers in wars against great power
opponents – or even against lesser powers such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – as well as
being able to attain sufficient sea control. Nevertheless, even though genuine maritime
coalitions could indirectly weaken powerful continental foes from sea, in such a great
war, it is usually necessary to apply more direct strategic pressure to defeat a great
continental state. 81 Against a great continental power or coalition, without land power
allies, sea powers can never finish the powerful continental rival. In history, both
leading maritime and continental powers have sought allies with the opposing geostrategic potential, taking the geopolitical context of the conflict into consideration. 82
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In war, therefore, as argued by Gray, superior maritime power has been, “the great
enabler.” However, it has not been “the finisher” for the final victory: “maritime
command is more a facilitator than a concluding executor”. 83 Actually, one of the most
significant reasons for building up a powerful navy is for maritime power projection.
This does not deliver a decisive blow, because as long as human beings have been
living on land, war requires decisive action by land forces to bring it to a genuine
conclusion. 84 Politically, geographically and strategically, everything starts from land
and comes to an end on land. Accordingly, “Sea power more often needs land power to
conclude a war successfully than land power needs sea power.” 85 As a result, it would
be unusual for seapower alone to successfully produce enough power to conclude a
great war. 86 From the lessons of history, in order to reach the decisive centre of gravity
in war against a great opponent of the opposing geopolitical environment, both sea
powers and land powers have had to promote the formation of alliances with states or
groups of states possessing a similar geopolitical environment as the rival power. 87 In
order to achieve victories, each side must be driven by necessity to seek mixed
strategies containing prerequisite maritime and continental components. This has been
an essential factor for defeating the rival. 88 Through battles at sea, great sea powers can
be defeated, and through battles on land, great land powers can be defeated. 89

Sea powers need a “rear continental state” that supports the sea power ally, not only to
deliver a decisive blow to the land power opponent, but also to play the role of
“distracter.” 90 Historical experience has shown that a rear continental state would “tip
the balance of power against the aspiring hegemon and keep it occupied in an expensive
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ground war.” 91 Such a rear-continental distracter ally has been experienced in AngloAmerican history: Burgundy against France, Austria against France, Prussia against
France, Russia against Germany, and, in the 1970s and 1980s, and China against the
Soviet Union. 92 For land powers, other land powers have always been natural enemies.
Especially, a great land power has always been the greatest threat to other adjacent land
powers because of either an aggressive character or the limited strategic distances
between them. However, the dominant land power has always tended to expand it naval
power for the ambition of exploiting seapower. It is no wonder that this behaviour
strongly alarms not only maritime states but also other continental states. On the other
hand, a great maritime power’s business usually depends on a global, mutual maritime
interdependence network system among littoral states for the conduct of economic
activity, and her flexible strategic tool of seapower often easily attracts potential allies,
regardless of whether they may be land or sea powers. However, it has to be
remembered that the leading maritime state itself often must take a risk to conclude war
through land battles. There is no easy way to finish war against a great continental foe. 93

Maritime Coalition-Building against Various Threats
Ocean Space as Seeds of Strife
Historically, human beings have attempted to expand territory to seize land, which
generates wealth and power, and which can be exploited to further promote expansion
through the use of advance bases and fortresses. That is why continental powers often
have traditional rivalries due to fighting over territory. Meanwhile, in previous times,
the ocean used to provide a natural castle wall for island states. Afterwards, as the
evolution of ships continued into the mechanical and industrial ages, marine
transportation came to play a central role in economic development and in power
projection. The sea has been used mainly as the most useful measure of transformation.
However, today, it contains diverse aspects, not only as a natural barrier and an
international highway, but also as a contested arena used to seize, or at least to claim,
marine resources or disputed islands. As a result, maritime states also often have
become involved in international disputes over national interests involving marine
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resources and territorial features in the maritime realm. Currently, some littoral states
have shown signs of a willingness to go to war for their maritime interests, as
continental powers have done on land.

In fact, although maritime cooperation to secure the network of commerce transported
by shipping amongst “liberal free traders” has been a desirable condition, maritime
transportation often has become the target in war. The global maritime transportation
system has thus been both a strategic tool offering the advantages of flexibility and
convenience to sea powers, and an extremely fragile network that navies have to
defend. 94

In the modern era, to make matters worse, situations at sea have been made more
complicated and troublesome by a great number of conflicts within or about maritime
theatres. It is undeniable that there is a strong possibility that conflicts could break out
due to interests relevant to seapower among littoral states, regardless of whether they
are maritime or continental-dependent powers. In addition, threats from non-state
actors have become prevalent in our present time. Seeds of strife within some maritime
theatres have been growing and gradually reaching potentially crisis proportions. There
are a large number of threats, which maritime coalitions mainly have to deal with as
follows: 95 threats from disputes among nations over territorial waters due to the rising
value of seabed resources and the rising value of waters as a food resource; the
growing strategic significance of sea areas for power projection, sea bases and naval
battles; the rising challenges to international law; pollution damaging national assets;
the introduction of new technologies; the administrative and legal disputes over
excusive economic zones, international straits and territorial seas; and non-state threats
upon the oceans such as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal
immigration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Such threats could be regarded as potential causes of serious conflicts, which should be
removed through cooperation among littoral states as much as possible. Regardless of
whether challenges are posed by traditional, state-based threats or newly-emerged
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threats, maritime states need to build strong alliance or coalition networks in order to
be able to either confront or prevent/avoid the menaces. Besides, the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention has made maritime security complicated with the establishment of
maritime zones and, as a consequence, a large number of often contested coastal state
regulations, which has resulted in littoral and maritime states being drawn into serious
disputes. Therefore, in order to counter non-traditional threats, every possible means
should be employed through international cooperation, including maritime coalition
building.

Maritime Coalition Building
To ease tensions among coastal states and secure confidence-building measures,
maritime forces who respond to emergency situations themselves have to consider needs
to enhance dialogue, increase exchanges of personnel and information, create
transparency, and promote habits of cooperation. 96 Taking these aspects into account,
they have to lay out situations for naval cooperation and coalition building during
“normal” times, i.e., for peacetime operations. In fact, as stated clearly by Ken Booth:
“warships have always had more than a fighting function”. 97 Chris Rahman argues that
there are three interrelated rationales for naval cooperation:

naval cooperation can be a confidence-building measure (CBM); a means of
improving standardization between navies in order to facilitate basic and
benign operational cooperation; and a means of building naval coalitions to
undertake more complex combined maritime operations, or at least to
enhance interoperability to the extent that coalition maritime operations can
be conducted on an ad hoc basis when necessary. 98
For instance, interoperability actually makes effective maritime cooperation possible,
hence navies have to regularly conduct adequate and efficient education and training.
Through enhancement of cooperative habits, procedures and interoperability, a more
enduring maritime coalition could be formed. Rahman states, “Such activities have been
described as ‘building blocks’ towards the goal of achieving higher levels of security
96

Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific:
Status and Prospect, Working Paper No. 7, Royal Australian Navy, Sea Power centre and Centre for
Maritime Policy, October 2001, p. 7.
97
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 26.
98
Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific, p. 7.

41

cooperation, which hopefully might contribute to the creation of a more secure strategic
environment.” 99

According to Rahman, there exist Levels of Naval Cooperation and Types of Naval
Cooperation regarding maritime coalition building in the maritime arena of Southeast
Asia and the Southwest Pacific. 100 In terms of an inward effect, confidence-building
through the formation of a maritime coalition would be enhanced by maritime
cooperation divided into several stages, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4 below.
Maritime operations and cooperation between navies might contribute to coalition
building and thus also the building of political confidence. Navies have to meet a
requirement for operational cooperation by sharing significant levels of equipment
standardization and common standard operating procedures (SOPs). Efforts toward
confidence-building through joint naval drills and exchanges make combined operations
workable. Five levels of standardization facilitate procedural, doctrinal or technical
cooperation for combined operations such as coordination, compatibility, interoperability,
interchangeability, and commonality, and there exist four types of naval cooperation:
combat operations; constabulary operations; benign application of maritime power
operations; and enabling and/or facilitative cooperation. 101

Although coalition building often is a response against external threats, Geoffrey Till
discusses the idea that there are two types of maritime coalition and naval roles. 102
According to Till, “national navies” are for sea control and power projection as
traditional maritime roles to cope with crisis and conflicts, related to other state actors.
This type involves traditional formal alliance relationships, for example, NATO and
the U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries. 103 Meanwhile,
“collective navies” are focused on missions to counter non-traditional maritime threats,
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and non-state actors, such as piracy, sea robbery, trafficking, terrorism, humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and environmental protection roles. Both types of maritime
coalition are able to contribute to the safety of the sea ways, regional stability, and to
the restraint of threats. 104 In short, through forming a maritime coalition, nations take
advantageous effects at the same time as contributing to confidence-building within the
coalition and responding to threats from outside of the coalition, such as a formidable
continental power or lesser, non-state actors.
Table 3. Levels of Naval Cooperation

105

ALLIANCES
Allied nations have the highest degree of political commitment and operate across the entire span of
maritime operations, including the highest level of training and interoperability, and encompassing
war-fighting and other combat missions.
COALITIONS
Coalition members are required to carry out some degree of political commitment and objectives,
even though they do not necessarily share completely common aims. Coalitions without the same
level of mutual commitment and world-views are classified into formal types formed by treaties or
informal types.
NON-COALITION NAVAL COOPERATION
This level of naval cooperation mainly consists of cooperation among navies without a guiding
security framework of coalitions or alliances. In such cooperation, without any specific common
political or strategic objectives, there is a trend toward focusing on either non-controversial issue
areas or on basic interoperability requirements to facilitate cooperation in benign or constabulary
missions.
MARITIME COOPERATION
In this form of naval cooperation, benign or constabulary operations are conducted by maritime
forces, including coast guards, in normal conditions.

Table 4. Types of Naval Cooperation
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COMBAT OPERATIONS
Combat Operations at or from the sea
CONSTABULARY OPERATIONS
Peacekeeping
Peacemaking
Mine countermeasures (MCM)
Sanctions enforcement
Surveillance and intelligence sharing
Natural resources protection and enforcement
Anti-piracy and maritime boundary patrols
BENIGN APPLICATION OF MARITIME POWER OPERATIONS
Non-combatant evacuation operations
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
Search and Rescue (SAR)
ENABLING AND/OR FACILITATIVE COOPERATION
Exercises
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) and common doctrine
Maritime information databases
Marine scientific research
Provision of matériel
Personnel exchanges, education, and training
INCSEA agreements
Multilateral forums and conferences
Ports visits/fleet reviews/senior personnel visits

The United States as the Leader of the Maritime Coalition
The Leading Power of the Maritime Coalition
The vast extent of water covering the Earth cannot be fully controlled by a single power,
even by a “super” sea power, owing to the large number of actual or potential threats,
unfamiliar surroundings, the progress of technology, the great financial burden and the
restrictions of sea laws. Sea power states tend to share fundamental common values as
national identities, such as democracy and a free market economy, often shaped by
common historical experiences. Without doubt, sharing political traditions serves to
make alliances and coalitions closer and endure longer. Following an alliance-based
national strategy clearly has been essential for maritime-dependent states. For such
states, developing navy-to-navy relations as a part of naval diplomacy is actually an
indispensable part of the glue with which to develop the bonds of alliances and
coalitions. Ultimately, every single naval officer and sailor is an essential diplomat for
national strategy.
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Strategic influence derived from the promotion of confidence-building and cooperative
relations between navies cannot be overestimated. Obviously, the relations among
maritime states always tend towards strategic interdependence because of the features of
the sea in a geopolitical sense, in regard to sharing the global ocean space, and it is
preferable in view of the national profits to be earned from maintaining a free and open
seaborne trading system. In naval cooperation within maritime coalitions, the degree of
interoperability with the leading maritime power’s navy for combined operations
between the coalition partners can be crucial, since the success of the coalition depends
on the leadership of the strongest state, with the most advanced naval technology. It is
also important for allies or coalition members to be able to gain confidence in the
capabilities of the leading sea power. A low level of interoperability and a huge gap in
naval capabilities within coalitions would create a burden for the great maritime power
and the coalition itself, and actually limit potential cooperation. It is important that
lesser sea power states are capable of receiving the many valuable security benefits
offered by membership of alliances with the leading sea power, described in the four
points below:

1) The greatest sea power has tended to possess state-of-the-art science and technology
which can be integrated into its naval power for tactical, operational and, potentially,
strategic advantage. In modern warfare, needless to say, technological superiority has
important implications for the outcome of any combat in the maritime environment.
Cooperation with a great seapower in the development of weaponry and the licence of
technology cannot be overestimated for lesser seapower states.

2) Maritime hegemonic states have tended to have the capability to manage information
and intelligence based on huge maritime networks. 107 As result, by aligning with the
pre-eminent maritime power means to enjoy an advantage in modern warfare, especially,
in moral warfare, information warfare, and strategic psychological warfare. For instance,
at its height the British maritime empire connected its naval bases through an imperial
cable communications network. It made an immeasurable contribution to British
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maritime dominion. 108 The French government in 1900 stated that “England owes her
influence in the world perhaps more to her cable communications than to her navy. She
controls the news, and makes it serve her policy and commerce in marvellous
manner.” 109

3) Maritime coalitions led by the greatest sea power can respond collectively to the
challenge of a continental power which has an ambition to exploit seapower to attain
wealth and regional or global hegemony. Moreover, such coalitions can ease tensions
among member countries and counter threats by non-state actors, through confidencebuilding brought by naval cooperation and diplomacy together with the superior
maritime power. The leadership of the supreme sea power is essential to solidify the
participation of other players.

4) The greatest sea power can play the main role to secure the world’s sea lane network.
In short, it often possesses the power to strongly influence other maritime-dependent
countries. Depending on the circumstance, it is highly unlikely that lesser members of a
maritime coalition dependent on using global sea lanes would have their maritime
interests seriously damaged if the dominant sea power is fully engaged with the
protection of the system.

Such advantages would prompt many countries to conclude and maintain an alliance
with a great maritime power. In view of such purposes, maritime powers have to
carefully strive to make various contributions to the alliance with the leading power as
the pillar of the coalition, and to deal flexibly with the security circumstances. The
success of maritime-oriented coalitions depends on how much the supreme sea power
and lesser sea powers can cooperate for the protection of their common interests,
including from a geo-strategic competitor, at all times.

The United States as the Greatest Sea Power
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Colin Gray states that Rome was historically a rare state that possessed both first-class
seapower and landpower for a while 110; and that in the contemporary world, America is
a super state that possesses first-class strategic capabilities across all strategic
environments, such as seapower, landpower, airpower, spacepower, cyberpower and
nuclearpower. 111 It is probably only natural that some attempt to compare the United
Staes, the only super power in the modern world, with the Roman Empire which built
the Pax Romana. The key factor for the growth of both super powers was actually their
geographical condition, including being surrounded by ocean. 112 According to Gray,
however, a champion of naval power, the United States is far removed from being a
“natural” sea power. Notwithstanding that America is an isolated nation owing to weak
adjacent countries and the fact that in modern warfare Americans have demonstrated an
inclination to favour airpower and “air-mindedness” to some degree, the vast territory of
the United States leads its people to possess a continentalist’s disposition and strategic
point of view. The United States is the biggest trading nation in the world, maintained
by marine transportation for the most part. Hence, the ability to secure its sea lines of
communication (SLOC) is critically significant for the United States and the rest of
world, yet still “The American people have little direct and obvious connection with
ships and have less and less personal experience of maritime travel on the social
dimension to strategy; that continuing trend is not helpful to public understanding of the
importance of their stake in order at sea.” 113 The United States can thus be viewed as an
“artificial sea power”.

In the strict sense, the definition of a seapower state is one that has a long coastline and
heavily depends for its security and economic well-being on the sea, and includes a
navy of sufficient might to secure its maritime interests (or at least has membership in a
maritime coalition which can do so), and a body politic with requisite maritime
understanding and consciousness. 114
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America’s geographical circumstances enable the United States to access other regions
via both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its landward neighbouring countries, Canada
and Mexico, are no match for the United States: “In the north a weak Canada, in the
south a weak Mexico, in the east fish and in the west fish.” 115 Thus, most of its trading
and strategic communications have had to have been based on seapower. Consequently
it has global interests in spite of the strategic distance of most of the world’s populations
and landmasses from the U.S. homeland. Hence the United States pursues a national
strategy logically based on overseas presence and power projection capabilities in order
to protect its national interests all over the world, as well as those of its allies, clients
and partners. 116

The Road to Becoming the Supreme Sea Power
In 1890, although the number of American soldiers and sailors were only half that of
Japan, 117 then Captain Mahan wrote, “whether they will or no, Americans must now
begin to look outward”. 118 A new rising nation led by President Theodore Roosevelt
sought not only wealth and power, but also the naval capability that also often follows
such ambitions. Since then, this maritime-dependent country with its vast territory
radically advanced its policy of increasing national power and focused on enhancing its
seapower. Under Roosevelt, America deployed the “Great White Fleet”, which voyaged
around the world from 1907 to 1909, stopping in Japan on the way in order to make a
show of its national might. Following the conclusion of the First World War, America,
which had become the world’s second greatest naval power, succeeded in making
Britain renounce the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as part of the post-War settlement
process which resulted in the Washington Treaty on naval arms limitation. Eventually,
in 1940, when Britain was under the threat of German invasion, the United States took
over the role as the global offshore balancer from the British, 119 and then used its
greatly expanded wartime seapower to defeat Imperial Japan, which had endangered
and eventually attacked U.S. interests in the Pacific region. Directly after the War, in
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1946, the U.S. Navy could boast almost six million tons of ships and possessed about 70
per cent of the world’s ships that were 1,000 tons or larger. 120

Conditions for Supremacy
The United States continues to maintain the capacity to meet the requirements for
maritime super power. Economic power is a source of strength that produces land
power, seapower, airpower, and spacepower, comprising the many fruits of
technological prowess, developed by a large defence budget in comparison to all other
states, to fight a desperate game for leadership and survival in this modern world. In
terms of its economic power, America accounts for around 30 per cent of the global
product, even though the U.S. population accounts for only about 4.6 per cent of the
world population. 121

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still maintains competence and potential
in some components of national strength, mainly certain high technologies and nuclear
armaments. However, in the case of the United States, not only its navy, but all aspects
of U.S. conventional and nuclear military forces are exceptionally capable. These are
based on the fruit of by far the most advanced technology applied to the security and
strategic sectors, such as intelligence gathering, air-to-air combat, precision strike
warfare, carrier and submarine operations, amphibious operations, armoured combat
and special operations. 122 Furthermore, U.S. administrations have continued to supply
financial resources to maintain the capability for naval mastery, even though other
NATO countries have squeezed defence budgets to adapt to the post- Cold War
circumstances. In fact, though only the U.S. Navy was ranked as a first-class navy, or
“Major Global Force Projection Navy” by Grove in 1990, 123 even in the post-Cold War
era, the U.S. naval budget is over U.S.$100 billion every year. U.S. military spending
was over 40 percent of the world’s military expenditure in 2009 124 ; and the U.S.
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military budget for fiscal year 2010 totals U.S.$663.8 billion,125 and that of the U.S.
Navy U.S.$171.7 billion. 126

Paul Kennedy also explains several reasons why American empire has been qualified to
possess formidable seapower: the United States holds dockyards which can produce the
biggest and best warships in the world; there are a great number of expert engineers and
craftsmen; it has been a country rich in resources; and its geographical circumstances
allow U.S. armed forces access to other region. 127 In terms of gross domestic product
(GDP), the European Union (EU) as whole exceeds that of the United States, but it is
impossible for EU member governments to collectively spend such an enormous
amount of their budgets on their armed forces, including their navies. Furthermore, it
cannot be said that the European Union, consisting of a number of nations, is a
monolithic entity with the internal solidarity of a nation state. Besides, compared with
the United States, it lacks the shipbuilding facilities to produce the greatest of warships
such as U.S.-style 100,000 ton nuclear powered super carriers. 128
The U.S. Navy has about 945 ships and craft of all kinds, 129 including 286 deployable
warships, 130 totalling approximately six million tons. 131 Remarkably, the U.S. battle
fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined in terms of tonnage, and eleven of those
navies are its allies. 132 Moreover, geo-strategically, there are a great number of U.S.
naval bases or facilities across the world such as Yokosuka in Japan, Singapore, Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Hawaii, and Guam, which
enables its forces to operate as a truly global, power projection navy. The U.S.
government carefully makes diplomatic efforts to maintain these bases as long as
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possible in order to sustain the global seapower network based on its maritime alliances
and coalitions, and its power projection capability. Fundamentally, it cannot be too
strongly emphasized that the United States became a super state through fully using the
characteristics and potential of seapower as the core of its global influence making.
America’s global influence is thus maintained by enhancing global reach from and at
the sea. Seapower is a strategic tool that has continued to evolve and will continue to do
so into future, as its importance only grows as the twenty-first century unfolds. 133

The Aircraft Carrier and Power Projection Capability
Any state in the modern world that intends to play a role of global power with the
ability to engage strategically across continents is required to possess a globally
capable, blue-water navy, including a serious power projection capability. Aircraft
carriers have long since replaced the battleship’s position as the “capital ship” of major
navies. 134 The aircraft carrier is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “A
warship designed to support and operate aircraft, engage in attacks on targets afloat or
ashore, and engage in sustained operations in support of other forces.” 135 Aircraft
carriers play a vital role to protect the fleet and provide support for amphibious
operations. 136

The status of the aircraft carrier was raised as aircraft cruising capacity and assault
capability were improved. As a result, the earlier shortcomings of aircraft such as the
small action radius and flight duration were overcome, thus enabling carrier-equipped
navies to provide airpower strike capability over long distances. 137 The emergence of
the aircraft carrier changed naval tactics and strategy through the transformation in
mobility, speed and striking power. In terms of power projection capability, the power
of a U.S. carrier battle group is the symbol of its naval mastery. Nuclear powered U.S.
carriers do not require refuelling at sea and have brought tremendous endurance and
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flexibility to America’s worldwide maritime strategy across the world ocean. 138 As a
result, the influence of their power projection capability is incredible. 139 This is limited
not only to the striking power of the aircraft carrier itself, but extends to the
capabilities of the escort ships, including nuclear submarines, which also possess
dreadful offensive strength with their cruise missile attack capability. According to
Kennedy, the carrier USS Enterprise, operating off the Persian Gulf in 2002, loaded 70
aircraft and was accompanied by fifteen vessels and 14,300 officers and sailors. The
cost of constructing such a flotilla might equate to about U.S. $20 billion, an amount
equal to Italy’s entire defence budget. 140

Meanwhile, the problem with aircraft carriers gives rise to heated debate because of
their cost and potential vulnerability to air and submarine attack. 141 In order to solve
the expense problem, the United States had a plan to develop the so-called “arsenal
ship” that was to be capable of delivering large quantities of sea-launched missiles.
The development programme, however, eventually was abandoned because the U.S.
Navy decided that aircraft carriers were still a superior option in terms of costefficiency and tactical flexibility. 142 Additionally, in most cases, a Ticonderoga-class
guided missile cruiser and two Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers, each equipped
with a high performance and costly Aegis combat system involving sensors such as
powerful radars and combat management computers and software, 143 are deployed as
part of a U.S. Carrier Strike Group (CSG). Only the U.S. Navy is able to develop such
a remarkably advanced weapon system and possess such a large number of Aegis ships
(around 80). Among these platforms, aircraft carriers, in particular, remain the symbol
of the navy, and U.S. aircraft carriers overwhelm other countries’ carriers in terms the
number, size, and capability. 144 The U.S. Navy currently possesses by far the largest
aircraft carriers and eleven CSGs.
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U.S. National Interests and Concerns in the Asia-Pacific Region
National Interests
Since the eighteenth century, U.S national interests have been tied up with the AsiaPacific region. 145 In our time, there are several aspects vital to American national
interests: to defend its homeland, citizens, military forces abroad, and interests; to
prevent, deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon attacks
on U.S. interests; to ensure U.S. allies’ survival and their cooperation with the United
States; to prevent development of hostile powers or failed states; to ensure the stability
of the global system, including international trade, financial markets, supplies of energy
and the environment; to create constructive relations, which meet U.S. interests, with
powers that might turn into strategic opponents. 146 Indeed, the contents of this list has
been applied to U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific region: “With half the world’s
population, one-third of the global economy, and growing economic, financial,
technological, and political weight in the international system, Asia is key to a stable,
prosperous world order that best advances American interests”. 147 Asia accounts for 27
per cent of total U.S. merchandise trade and the amount of two-way trade between Asia
and the United States annually is about U.S.$1 trillion. 148

The Strategic Chokepoints
Naval capabilities compensate for the disadvantages of America’s distance from the
most strategically vital parts of the world, where most of its allies and strategic interests
lie, especially around the rimlands of the Eurasian super-continent. As national blood
vessels of military power and marine transportation, the U.S. government has termed
eight international regions “U.S. Lifelines and Transit Regions”: the Gulf of Mexico
and Caribbean Sea, along with the Panama Canal; the North Sea and Baltic Sea,
including the associated channels and straits; the Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea,
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along with the Strait of Gibraltar and access routes to the Middle Eastern areas; the
western Indian Ocean, along with the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz,
and the waters around South Africa (Cape of Good Hope) to the Mozambique Channel;
the Southeast Asian seas, including the Malacca and Lombok straits, among others, as
well as the SLOC that pass the Spratly Islands; the Northeast Asian seas, SLOC
important for access to Japan, Korea, China, and Russia; the southwest Pacific,
including SLOC access routes to Australia; and the Arctic Ocean and Bering Strait. 149
Many of these regions overlap with sea areas of the Asia-Pacific region and act as
crucial chokepoints. In recent years, serious concerns seem to have affected U.S.
regional interests and strategy. Principally, two concerns can be identified which impact
upon regional stability in the current era, and each of these have a direct influence on
American strategy and the efficacy of its seapower.

Two Concerns
The first American concern in the region has been with the rise of China, which seems
to be a growing continental power that may pose a traditional threat to maritime states,
and which has radically increased its influence on regional countries as a result of its
growing economic strength and naval power. There is great potential for China to create
regional conflict, over a number of separate issues. Among them, most importantly, the
issue of conflict across the Taiwan Strait should be regarded as a serious strategic issue
for the United States, and the Strait can be considered an important chokepoint located
in the key position in the “first island chain” running opposite the East Asian mainland,
should war ever break out with China. 150 In the Asia-Pacific region, however, Taiwan is
not the only issue of potential danger, there are also several other serious strategic
problems, such as North Korea’s missile strategy and nuclear development, and disputes
over islands and marine resources such as those in the East and South China Seas.

However, these concerns all relate to China in one way or another, and mostly, are
directly or indirectly relevant to the balance of seapower for regional security. For the
United States, as the leading sea power and principal ally-protector for Japan and many
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other states in the Asia-Pacific region, the advent of China’s initial assertions of
regional hegemony, including the development of an increasingly formidable navy
which could break the continental-maritime balance, is unacceptable. As the only global
power, the United States cannot be indifferent to any major continental state which
attempts to either extend its rule over the Eurasian continent or expand its power
seaward to challenge the U.S. maritime defence system around any region of the
Eurasian rimland, including the rimlands of Asia. A maritime state cannot submit to
domination by a growing land power with an expanding navy over such crucial sea
areas. 151 China’s exploitation of seapower has directly had a harmful influence on allies,
above all Japan, which depends completely on the alliance with the United States for its
security. The United States has thus been required to protect maritime allies from
threats brought about by the rise of China because such a situation is directly connected
to U.S. interests and national strategy to dominate the world ocean. 152

The other menace has been the threat to maritime security by less easily defined sources,
such as terrorism, piracy and natural disasters, which may require cooperation with
other nations to overcome. Although America has near invincible power in terms of
conventional warfare capabilities, but still even for the super power, it is extremely
difficult to counter such vague, unconventional foes and threats and “non-traditional”
security challenges. In terms of national power, it may be no exaggeration to say that
the United States has reached the peak of its power and has more or less managed to
maintain it. However, the world’s security environment has completely changed since
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There are diverse threats which have to be countered by a
brand new concept, more flexible than Mahan’s ideas of large fleet actions in major
naval warfare. Consequently, unlike the maritime strategy during the Cold War, the
aftermath of 9/11 has required the development of a new strategy to highlight the
prevention of war as well as the winning of war, and of maintaining good order upon
the oceans and in the world’s littorals. This strategy has not been aimed at defeating
particular state opponents. 153
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The United States and the Maritime Coalition
In order to protect its interests, prevent conflicts and prepare to counter enemies in the
Asia-Pacific region, the United States has been attempting to enhance the capabilities of
U.S. forces, mainly by the deployment to the region of long-rang strike capability,
streamlined and consolidated headquarters and a network of access. 154 The overseas
presence requires secure infrastructure for security matters. Permanent overseas basing
with armed forces is crucial. As a consequence, allies as friendly hosts have been vital
for U.S. national strategy. 155 “It bears reemphasizing: Our military forces, both forward
deployed and based at home, are only part of our military capability. Another part is
rooted in the network of alliances and security relationships we have created with other
nations.” 156

The maritime coalition has to be organized from strategic players in the region by the
conduct of U.S. national strategy, as it is the greatest sea power that always can take the
initiative to choose and organize allies. No matter how this is done, its alliance strategy
is really vital. Former Australian Defence Minister (and current Ambassador to the
United States), Kim Beazley, has asserted that a member of the U.S. San Francisco
alliance system is simply unable to find any other regional or bilateral alliance strategy
superior to the existing security framework. 157 The coalition composed of maritime
states is the basis of the alliance strategy for the United States. The leader of the
coalition has to have the strategic and diplomatic flexibility to bring new members into
the system when necessary, considering the geopolitical context of the maritime alliance
strategy.

According to Lawrence Prabhakar, currently, the U.S. government is attempting to
enhance the capability of the alliance network through three measures: selling U.S. arms
and helping “transformation” in order to strengthen alliance capabilities in partners such
as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and Singapore; assistance to develop greater
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interoperability of U.S. forces with its counterparts in Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Thailand and the Philippines for the sake of maturing combined operations; constructing
access points in the allied states that would allow U.S. marine and air expeditionary
forces to be efficiently deployed and to fully use naval and air striking power for littoral
dominance in a difficult situation. 158 The Asia-Pacific region is becoming less stable
due to increasing challenges to the mature U.S. security framework, especially those
posed by China in the maritime-littoral security arena. For the United States, its allies
and friendly nations, there are real advantages provided by strengthening the U.S.-led
maritime coalition as an axis of the sum total of combined (that is to say, multinational)
maritime might. Building the maritime-dependent coalition is thus the best strategy
against the various threats facing the region.

The main players to ensure the endurance of the coalition must be navies due to the
maritime nature of the region. Only the United States, as the greatest maritime power
which can exert overwhelming influence on other country’s navies and maritime
strategies, is able to exercise leadership of the maritime coalition by promoting naval
cooperation. The U.S. Navy regularly conducts combined maritime drills and operations
with almost every nation’s navy at various levels, many of which adopt the same or
similar concepts and procedures to those of the U.S. Navy. Almost every navy, even
including Russia and China, sends senior naval representatives to the biannual
International Sea Power Symposium held at the U.S. Naval War College. 159 In addition,
the U.S. Navy supplies technology and armaments to friendly navies or develops
advanced systems with allies. These activities have enhanced the interoperability of the
United States with a great number of countries around the world. 160 Also, as described
by Sam Tangredi: “Like the U.S. dollar in international commerce and the use of the
English language in the development of information technology, the U.S. Navy has
become the benchmark and dominant standard for all things naval.” 161
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Only the United States can afford the cost of preserving the extensive logistic capability
for an ocean going fleet and of attaining (and maintaining) advanced naval technologies
to make a fleet adapt to the modern world. 162 That is why only U.S. naval power has
had the capability to forge agreement in, and to lead, maritime coalitions for the
procurement of common profits in terms of strategic stability and improved maritime
security. The greatest maritime power, like the United States, must take necessary
measures for the prevention of a continental state’s ambition aimed at exploiting
seapower and posing new threats to regional stability. As noted earlier, to defeat an
aggressive land power, a sea power needs not only maritime friends, but also a
continental power’s cooperation as a land power strategic partner. The United States
actually has enough diplomatic power to win a land power over to its side and to site its
bases in a coalition land power’s territory. To defeat non-traditional threats, the United
States and maritime states need a new maritime coalition, including rivals, with a new
concept such as a newly-emerged maritime coalition based on Till’s “collective navies”
idea, not a traditional maritime coalition as “national navies”. These are key factors to
the success of coalitions established for quite different purposes.

The New Maritime Strategy
The new world situation has urgently required the United States to develop a much
more delicate and flexible strategy in order to cope with the innovative features of
newly-emerged challenges, mainly from non-state actors. In this case, the battlegrounds
would include “ungoverned” maritime zones accounting for a substantial portion of the
world’s marine geographical situation. It is undoubtedly tough to precisely predict how
maritime terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug
trafficking might actually interact with one other. There are four distinct features of the
new American joint maritime strategy, the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. 163 Firstly, the new strategy emphasizes closer cooperation between the
maritime forces of the United States and those of other countries as much as possible.
Secondly, unlike its strategy during the Cold War, not only the winning of war, but also
the prevention of war has been regarded as an important target, including preventing the
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development of non-state threats. Thirdly, the new strategy has a special emphasis on
“soft power” such as humanitarian assistance and the protection and promotion of
economic activities, as well as “hard power” for naval battles. Fourthly, the strategy has
not expressed any concern over Chinese naval expansion, although the necessity of
deploying more aircraft carriers and submarines to the western Pacific was stated clearly
in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in view of the concern about China’s
naval expansion. 164 The new concept of the maritime strategy seems to consider the
participation of rivals in at least some cooperative activities. There are three main
reasons that lead to United States to push ahead with such a global cooperative
framework: the globalization of the world economy, with marine shipping at its centre;
new vulnerabilities exposed by non-state threats; and dramatic advances in technology,
especially information technology. 165

Admiral Michael Mullen and the 1,000-Ship Navy
Currently, American naval capability can provide extraordinary readiness to enable its
forces to dispatch for various activities, operations and exercises. In spite of this, the
United States further focuses on increasing the flexibility and agility of the navy rather
than the combat strength of its conventional carrier battle and amphibious groups. 166 To
deeply integrate U.S. maritime forces and enhance international maritime cooperation,
the concept of the “1,000-ship Navy”, advocated initially by then U.S. Chief of Naval
Operations (and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Admiral Michael Mullen,
in August 2005, has been promoted. The concept of the 1,000-ship Navy reflects the
features of the new strategy well. The 1,000-ship Navy, now renamed the Global
Maritime Partnership initiative, is promoted as a voluntary global maritime network,
without formal legal or encumbering ties, which is to include maritime forces, port
operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and non-governmental
agencies, working cooperatively in order to increase the level of security and safety in
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the international maritime sphere. 167 The main objectives of the concept are to protect
SLOC and to prevent terrorism. This concept can be categorized as a form of “collective
navies” coalition; a type of informal “coalition of the willing”, the reflection of an
idealistic view of the Global Maritime Partnership as a form of collective security. 168

Admiral Mullen stated the different roles for and challenges of the U.S. Navy in the
following terms: “Balanced to face the challenges of our age: Piracy, drug smuggling,
transport of weapons of mass destruction over the high seas, exploitation of economic
rights, organized crime, and yes, terrorism. As well as not taking our eye off the
requirement for major combat operations.” 169 The U.S. Navy has evolved since the end
of the Cold War to operate in the green and brown water areas, in addition to the
traditional blue water emphasis, but Mullen understands that no matter how formidable
the U.S. Navy is in size, there are limits to what a single power can accomplish.
“Despite differences in size or structure of our navies, cooperation today is more
necessary than ever before. And cooperation is growing, but we need more - much
more.” 170

As a feature of seapower, beyond doubt, this global maritime network is not only for
security, but also for the promotion of economic growth and political networking. 171 As
the only global blue-water navy, the U.S. Navy is able to take the initiative in building
the naval cooperative framework with other maritime nation’s support, including
leaders of shipping industries. 172 Mullen listed ten principles considered for the Global
Maritime Partnership initiative: respect for national sovereignty; participation and
cooperation for common interests; focusing on security in the maritime domain,
including ports, harbours, territorial waters, maritime approaches, the high seas,
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international straits, and seams between them; the significance of all participants and
each member’s capabilities; the involvement of a variety of players consisting of navies,
coast guards, shipping companies, and a variety of governmental agencies and nongovernmental actors; the significance of assistance for less capable nations or navies;
active requests by nations or navies that need assistance; developing regional maritime
networks; sharing information; and the imperative need for the cooperation in spite of
the necessity of protracted effort. 173

Hurdles to Overcome
According to Ronald Ratcliff, there are some problems to overcome for the sake of
building the Global Maritime Partnership initiative: hostility among rivals, capability
for responses to specific circumstances, confusion caused by relations between domestic
and international law governing the seas, and the difficulty of communication. 174
According to Ratcliff, “Nothing in this list in new, but the world’s navies have yet to
find ways to resolve them.” 175 Actually, naval officers have had to face similar
problems since earlier times. One time Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral of the Fleet
Chester W. Nimitz, stated the following about multinational naval doctrine:
different supply specifications, difference communications, lack of
common language national pride, different standards of living, different
personal relationships…. There were also more substantive issues,
including different tactics and techniques, extra time required for the
establishment of integrated commands and staffs, and lack of knowledge of
capabilities. 176
Further, James Tritten states his opinion with no reservations:
Military doctrine is derived from various national considerations:
government policy, available resources, strategy and campaign concepts,
existing doctrine, the threat, history and geography and demographics, type
of government, and existing doctrine, and TTP [tactics, techniques and
procedures]. It is extremely hard to see how many foreign governments
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would allow U.S. military doctrine, at strategic or operational levels, to
govern the behaviour of their own national military forces. 177
Such problems have to be approached carefully and slowly.

Weaving the Elements and Factors of Seapower
The key point of properly conducting seapower is how people could comprehend
various factors and the complicated interactions of seapower. Seapower is composed of
a range of essential elements belonging to all strategic layers interacting with each other
with a sensitive sense of balance (refer to Figure 3 above). Specialists on seapower have
been required to master a wide range of relevant knowledge about a number of
intellectual and practical fields such as international relations, geopolitics, strategic
thought, military expertise, ocean law, fisheries and sea-bed resources, shipping, and
relevant technologies, because of the comprehensive nature of seapower. In practice, for
a maritime state, it is truly difficult to attain formidable seapower unless all diverse
factors come together into a cluster. Even though seapower has been an extremely
useful, indeed vital, strategic tool and a driving power for a nation, harmonizing each
strategic element is awfully difficult and requires sensitive political and diplomatic
skills for successful integration.

Wylie’s General Theory for a Sea Power State
Admiral J.C. Wylie stated in his classic work, Military Strategy: a General Theory of
Power Control, that a “A breadth of opinion and perspective and belief is a requirement
for continuing resilient vitality in any social program.” 178 In order to effectively employ
seapower as a national strategic tool, a high-level theory that could weave different
factors and differences of position and philosophy into true seapower is required. 179
Wylie stated further that there are “certain requirements of universality and specificity
and structure and inclusiveness that must be met by any general theory of strategy.” On
“the business of war strategy”, Wylie pointed out as war-planning assumptions: 1)
“despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be war.”; 2) “the aim of
war is some measure of control over the enemy.” 3) “we cannot predict with certainty
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the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves.” 4) “The ultimate determinant in
war is the man on the scene with a gun.” 180 In terms of a general theory, he insists

The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected
degree of control of the enemy for the strategist’s own purpose; this is
achieved by control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the
center of gravity of war to the advantage of the strategist and the
disadvantage of the opponent. 181
Wylie’s theory can be converted into a general strategy for a maritime state focusing on
seapower. Such an approach of using general strategy has been adopted by John B.
Hattendorf, an adherent to Wylie’s theory, who states:

Strategy’s aim is to establish control while it provides a common frame of
reference for the specialised work of the soldier, sailor, airman, politician,
diplomat, technologist, and economist in their joint efforts to reach a
mutual goal that reflects national policy and the basic interests of a nation.
Strategy, as a concept, covers all kinds of conflict. It is not limited to wars
or even to military application. The military or naval application of it is
rarely inseparable from the broad social context within which and on
behalf of which it functions as a part. 182
Not only a mere government, but also a coalition builder, the United States needs to
construct such a general theory – to create and maintain international frameworks for
maritime cooperation, such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative – which is
convenient to harmonize diverse values, interests and capacities that a wide variety of
navies and players have. This topic calls for further research to establish this sort of
theory. With respect to Japan, as the primary subject of this thesis, a sophisticated
theory is required to convince Japanese people, who lack awareness about their security
environment and national strategy, that it is in the national interest to share a common
awareness of, and a general support for, strategy for weaving together the essential
elements and factors of seapower.

Each element of seapower has an essential role to play in seapower and maritime
strategy. In order to weave together the various elements of seapower, it is, above all,
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important to understand the maritime approach to strategy, including its coalitionbuilding aspects. Any state that wants to utilize seapower as a strategic tool, or to
develop as a “true maritime state”, must be able to understand the features of maritime
power and the global aspects of maritime strategy. Accordingly, seapower experts have
to intensify activities to raise awareness for the importance of maritime power amongst
both the public and political leaders through enhancing public relations activity. This
will not occur unless people become aware that their homeland must be a maritime
state; in Sun Tzu’s terms, to “know oneself” as a sea power state. Whether or not people
have adequate understanding and consciousness of this maritime mindset will influence
the fate of a sea-dependent state.

Conclusion
In history, seapower has maintained its position as a significant strategic tool, which
secures the safety and prosperity of maritime states. In the modern age, compared with
Mahan’s era, integrating different players and factors is especially significant to
increase the effect of seapower. In order to create a global maritime network for peace
and prosperity, the construction of maritime coalitions is crucial, in practice. Above all,
coalition-building through naval cooperation is the key factor of this matter. The
importance of the quantity and quality of a navy’s role at the political-strategic level has
been rapidly increasing because of the need to cope with the various new threats that are
appearing in the twenty-first century.

In addition, the traditional threat to a maritime state, a great continental power heading
for the oceans, remains unchanged as a real possibility. To counter such an opponent, a
maritime state is required to carry out a difficult strategy to build alliances and pursue a
“balance of power” strategy with sea power allies to build and maintain the seapower
network focusing on sea control and economic warfare to weaken the opponent.
Moreover, since the advent of newly-emerged different types of threats, maritime states
need to build “collective navies” to deal with this range of challenges.

Seapower can be a superb strategic tool to expand and preserve national power, yet it
requires a state to commit to a great deal of policy (that is to say, political) and financial
exertion to fully realize its latent power. A most important factor remains how maritime
64

mindedness can be nurtured in the character of the people and the government. Without
a sense of common purpose in maritime strategy, effective seapower composed of the
various factors outlined throughout this chapter will never be formed. Such strategic
awareness is urgent for Japan, which cannot subsist without seapower.
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CHAPTER 3
Seeds of Conflict around the Japanese Islands

Introduction
The greatest threat to a maritime state, as previously mentioned, is a great continental
power which has ambitions to build a first-class navy for the purpose of challenging the
maritime state(s) at sea. In the 21st century, Japan appears to be faced with more
potential crises spurred by continental powers than ever before. This chapter will
examine potential threats to Japan’s security from neighbouring states on the continent.
The first section will analyse why Japan has to remain cautious of threats from China
within the context of China’s strategic culture and maritime strategy. The second
section will identify and discuss the development of a continental coalition and the issue
of the northern territories between Japan and the other great land power, Russia, which
hinders the development of friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.
The third section will explore the issue of Korea by discussing its naval power and
ambitions, its territorial disputes with Japan, the geographical and historical context of
Korean strategic culture, and the relevance of North Korea to Japan’s security.

The Rise of China and Growing Danger to Japan in the Maritime Arena
The strong influence that China wields on the future of international relations is
inarguable. China’s robust economic growth has had a strong influence all over the
world, especially among Asia-Pacific countries. The Chinese public welcomed the rise
of China as a global power and declared themselves in favour of, and actively supported,
the expansion of China’s economic and military power. The Chinese are confident that
China will catch up with the United States as a global power in the future. 1

Since 1996, China’s defence spending has increased over ten per cent every year. China
has been buying weapons from Russia since the end of the Cold War. China has
strongly pushed ahead with the modernization of its armed forces, especially the
Chinese navy, as the core of its national strategy. Obviously, taking into consideration
the issue of Taiwan, China’s maritime strategy has been carefully observed by the
1
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international community. A great land power state with both the capability and intent to
expand naval power as a central element of its grand strategy poses one of the greatest
threats to the national interests of maritime states at all times. A land power that has
enough strength to head for the sea makes the balance of power in the maritime arena
unstable. After the end of the Cold War, China has replaced the Soviet Union as a land
power menace to maritime states from the Eurasian continent, most especially, its
neighbour, Japan, a genuine sea-girt state. For sea power states, it has been
demonstrated throughout history that a formidable continental power is always a
potential enemy in the long run. 2 Although the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) is one
of the most advanced military forces in the world, it can be stated without doubt that
China’s maritime ambitions and its increasing naval power clearly pose a menace to
Japan’s seapower and its wider national interests. A particular concern would be the
potential use of China’s submarine fleet as a primary instrument of its strategy;
platforms which, as natural enemies of both merchant and naval shipping, are
particularly problematic for Japanese strategic planners and policymakers

China’s Strategic Culture
Chinese World Order
China has one of the world’s oldest civilizations, the world’s largest population, and is
the largest country in Asia in terms of land area. These factors have contributed to bring
about a distinctive strategic culture among the Chinese. The term “strategic culture” has
been defined as follows: “a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits
regarding the threat and use of forces, which have their roots in such fundamental
influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture.” 3 One of the most
notable factors that shape Chinese strategic culture is “Sinocentrism,” which originates
from a sense of superiority among the Chinese borne of its great culture and civilization,
which has strongly influenced a large number of East Asian countries. It has been
argued that China’s foreign relations historically have been hierarchic and nonegalitarian due to this impact of a psychology of domination of neighbouring lands and

2
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peoples upon Chinese culture. The graded and concentric hierarchy of China’s foreign
relations can be grouped into three zones: 4

1) the Sinic Zone comprised of the most close and culturally-related tributary
states such as Korea and Vietnam, which used to be dominated by the Chinese
empire, including Ryukyu (Okinawa), and Japan for a short period;
2) the Inner Asia Zone comprised of tributary groups, the nomadic states and
semi-nomadic people of Inner Asia. These are the people who were considered
threats to the security intended to be provided by the Great Wall at times, who
were not only ethically and culturally non-Chinese but also external or on the
border of the Chinese civilization area;
3) the Outer Zone consisted of the “outer barbarians”, who lived in remote
places over land or sea at various distances beyond the Chinese “centre,”
including the Japanese, Southeast Asians, South Asians and Europeans. who
were supposed to pay a tribute to the Chinese empire in order to maintain trade
relations with China.
These zones constitute what has been called the “Chinese World Order”. This mentality
has been clearly etched in the Chinese psyche and has affected the country’s behaviour.
For example, when King George III of Great Britain dispatched an envoy with British
industrial products as gifts to the Qing Dynasty for a trading relationship in 1793, the
Chinese emperor answered,

We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor, instruct the King of England to take
note of our charge…The Celestial Empire, ruling all within the four seas…does
not value rare and precious things…nor do we have the slightest need of your
country’s manufacture. Hence we have commanded your tribute envoys to
return safely home. You, O King, should simply act in conformity with our
wishes by strengthening your loyalty and swearing perpetual obedience. 5
Fear of Domestic Rebellion and External Aggression
Chinese history is strewn with wars. According to Shu Guang Zhang, from 1100 BC
until the end of the Qing Dynasty (1911), there were as many as 3,790 domestic and
foreign wars, as well as rebellions, that can be confirmed in China’s history. 6 Most
Chinese dynasties were overthrown due to “inside disorder and outside calamity” (nei4
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6
Shu Guang Zhang “China Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage,” in Booth and Trood eds., Strategic
Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 29.
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luan wai-huan in Chinese); domestic rebellion and external aggression. 7 In the security
environment around the Chinese periphery, in instances where foreign powers were not
subservient to Chinese power, domestic rebellions had a greater chance of occurring due
to either foreign sponsorship or the use of neighbouring territories as sanctuaries by
rebel groups. That is why China has had to apply diplomatic pressure on neighbouring
countries to contain unsatisfactory elements hostile to the imperial regime. Throughout
history, as indeed remains the case today, maintaining regime security has been a
primary policy consideration for the autocratic rulers of China. According to John
Fairbank, the Sinocentric world order was not relevant just to the Chinese culture area. 8
Even though there were culturally huge differences between the Manchus, Mongols,
Uighur Turks, Tibetans, and others, and the Chinese, the Inner Asia Zone had included
them, because mounted soldiers from the Inner Asian Zone had a decisive power in
wars until the emergence of firearms, and they gradually became rulers of all China.
Therefore, the non-Chinese were classified into the zone. While the Chinese had
cultural and economic superiority, it was not enough to control the nomadic peoples’
warmaking capability at times. 9 As Fairbank insists, “In strategic terms the ‘Chinese
empire’ had to be actually the great continental ‘Empire of East Asia’….” 10

As a matter of fact, the Chinese suffered from a sense of inferiority in military affairs. It
seems counterintuitive that this factor actually shaped Sinocentrism further. That is,
those in power have always had a fear of external and internal threats. Accordingly, it is
not hard to anticipate that such a mental process produced a mixed sense of superiority
and fear toward others, especially the warlike nomadic peoples of the great Eurasian
steppe. This thinking has prodded China to adopt domineering, at times wholly
aggressive, diplomatic postures towards its neighbours. Nationalism, like Sinocentrism,
is also an effective political tool for policy makers to unify a vast multicultural,
ethnically diverse continental empire. This is one reason why China’s neighbours
historically have had to have been prepared to deal with China’s offensive diplomatic
posture towards them.
The Land Power Who Fears the Sea
7
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Because of China’s size, defending it means defending virtually an entire continent. 11
China’s land area is about 9.6 million square kilometres and with a land frontier of
around 28,000 kilometres in length, adjoining North Korea, Mongolia, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,
Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, and Viet Nam. China has an 18,000 kilometre coastline,
looking across the seas towards Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Brunei. In contrast, Russia’s defence is overwhelmingly land-based,
whereas the United States has focused on sea- (and air-) based defence. China, however,
must defend not only its land boundaries but also its maritime borders. 12 In its long
history, the high frequency of civil strife and interstate wars against continental powers
required China to focus its efforts on land-based security based on constructing and
maintaining huge land forces. Although it seems that China’s main national security
problems are concerned with arrangements to secure its land frontiers; and unlike the
Soviet Union, another (former) continental giant, China had no friendly states among
neighbours acting as strategic buffers. 13

China’s national destiny as a land power state has shaped typical strategic behaviour as
a land power lacking buffer zones, unlike sea girt countries. Land powers generate
national power from their land territories; hence, they often pursued a territorially
expansionist policy of seizing land to increase wealth and/or security, and they often
were driven to invade adjacent countries for such purposes: i.e., to gain power and
protection. Arousing the suspicion of other continental states is an imperative habit.
However, at present the Chinese government instead concentrates on building a blue
water navy for the sake of pursuing ambitions based on Chinese interpretations of the
lessons of Mahan’s theory of maritime strategy. 14

In Chinese history, land battles usually decided destinies of successive dynasties. Rivers
were battlefields for navies. In the south, however, there were people with maritime
spirits. For instance, at some time around the fourth century, the Chinese put the
11
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compass into practical use and travelled seawards. During the end of the seventh
century, the Chinese sailed the South China Sea, Celebes Sea, Banda Sea, and Andaman
Sea, and then they built a Chinese settlement in each of these places. 15 During the era of
the Ming Dynasty, in 1405, the Zheng He-led mighty fleet which included about 27,000
men set out on an epic voyage to make a visit to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and
eastern Africa at the behest of the Ming Dynasty Yongle Emperor. Zheng He conducted
a total of seven such great voyages until 1433. During the Ming period, mighty fleets
led by Zheng He reached Java, Palembang, Malacca, Ceylon, and Calicut on the
southern coast of India. Zheng He made many expeditions and even reached the Persian
Gulf and the east coast of Africa. He made over 30 countries tributary states to the Ming
Dynasty. 16

Although the Ming Dynasty had a formidable navy, the Chinese continent was in
turmoil and its national power and central position within Asia began to decline when
European powers extended their reach to the Far East in search of mercantile profits.
Over the next several centuries Chinese power and security was repeatedly challenged
by seaborne powers, culminating in what the Chinese view as their “century of shame”
from the mid nineteenth to the mid twentieth century; a national humiliation delivered
most frequently from the sea;

In the last 109 years, imperialists have repeatedly invaded China from the
Sea….470 times, 84 of these being serious invasions. The ocean has become
an avenue for the aggressors to bring in their troops and haul away our
wealth….The ocean is not only the basic space for human survival, but also
an important theater for international political struggle….The better people
can control the sea, the greater they have the sea territorial rights [which
have] become inseparable from a country’s sovereignty…. 17
From such historical experiences, China learned the following lessons: 1) a strong naval
force is necessary for the protection of the land; 2) a nation without an understanding of
Hirama Yōichi, “Chugokukaigun no Kako Genzai Mirai: Blue Water Navy he no Hatten to Sono
Mondaiten [Chinese Navy’s Past, Present, Future: Development into Blue Water Navy and Issues]”, Hatō
[Billows], Vol. 10, No. 7, p. 15.
16
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the importance of the ocean is a nation without a future; and 3) a major sea power which
is unable to protect its sea territorial right will not be undurable. 18

The Land Power Who Heads for the Sea
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Chinese naval strategists were allowed to alter
and develop its traditional strategy of “People’s War.” This strategic concept posited
that any foe who invaded the Chinese homeland could be overpowered by a massive
number of soldiers and the general population; a strategy which was supposed to be
conducted by making a strategic withdrawal in order to drag the opponent deep into the
vast Chinese hinterland. 19 The naval strategy adopted by the Communist Party largely
reflected the strategic thought of Mao’s traditional guerrilla strategy. The collapse of the
Soviet Union, however, significantly diminished the possibility of any external threat
that could invade Chinese territory. 20

In the 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) after longstanding argument, finally
decided to change the traditional strategy that had downplayed technological capability
to one of a high-tech national defence strategy emphasizing electronics, automation,
guided missiles, and nuclear power. 21 Admiral Liu Huaqing and the naval thinkers
struggled to reform and improve the “coastal defence strategy”, the main doctrine until
early 1980s designed for guerrilla warfare against invaders from the sea and conducted
by light warships, shore-based planes and submarines. Afterwards, modernization of the
navy and a new naval strategic concept, the “active green water defence strategy” was
adopted. 22 This transformation was intended to extend China’s maritime defensive
frontier to between 200 nautical miles and 400 nautical miles from the coast, even as far
as the disputed South China Sea islands. 23

18
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Meanwhile, China’s maritime interests were steadily gaining in importance. Overall,
these facts, and the growing significance of maritime interests led Chinese leaders to
reconsider their maritime strategy. The impact of the performance of U.S. forces in the
Gulf War drove the PLA to intensify this re-thinking of Chinese maritime strategy.
Through research on modern maritime warfare by the navy, the PLA came to recognize
the importance of an offensive posture in naval battles, such as attacking the enemy’s
ships, blockading its islands, ports and bases, attacking its sea lines of communications
(SLOC) and conducting landing operation on its soil. Furthermore, the Taiwan missile
crisis in March 1996 brought home to China the might of the U.S. Navy and the
significance of pre-emptive action to stop it. 24 Afterwards, the Chinese navy came to
consider the necessity of protecting its maritime interests beyond even the extent of the
“two island chain,” 25 which China is believed to have set as a maritime defence
perimeter in 1997. Chinese naval strategists also believed that the navy would have to
have a capability in its naval and air forces to conduct sea denial out to a distance of
2,000 nautical miles. 26 As the dependence on foreign trade and the significance of
marine resources increased, China underlined the urgent need to expand the range of its
naval activities. Nonetheless, the defensive depth of the Chinese coast remains quite
shallow and this poses serious issues for the Chinese navy and the PLA in general. 27

China’s Maritime Interests
There are some maritime aspects which are crucial for China’s national interests. 28 The
first relates to maritime territorial and boundary claims, and border security issues. In
February 1992, the National People’s Congress passed “The Declaration of the Law of
the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea” which defines Chinese maritime
territorial limits. China has several longstanding territorial and other maritime disputes:
over the Senkaku Islands with Japan and Taiwan; over the East China Sea with Japan;
sovereignty over Taiwan; the Paracel Islands with Taiwan and Vietnam; the Spratly and
24
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other islands in the South China Sea with Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Brunei and Malaysia; water areas of the South China Sea with each of these opponents;
and boundary issues with both North and South Korea. 29

The second aspect which is important for China’s national interests is the significance
of marine resources. In order to feed the world’s largest population, significant food
resources are needed. This includes securing fish for food consumption from oceanic
fishing. This can be sourced from China’s vast claims to ocean jurisdiction. In 2008,
China’s gross ocean product (GOP) reached 2.97 trillion yuan, 30 an increase of eleven
per cent in a year-to-year comparison, accounting for 9.87 per cent of China’s gross
domestic product (GDP). 31 China’s GOP reached 1.386 trillion yuan (US$202.96 billion)
in the first half of 2009, which is an increase of 6.9 per cent over the same period of
2008, accounting for 9.91 per cent of China’s GDP.

32

China’s State Oceanic

Administration deputy director has stated that “The country’s GOP represented a further
growth in the first half despite the world financial crisis, and will become one of the
new economic engines in the future”. 33

SLOC Security and the “String of Pearls”
The close relationship between seapower and economic power has roused Chinese naval
expansion and seapower network construction. Since 1993, China has been a net
importer of oil as its rapidly growing economy increasingly consumes it with vigour. By
2020, it is said that China would need about 200-320 million tons of oil annually. 34
China’s dependence on imported oil and natural gas has been increasing drastically and
has led Beijing to conclude long-term agreements with energy suppliers such as Angola,
Central Asian states, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other states of the Middle East,
Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela. 35
29
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At the same time, China has focused on pursuing a blue-water navy capability as part of
its national strategy. China drafted a “String of Pearls” strategy, “which is a term for a
collective series of diplomatic and military measures aimed at acquiring access and
strategic bases along more than 10,000 kilometers of sea-lanes stretching from the
Middle East to China via the Persian Gulf.” 36 China concluded agreements with the
littoral states in the region to increase the number of the anchorage sites as so-called
“pearls”. The “String of Pearls” strategy would allow the Chinese navy to obtain a
certain degree of operational capability in the Indian Ocean which it has never had in
living memory.

Many countries feel the urge to control the Strait of Malacca because of its significance
as the main sea line of communication, including India, China and the United States.
About 80 per cent of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait, which
provides the shortest and cheapest sea route for oil shipments from the Middle East. 37
Chinese leaders understand well, “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the
Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China”. 38 China is
very suspicious of any American or Japanese intention to increase their influence over
the Strait, potentially deploying their maritime forces and using the threat of terrorism
as a justification. Even India has enhanced its naval presence around the region. China,
the world’s second largest energy consumer, has been concerned about threats to its
shipping industry and dependence on imported resources posed by maritime terrorism
and piracy. The “Malacca Dilemma” remains a matter of grave concern for Beijing. The
Chinese President, Hu Jintao, in November 2003, expressed concern by way of feint
that “certain major powers” were ambitious to take the lead to control the Strait. As part
of China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, China has been attempting to enhance its own
involvement around maritime Southeast Asian states through offering assistance such as
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technical support, training, oceanographic surveys and navigational aids. 39 When an
annual Straits of Malacca Conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in 2004, Zhao Jianhua,
Counsellor for the Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced that
China was willing to support the littoral states on issues of maritime cooperation for the
security and safety of the Malacca Strait, including on other issues such as marine
environmental protection, maritime transport and navigation safety and the fight against
transnational crimes at sea. 40

In September 2005, Malaysia and China concluded a Memorandum of Understanding
on Bilateral Defence Cooperation. It is an important milestone for China’s strategy to
secure its SLOC and the Malacca Strait. In September 2006, at the International
Maritime Organization’s meeting on the “Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Enhancing
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection” in Kuala Lumpur, China expressed its
willingness to clearly help support the littoral states to safeguard the sovereignty and
security of the Straits. 41

In addition, with the expansion of naval bases in the South China Sea, China has stayed
on the offensive ― including in the Spratly Islands ― as the strategic passage to control
sea lanes from the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Straits, through which about 90 per
cent of Japan’s imported oil sails. 42

Anti-Japanese Sentiment
China did not adopt anti-Japanese strategic postures during most of the Cold War era,
and certainly not after the Sino-American political reconciliation of the 1970s and
1980s. However, after a series of events which included the Tiananmen incident, the
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the
break-up of the Soviet Union, China started to employ anti-Japanese statements.
Increasingly, Chinese propaganda portrayed Japan as a nefarious villain in order to
divert the people’s attention from democratization and any political or social activism
39
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perceived as critical of the ruling Communist Party; and to appear strong with respect to
its territorial disputes in the face of pressure from domestic nationalists, both within the
government apparatus and without. 43

In fact, Chinese history textbooks focus on Japan’s war record until 1945 yet never
mention Japanese diplomatic postures and assistance to China in the post-War era, in
spite of the fact that the sum total of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
has totalled about seven trillion yen since 1979, comprising 60 per cent of the foreign
aid to China in the 1980s. The Japanese government continued aid while many
countries stopped their assistance even after the Tiananmen incident. 44 China has also
strongly opposed Japan’s bid to secure a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council,
despite the fact that Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations after
the United States, making up around 16.5 per cent of total contributions, while China’s
contribution only accounted for just over 2.5 per cent of the total U.N. budget in 2008. 45

China has been extremely cautious about the possibility of a Japanese military build-up
because of the latter’s economic power and advanced technology for both nuclear and
conventional weapons. Chinese observers believe Japan would become a regional
military power.

46

The Chinese have been cautious even of Japan’s overseas

peacekeeping activities. Chinese observers maintain that despite the attempts of both
China and Japan to build constructive relations, seeds of strife remain. There is a range
of Japanese behaviour, both past and present, which aggravate China and its diplomatic
position towards Japan, such as: denying Japanese aggression in World War II and, in
particular, wartime atrocities believed to be committed by Japanese forces in China;
promoting Japan-Taiwan friendship; and attempting to revise Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution. 47 Some Chinese security analysts have regarded Japan as one of China’s
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most serious military threats in the post-Cold War period. Yet the post-Second World
War behaviour of the two states has been quite divergent: whereas China has waged
several wars, 48 including initiating some armed conflicts by invading neighbours such
as India and Vietnam, Japan, consistent with its post-War constitution, has studiously
avoided direct involvement in armed conflict.

Beijing has never relaxed its vigilance against Japan and the Chinese Navy frequently
conducts naval exercises, assuming a posture of war towards Japan. 49 Beijing is deeply
concerned with the possibilities that Tokyo would extend its military might to protect its
economy, or Japan’s economic power would immediately turn into military power; or
that Japan would lose confidence in its U.S. alliance and build its own arsenals, or that
Japan would end its relationship with the United States due to trade-related problems
and stand on its own feet as a full-fledged regional military competitor. In all these
possible scenarios, Japan would emerge as a great threat in the future to China and its
ruling Chinese Communist Party. 50

To make matters worse, since the Koizumi Cabinet was inaugurated in April 2001,
various causes of conflict between Japan and China have risen to the surface and
become the centre of attention in bilateral relations, such as visits made by the Japanese
Prime Minister and several other politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine. There were also
acts considered provocative by Japan such as Chinese vessels’ violation of Japanese
waters, and longstanding issues such as the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands,
and the conflict over maritime delimitation of their respective exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) in the East China Sea. The Koizumi administration aggravated Japan-China
relations already under strain due to the issue of Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.51
In April 2005, a violent Chinese crowd conducted anti-Japanese demonstrations. The
mob attacked the Japanese embassy and the Japanese ambassador’s residence in
Shanghai. During the same period, Chinese rioters raided Japanese consulates. China
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refused to issue an apology or to pay reparations as demanded by the Japanese
government. 52

Taiwan’s Strategic Value
The island of Taiwan lies just 150 kilometres from the Chinese mainland and the east
coast is about 110 kilometres from Japan’s Yonaguni Island. The width of the Taiwan
Strait between Taiwan and China ranges from about 130 to 150 kilometres. Taiwan has
a population of about 23 million and a land area of 35,980 square kilometres. The island
had been occupied by Imperial Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the
Sino-Japanese War settlement. 53 After Imperial Japan’s Second World War defeat,
Taiwan was governed by the Chinese Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek,
effectively exiled from the continent by the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in the
Chinese civil war. Since then, the Nationalist Party persisted in using the term Republic
of China (ROC), even though native-born Taiwanese have preferred “Taiwan” as the
name of their country. Thus, there are really two Chinas: the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), called “China”, on the continent, and the ROC on the island of Taiwan,
generally referred to as “Taiwan”, and not formally recognized as a state within the U.N.
system. While communist China earnestly seeks to unify Taiwan with the PRC into
“one China,” the somewhat politically divided Taiwanese seek international acceptance
and recognition of their effective de facto independence without necessarily pushing for
full, formal, or de jure, independence. As a complicating geo-strategic factor in their
bilateral relations, the island of Taiwan is of immense importance for both China and
Japan. 54

For China
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The modernization of China’s naval and air forces has been an essential strategic factor
to secure the Taiwan Strait from the PLA’s perspective. From a security viewpoint,
although threats had historically originated from the continental north, China had been
exposed to substantive seaborne threats since the mid 19th century. The waters around
Taiwan, Hainan Island and the Zhoushan Islands are located along the south eastern
coast of the mainland. From China’s continentalist standpoint, these islands form a
protective wall for its coastal areas in which big advanced cities are grouped as the hubs
of Chinese economic activity. 55 China’s navy consists of three fleets: the North Sea
Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. However, if a conflict occurs in the
South China Sea, the North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet have to pass through the
Taiwan Strait to participate; and this same principle will apply in any case requiring the
cooperation of the different fleets in a concentration of force, such as if an incident
occurs in the East China Sea. 56 If China desires to advance to the sea, it can only have
access to the Pacific Ocean owing to its geographical circumstances; that is through the
island chain that includes Japan and, most pressingly for Chinese strategists, Taiwan. 57

The sea on the eastern side of Taiwan is deep enough for submarines to operate
underwater without being detected. In order to reach the Pacific Ocean Chinese vessels
need to pass through waters near Taiwan located about the midpoint between the East
China Sea and the South China Sea, including via the Bashi Channel separating Taiwan
from Luzon, or between northern Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku Islands. In addition,
for ships of the East Sea and North Sea Fleets to transit to the Indian Ocean, they must
also pass close to Taiwan, either through the Taiwan Strait itself or to the east of the
island and via the Bashi Channel. Supposing that China could build a naval base on
Taiwan, the PLA Navy could gain some degree of freedom of manoeuvrability in this
maritime area. 58 As a result, its strategic influence could reach to maritime Southeast
Asia through the South China Sea unhindered by geographical obstacles. There is a
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concern that if China achieves sufficient sea control within the South China Sea, most
ASEAN countries might be put under the effective control of China.

Maritime Southeast Asia, containing the Malacca and Lombok Straits, is a region of
great importance to Japan’s maritime interests and strategy. Concerning this, it would
thus be a fundamental threat to Japan, too, if China achieves dominance over the Asian
maritime region.

Moreover, in terms of its economy, Taiwan’s gross GDP was about US$402.7 billion in
2009. 59 This economic potential is without doubt attractive to the Chinese. Access to
Taiwanese technology may be an even greater attraction. For these reasons, Taiwan’s
strategic value cannot be underestimated.

For Japan
The issue of the Taiwan Strait is important from a Japanese perspective for several
reasons. First, Japan is highly dependent on marine transportation for its economic
wellbeing and security, involving activities such as the import of raw materials and the
export of manufactured goods. Therefore, if China seizes Taiwan, it means that China
could easily control the Bashi Channel and Taiwan Strait, and the East and South China
Seas, which would enable China to also throttle Japan’s economy using a naval
blockade of this area. The Taiwan issue is the most paramount when considering the
security of the maritime transport interests of Japan. 60

Secondly, many Japanese regard Taiwan as the world’s most pro-Japanese country, and
there are strong cultural and social bonds between the two peoples as a consequence of
Japan’s colonial rule of the island from 1895 to 1945. For example, Taiwanese who are
educated in Japan take pride in this and even in speaking the Japanese language.
Japanese influences can be easily discerned in Taiwanese daily life.
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Third, Taiwan has been regarded as a member of the “club” of maritime democratic
states in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan’s democratic transition has been part of the
nation-building process on the island and, as a result, has encouraged a certain degree of
empathy and support from other states with similar liberal democratic political values.
Maritime states need to be closely interdependent with each other for their own safety
and to protect mutual interests and values. Democracy is one of the main elements of
common ground by which to maintain the complex global maritime network that makes
international cooperation possible. If Taiwan is subsumed by autocratic, continental
China, it would mean the stunting of the development of democratization in Asia. 61
Consequently, Japan should be vigilant over Beijing’s strategies toward Taiwan and the
waters of the Taiwan Strait.

East China Sea Exclusive Economic Zones
Tokyo and Beijing have a dispute over the delimitation of their respective exclusive
economic zones in the East China Sea. China has asserted that its EEZ extends to the
Okinawa Trough and the Nansei Islands, way beyond a theoretical mid point and thus
encompassing a much larger part of the East China Sea than Japan would be eligible for
under the claim based on the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958; while the Japanese
government insists on an EEZ drawn from its baselines based on the equidistant
principle: that is, with a boundary drawn at the mid point of the East China Sea. China,
however, rejects the equidistance line that the Japanese government claims between
China and Japan. Indeed, despite an evaluation made by Japan’s Ocean Policy Research
Foundation based on its interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC) that the total area of China’s continental shelf is 964,000 square kilometres,
China insists that it can claim about three million square kilometres. 62

In the 1980s, Beijing test-drilled about 20 places for oil around the ocean area of
China’s side near the equidistant line. On 28 January 1992, the China National Offshore
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) declared oil development open to foreign business. In the
following month, China enacted and promulgated its territorial sea law claiming the
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Senkaku Islands. 63 In 1996, a Japanese right-wing group named Nihon Seinen Sha
constructed a lighthouse and requested that the Japanese government plot it on a
hydrographic chart. In the same year, the Japanese EEZ was established in waters
around the Senkaku Islands after the LOSC became effective, which was protested by
both China and Taiwan. 64 In November 1996, Chinese marine research vessels
repeatedly violated Japanese territorial waters as it ignored warnings from the Japan
Coast Guard (JCG). China’s evaluation of the prospects for oil and gas exploitation in
the area around the middle of the equidistant line in the East China Sea yielded
promising results. In April 1998, as a result of the potential for oil and gas development
in this area, China constructed a platform for oil-well drilling and petroleum processing
in the Pinghu offshore gas field, just 70 kilometres from the median line between Japan
and China. Since December 1998, this facility has already delivered 450 million cubic
metres of natural gas annually to Shanghai via two pipelines. 65

In May 2005, China completed drilling facilities at Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Chinese)
and Kashi (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the ocean area and a treatment facility at Kashi.
More crucially, the facility at Shirakaba is extremely close to the equidistant line and
there is a strong possibility that China pumps resources from Japan’s side of the line. In
October 2005, the Japanese government proposed joint development of the areas around
the line to China but China proposed a plan to jointly develop not only the Chunxiao
oilfield group, but also the marine area of the Senkaku Islands and even the joint
development area between Japan and South Korea. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan was deeply shocked by China’s proposal. 66 In June 2008, China agreed to Japan’s
participation in developing Shirakaba. The two governments also promised to conduct
joint research by equal investment in an area north of Shirakaba and south of the
Asunaro (Longing in Chinese) gas field. 67 However, on 4 January 2009, a Japanese
newspaper company, Sankei News, made a scoop with the story that China had

Shigeo Hiramatsu, Chugoku no Kaiyou Senryaku [China’s Maritime Strategy], Keisō Shobō, 1993, pp.
70-71.
64
Kazumi Murakami, “Siryō: Nippon no Ryōdo Jikenshi [Data: Territorial Incidents],” Gunji Kenkyu
[Japan Military Review], September 2006, p. 50.
65
Nakazawa Higure and Simojyō Shimaguni Nippon no Ryōdo Mondai, p. 42.
66
Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Chugoku no Sensō” ni Nihon wa Zettai Makikomareru [Japan will absolutely Get
Involved in China’s War], Tokyo, 2008, p. 292.
67
“Japan Flags Steps against China in Offshore Gas Dispute,” Platts Oilgram News, 19 January 2009.
63

83

unilaterally researched and developed the applicable marine area in violation of the
2008 agreement. 68

The Senkaku Islands
The seabed around the disputed uninhabited islands known as Senkaku in Japanese and
Diaoyu in Chinese in the East China Sea seem to be rich in oil and natural gas resources.
The islands are claimed by China, Japan and Taiwan. The Senkaku archipelago is
composed of five uninhabited islands and three rock reefs. The largest island among
them, Uotsuri Island, is located about 410 kilometres from the Okinawa mainland and
about 170 kilometres from Ishigaki Island; and is also 170 kilometres from Taiwan and
330 kilometres from the Chinese mainland (see Map 1). Currently, Japan effectively
controls these islands. The gross area is only 5.56 square kilometres, with Uosturi Island
comprising 3.82 square kilometres. About 248 Japanese nationals used to live on
Uotsuri Island. There is an anchorage on the site, a dried bonito factory and a lighthouse
built by a Japanese political group noted above. Although uninhabited since the end of
World War II, 69 Japan had in 1895 declared that the Senkaku islands were incorporated
into Okinawa prefecture after research had determined that no other countries were in
possession of the island group. 70

After the war, the United States occupied Okinawa and established a government, in
which the Senkaku islands was included. 71 In 1961, after Toukai University Professor
Hiroshi Arano published an article in a U.S. academic journal suggesting that there were
rich oil and natural gas fields in the East China Sea, for the first time, the world took
notice of the Senkakus. As a result, the United States became interested in this area and
the vessels of the U.S. Seventh Fleet surveyed this sea area. In the 1960s, as a result of
an Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) investigation, it became
known that there seemed to be potential for enormous oil deposits underneath the East
China Sea. In 1969 it was confirmed that the region is abundant in oil and other natural
resources. As a result of the ECAFE surveys, since 1971, first Taiwanese and then
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Chinese claims over the island chain were made. 72 In 1971, the Taiwanese government
announced that the islands were historically and geographically Taiwanese territories
and the United States must return them as part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 73
China insisted the islands were stolen by Japan due to its defeat in the Sino-Japanese
War. 74 In response to such claims, a Japanese right-wing organisation, Nihon Seinen
Sha, built a lighthouse on Uotsuri Island in 1978 to stake a claim over the islands. Since
then, Chinese and Taiwanese civilian organisations have sailed to the islands to protest.
In the context of its claims under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), China passed
a new territorial sea law in 1992, setting out its claims to island territory and with an
implied intent to investigate seabed resources around claimed islands and protect its
claims, potentially by the use of force. Afterwards, Chinese oil exploration vessels
stepped up operations around the islands. 75

Troubles over the Senkakus
On 2 September 1968, when Okinawa was under U.S. administration, Taiwanese ship
crews, navy personnel and journalists landed on Uosturi Island. They painted in big
letters a sign which read, “Viva, President Chiang” and hoisted the ROC flag. The
Japanese government sent instructions to the Japanese Embassy in Taipei to file a
protest to the ROC government. As a result of talks between the Japanese government,
the Ryukyu government that ruled Okinawa, and the U.S. government, the ROC flag
was removed from Okinawa. This was the first official recorded case that anyone other
than Japan had landed on the Senkaku Islands. 76 On 12 April 1978, a JCG patrol boat,
Yaeyama, found a group of about 140 Chinese fishing boats around the sea area of the
Senkakus. Sixteen of them were operating in waters northwest from Uotsuri Island. The
stern warnings and expulsion orders issued by Yaeyama were ignored by these
vessels. 77 On 13 April, 40 Chinese boats intruded into the waters and staked a claim
with placards. TheJCG deployed ten patrol boats and seven aircraft, including two
helicopters to the area. On 14 April, after Yaeyama issued a warning to a Chinese boat,
one Chinese crewmember pointed an automatic weapon at Yaeyama. Yaeyama left but
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was chased by the Chinese boat for 30 minutes.78 On 13 April, the Japanese government
filed a protest with the Chinese Embassy in Japan. The following day the Japanese
Embassy in Beijing officially expressed sincere regret at this incident to the Chinese
government. On 15 April Beijing unofficially told one Japanese politician in China that
it was an accident. The Chinese, however, repeated the encroachment. Eventually, the
number of violations decreased as Japan’s security precautions increased. On 18 April,
all of the fishing boats left Japanese waters but continued operating in this sea area until
early May. From 12 to 18 April, the number of their violations reached 357. 79

There have been many instances of incursions into the Senkaku islands. On 22
September 1996, Hong Kong activists left Hong Kong on a cargo ship to protest the
activity of the Japanese political group that built the lighthouse. On 26 September 1996,
JCG vessels warned and seized the ship; meanwhile, four of the passengers dived into
the water about 3.3 kilometres from Uotsuri Island and washed up on the island. The
boat rescued them and its captain called on the Japan Coast Guard for emergency help,
but two of them were critically wounded. The leader of the activists died and the other
was severely injured and taken by JCG helicopter to hospital in Okinawa for
treatment. 80

On 6 October 1996, boats carrying activists from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao set
sail from Taiwan. Forty-one of them intruded into Japanese waters. In response, the
Japan Coast Guard sent about 50 patrol boats and ordered the intruding boats to leave
the area and seized the protest boats. Two of them, however, broke through the JCG
blockade and one activist managed to land on Uotsuri Island, planting both ROC and
PRC flags on the island. This was the first case of Chinese protestors successfully
landing on the Senkaku islands, despite the tight security. On 28 June 1998, six protest
boats from Taiwan and Hong Kong ignored warnings from a JCG boat and intruded into
Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands. 81 On 24 March 2004, seven Chinese
activists illegally landed on Uotsuri Island and were placed under arrest by Okinawa
Prefectural Police. At first, the police had planned to bring the case for prosecution;
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instead, the activists were deported back to China, as Tokyo put a priority on diplomatic
considerations. 82

At around 10 am on 7 September 2010, a JCG patrol ship, the 1,349-ton Yonakuni, was
hit by a Chinese trawler about 12 kilometres north-northwest of Kubajima, one of the
Senkaku Islands. The trawler collided against Yonakuni after the JCG vessel gave the
ship a warning. About 40 minutes later, the Chinese trawler collided with the 197-ton
patrol vessel Mizuki, chasing the Chinese ship, about 15 kilometers northwest of
Kubajima. About 12: 55 pm, the trawler eventually came to a stop after JCG officials
boarded the trawler in Japan’s EEZ. 83 The Japan Coast Guard arrested the fishing boat’s
captain on 8 September, on suspicion of obstructing public duties in connection with
collisions with its patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands. 84 On the following day, the
coast guard sent the 41-year-old Chinese skipper Zhan Qixiong, to the Naha District
Public Prosecutors Office’s branch on Ishigaki Island in Okinawa Prefecture. JCG
investigators questioned 14 Chinese crewmembers. No one was injured in this
incident. 85 According to the Japan Coast Guard, about 70 Chinese fishing boats were
operating after mid-August. 86
On 10 September 2010, the Ishigaki Summary Court in Okinawa Prefecture granted a
request by prosecutors for a 10-day detention. 87 Beijing made a strong protest against
the incident, demanding the release of the captain. 88 China announced its postponement
of resumption of negotiations over joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea
due to the incident. 89 On 13 September, Japan returned the crew, except for the captain,
to China, followed by protests in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong over the incident.
China demanded that Japan again “immediately and unconditionally'” release the
skipper. 90 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned “If Japan goes its own way and
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continues with its judiciary proceedings, China will take further action,” and “Japan
should bear all responsibility for the serious consequences that will arise [from its
action].” 91
On 23 September, it was reported that Beijing was unofficially imposing an export ban
on rare earth materials to Japan. Rare earths are essential materials, especially for Japan,
to produce high-tech devices. China is the largest exporter of rare earth materials,
accounting for 97 per cent of the world’s supply of the materials. 92 In addition, China
detained four Japanese citizens, employees of the construction firm Fujita Corporation,
for allegedly videotaping military facilities. 93 Afterward, Japanese prosecutors released
the Chinese skipper, considering the relations between the two countries, although Chief
Cabinet Secretary Sengoku emphasized the decision was made by the prosecutors. 94
Beijing can be seen to have achieved a diplomatic victory over the incident, with Tokyo
giving in to diplomatic pressure to release the Chinese. However, China’s autocratic
bluster met with strong international criticism. 95

Marine Surveys by the Chinese Navy
Okinotorishima (Okinotori Island) is located about 1,700 kilometres south of Tokyo.
The “island” is a rock surrounded by a coral atoll 10 kilometres in diameter, and is
actually made up of the two rocks, Higashikojima and Kitakojima The aggregate area of
the area claimed by Japan as EEZ based on Okinotorishima is about 400,000 square
kilometres, which accounts for about ten per cent of Japan’s total EEZ (see Map 1). 96
There are deposits of nickel, cobalt, manganese and copper as well as other seabed
resources around the islands. The water area around the rocks is a known spawning
region for tuna. This ocean area is a sea route for iron-ore and coal bulk carriers from
Australia and New Zealand to Japan. Japan imports about 7.7 millions tons of iron ore
(about six per cent of its annual imports) and about 16.7 millions of coal (about eleven
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per cent of annual imports) through the ocean area surrounding Okinotorishima. 97

Since 2001, China has deployed marine research vessels to the Okinotorishima ocean
area without the agreement of the Japanese government. China has disregarded Japan’s
protests, though a Chinese official publication praised the Japanese government for its
shore protection work for the island in the past. 98 China itself has actually built
structures and an artificial island on some of the rocks and coral reefs of the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea, despite the fact that these rocks are submerged at high
tide. 99 In that case, China still constructed them and ignored the LOSC. Okinotorishima
was cut and eroded away by wave action in the past, and as a result, the rocks are barely
above water at high tide. The Japanese government started shore protection works in
1987. Currently it is undertaking a three-year plan of works with funding worth 28.5
billion yen. These operations commenced in March 2007 and the Japan Coast Guard has
already constructed a lighthouse there. 100

There is a concern that China’s research around Okinotorishima could be used to gather
data to enable the laying of mines and for submarine navigation in a case of a Taiwan
contingency. Okinotorishima, which is located about 1,000 kilometres from U.S.
military bases on the island of Guam, is geo-strategically important for China since it is
located almost directly between Guam and Taiwan. Thus, the PLA Navy might be able
to use the area around Okinotorishima to block or intercept U.S. naval forces using this
most direct route to come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. 101

In 2004, Chinese officials started to announce that Okinotorishima was a rock, not an
island. In response to this, Tokyo Governor Shintarō Ishihara set up an address billboard,
declaring it an island in the following year. 102 In March 2007, the JCG completed
construction of a lighthouse near Okinotorishima. Around the islands, annually, 1,200
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ships pass by. 103 in addition, the Japanese government is planning to construct wharf
facilities near the islands to defend its territory and claimed EEZ sovereignty rights in
this area. 104

In November 2004, a Chinese Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) that
had left its home port of Qingdao in October, headed for Okinawa through the East
China Sea. On 8 November, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) received
information on the unidentified submarine from United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and
sent a P-3C ASW maritime patrol aircraft to the relevant waters around the southeast
part of Okinawa. The submarine passed between Okinawa and Miyakojima (Miyako
Island) and headed towards Guam. It then circled Guam at a distance of about 150
kilometres distance from the island. On its return, at 5:00 AM on 10 November, the
Chinese SSN submerged and intruded into Japanese territorial waters near Ishigakijima
(Ishigaki Island). After the submarine left Japanese waters, a “Maritime Security
Operation”, which ordered the JMSDF to police the violated waters, was issued at 8:45
AM by the head of the Defense Agency, Ohno Yoshinori. However, the order was
issued after the Chinese submarine had already exited Japanese territorial waters. The
Japanese government was criticized for its slow response to this incident. 105

In 2004, Chinese oceanographic research vessels conducted 34 marine known research
activities within Japan’s EEZ focusing on waters around the Okinawa islands, the
Senkaku islands and Okinotorishima. 106 Presumably, China investigated the seabed
resources in the East China Sea and the passage from the East China Sea to the
Pacific. 107 Since the Taiwan crisis of 1996 China has been developing an appropriate
maritime strategy based on sea and area denial as a countermeasure to U.S. Navy
intervention in a future Taiwan contingency. Taking into consideration Beijing’s
maritime strategic concept of the two island chains – the First Island Chain being
Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippine Islands and the Second Island Chain the Izu Islands-the
Ogasawara Islands-Guam-Papua New Guinea – it seems that the turning point in any
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Sino-American conflict over Taiwan would be whether China could contain the U.S.
Navy before the Americans could reach the Second Island Chain. For this purpose,
China has been assiduously studying the sea floor of the ocean area stretching from
Okinawa to Guam via Okinotorishima to be able to deploy naval mines and plan for the
deployment of its submarines. 108

Further, in October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels sailed through the Tsugaru Strait
to reach the Pacific Ocean. For Chinese surface combatants, it was the first identified
passage through the strait. These ships navigated southward into the Pacific Ocean and
passed between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. In December 2008, two Chinese
marine research vessels carried out navigation operations and sailed within the Japanese
territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. 109

China’s Naval Power against Japan
According to the Chinese government, China’s defence budget reached about 472.9
billion yuan and increased 15.3 per cent from 2008. It has increased on average 10 per
cent annually over the last 21 years. At this rate, China’s defence budget doubles every
five years. China’s official defence budget has risen 22-fold over the past 21 years. 110
Analysis of 2000-2009 data shows the officially disclosed military budget of China
increased at an annual average rate of 11.8 per cent, in the meantime China’s GDP
annually increased 9.6 per cent on average over same period. 111 China’s growing
economic power cannot be helped depending maritime power. As an inevitable result, it
must increase its naval power.

The Chinese navy has about 885 vessels including 60 submarines, and totals
approximately 1.32 million tonnes.
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Beijing expended considerable effort to
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modernize its war capabilities, especially focusing on its naval power in preparation for
littoral warfare in waters adjacent to the Chinese mainland over the past two decades. 113

Even though China’s naval power has modernized, there are still many problems.
Several vulnerable points of the Chinese navy are pointed out: 114 weak joint operations
capability; lack of capability to secure air supremacy to continue a large-scale operation
on the open sea; insufficient C4ISR systems and anti-ship search and targeting
systems

115

; many older-model, obsolescent submarines; lack of minesweeping

capability; limited logistic support capability, and very few airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) and tanker planes; and an inadequate number, according to
Kawamura, of mobile short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to force the surrender of
the Taiwanese. 116 In addition, for example, compared to the JSDF, although Chinese
forces outnumber Japanese forces, the JSDF is superior to the PLA with respect to
technology and training, as well as, arguably, with regard to the bilateral naval power
relationship 117 ; and in its alliance relationship with the United States, which brings
many advantages, as discussed later in Chapter 5.

Kawamura asserts that now that China has begun the radical modernization of its forces,
there would be some threats from the Chinese navy in the near future. 118 First, is the
threat of mobile theatre anti-ship ballistic missiles. If this missile were actually to be
used, U.S. carrier battle groups would be threatened by this hard to defend against
weapon, as would also Japan and Japanese surface naval forces. Secondly, China has
shown interest in the past in purchasing the Tu-22M3 (NATO code name: Backfire)
long-range bomber from Russia. This bomber can fly at Mach 2 and its radius of
operation is about 7,000 kilometres. This range easily includes the Japanese islands and
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would pose a threat to Japanese sea lanes and those of its ally and other partners. Even
though no sale of this system has taken place, it is a key point to note China’s interest in
such a long-range weapon capable of striking seaborne targets. Its development of an
anti-ship version of the DF-21C medium range ballistic missile may be indicative of this
interest, 119 and may even be viewed as an alternative to manned aircraft such as the
Backfire. Thirdly, China may build aircraft carriers. As long as the Chinese navy aspires
to be a blue-water navy, the acquisition of an aircraft carrier capability is indispensable.
In recent years, experts have carefully observed and debated whether or when China
would deploy aircraft carriers. 120 China is believed to expect a future PLA Navy carrier
force to fulfil four roles: to protect home waters; to secure maritime interests; to secure
nuclear deterrence by protecting its SSBNs; and to project power and influence befitting
that of a great power. 121

Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbol of a country’s
important deterrent power have been accorded more attention. For some
historical reasons, China has not yet built aircraft carriers. But the academy
must look forward and train experts needed for the carriers. As the building
process is long, we simply cannot afford to dig wells after becoming thirsty. 122
On 20 May 2009, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie stated, at talks with his
Japanese counterpart, Yasukazu Hamada, that all major powers except for China
possessed aircraft carriers; hence, China could not afford not to be without the
capability forever. 123 Given that Japan doesn’t possess a carrier either, Liang may have
been delivering a put down of Japan by implying that it isn’t a major power.

In 1985, China bought the former Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne to
explore China’s ambition of operating its own aircraft carrier. Afterwards, China
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purchased the ex-Soviet vertical take off and landing (VTOL) aircraft carriers Minsk
and Kiev. They have been used as theme parks and have not been used for military
purposes. In 1998, the Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag, the uncompleted
former Soviet carrier was sold to China by Ukraine. China has had it partly restored and
refitted to be used for training the Chinese navy how to operate an aircraft carrier. 124

In 2007, it has been reported that the China’s Central Military Commission approved
two projects to build Chinese-made aircraft carriers. 125 The project aims to build a class
of mid-sized conventional powered aircraft carriers. The aircraft carrier, derived from
the Varyag, would carry a carrier-based version of the Chinese J-10 fighter aircraft and
the Russian Sukhoi Su-33, currently in use by the Russian navy. According to the report
China plans to build the first of this class of carrier by 2016 and to operate three aircraft
carriers by 2020. China would take at least ten years to attain practical fighting power
because training to operate carrier-based aircraft would take many years. 126 Chinese
pilots have reportedly already been trained in Ukraine and have begun take off and
landing practice using a mock aircraft carrier flight deck on land. Also, China has
already placed an order with a domestic company for a voltage distribution board used
for the power control system of the aircraft carrier. Evidently, the aircraft carriers are
being built on Changxing Island and will be deployed to the Sanya naval base on
Hainan Island to control the South China Sea. 127 The presence of Chinese aircraft
carriers in the South China Sea could have a problematic, intensifying impact on the
security environment of Japan and the whole of East Asia .

Russia and the Continental Coalition
For maritime states, a continental ally that plays the role of maintaining the balance of
power on land against a rival land power is an essential factor for national strategy in
order to be able to maintain the effectiveness of the irreplaceable sea power network in
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any struggle against a major continental power. This scenario is a matter of life or death
for Japan. Historically, it typically has been difficult for great continental states to
maintain good terms with other major land powers. However, in recent years, major
land powers have been forging close security ties with each other in continental Eurasia.
This possibility must be at the top of a maritime state’s list of security concerns.

Colin Gray insists that if China, Russia, Iran and other states form a continental
coalition, it could challenge an American-policed Western-style world order, and in
such a situation, a “Heartland” power or axis dominating Eurasia and posing a firstclass menace to the maritime realm would represent Mackinder’s nightmare vision.
Gray emphasizes:

Irregular warfare may well be the dominant mode in belligerency for some
years to come, but interstate war, including great power conflict, will enjoy
a healthy future…. Unfortunately, the twenty-first century is going to witness
a new cycle, or two, of the historically familiar struggle for power and
influence between great power rivals and their allies and fellow travellers.
To venture a perilous bold prediction, what we can discern today appears to
be the early stage of what has the potential to develop into a new Cold
War. 128
Although there are still a number of reasons for antagonism between Russia and China,
the truism remains, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” in international politics.129
Thus, a situation in which the two major continental powers are drawn together in
coalition, despite actual and potential strategic differences, by a common opposition to
American leadership of world order, may indeed be developing. This would pose a great
challenge to Japan’s long-term security.

Russia
The defence budget of Russia was drastically reduced during the 1990s as a result of the
country’s continued economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Consequently, Russian military strength drastically declined as well. Naturally, the Far
Eastern Military District which is supposed to deal with Japan and China could not
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resist such a trend. The Soviet Pacific Fleet used to be the second strongest fleet in the
Soviet Navy after the Northern Fleet, but a large number of naval vessels were removed
from the register. 130 In recent years, however, the Russian economy has recovered with
the export of natural resources, especially oil and gas, during a period of what is likely
to be prolonged high commodity prices for energy resources.

Furthermore, the “former” Putin administration, which adopted the slogan of rebuilding
a strong Russian state, pushed the reconstruction of its military services. The Russian
aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, received major repairs and was put back into active
service. The Kuznetsov was emblematic of this tendency. In addition, by frequently
conducting combined military drills with other countries, Russian morale and skills
have been gradually restored. In fact, Russia is still an active player in the geopolitical
great power game in the Far East and in Central Asia. Then President Putin engineered
a plan for the build-up of the Russian Navy in 2002. In October 2006, Putin approved a
military build-up program to spend five trillion rubles for military equipment from 2007
to 2015. 131 In August 2008, the Russian Pacific Fleet conducted a large scale
multinational combined drill. And expert analysts have noted that Russia has fortified
its presence in sea areas with abundant natural resources in order to take the initiative in
resource development. 132

Land Power Coalition
Unusual Relations for Land Powers
The two great Eurasian continental powers, Russia and China, share a common land
frontier of over 7,000 kilometres. Border issues among land powers have often become
causes of conflicts and can produce enmity among neighbours. The Soviet Union and
China deployed huge armies on their common (and disputed) border, especially on the
Usuri River, which was a high-tension border area. However, their relations rapidly
improved in the late 1980s and the 1990s through both countries’ diplomatic efforts to
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solve territorial conflicts and conclude a number of agreements, as well as to strengthen
relations with other Central Asian countries.

In April 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. President Clinton
announced a “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century”;
but after this, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and Russian President Yeltsin, the leaders of
the two great continental powers declared a “strategic partnership for 21st century”. It
can be posited that the Sino-Russian continental partnership was formed as part of a
strategy to confront the U.S.-Japan maritime alliance. 133 Russia and China could find
common benefit by forming the “partnership”: they are aiming at making the U.S.Japan alliance weaker or divided, owing to the fact that, firstly, both China and Russia
have eyes on weakening U.S. power and in a multi-polar world, it is favourable for
them to maintain a “weak Japan”. In fact, it is merely wishful thinking to hope that they
might support Japan’s bid to become a permanent U.N. Security Council member.134
Also, in July 2001, Russia and China signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and
Friendly Cooperation. On 14 October 2004, the Russian President Vladimir Putin and
the Chinese President Hu Jintao declared their resolution of the border issue. In this way,
historically unusual circumstances that have enabled the two continental states to
weaken longstanding mutual enmities were established.

Honeymoon Period
China was Russia’s close ally after the communist regime was established in 1949, yet
they became bitter enemies over the ideology of communism and over border issues.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, China has been a valued customer for
Russia’s arms exports. Because Beijing has given some urgency to the necessity for
China to reform, reorganize and modernize the PLA, it has needed to access foreign
technologies and systems to make up the shortfalls in its own levels of advanced
military technology. However, since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, most Western
countries, including those of the European Union, have maintained an arms export ban
because of diplomatic pressure from the United States and Japanese governments. That
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is why China has been forced to obtain such advanced technology through Russian
channels. Russia is a major arms exporter and the country receiving the largest amount
of Russian-made arms in recent years has been China. In 2000, a 15-year Military
Cooperation Plan was concluded between Moscow and Beijing as an incentive measure
for boosting arms trade, licence transfers and cooperation for research and
development. 135 In 2006, President Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao confirmed the two
countries had forged unprecedented good relations. 136 Consequently, a honeymoon
period between the two countries revitalized the Russian military industry. In addition,
China has also relied on Russian energy resources for its economic growth. China’s oil
import from Russia is expected to reach 20 to 30 million tons in 2010. 137 According to
Ariel Cohen, their strategic partnership could counteract a unipolar world led by the
United States, and promote border demarcation, weapons sales, technological transfer,
access to resources, and suppressing violent Islamic militants in Central Asia. 138

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is composed of China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Originally called the Shanghai Five, it
was founded in 1996. After Uzbekistan acceded to Shanghai Five in 2001, it was
renamed. The SCO is a form of alignment. 139 According to Thomas S. Wilkins, “The
SCO represents the correlation of multiple strategic partnership dyads into a combined
institutional form; a ‘strategic partnership network’” 140 Strategic partnerships “are
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primarily goal-driven rather than threat-driven alignments.” 141 A Chinese initiative, the
SCO focuses on cooperation in the areas of territorial issues, anti-terrorism, energy,
economics and trade, finance and education, as its primary targets. 142 In addition, a
significant SCO regional security objective is to struggle against the so-called “three
evils”: terrorism, separatism and extremism. 143 Its cooperation on energy matters
commands considerable attention. For instance, establishing an energy association in
the SCO was proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the holding of an
Energy Ministers Meeting in Iran was suggested by Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, for
the strengthening of energy cooperation between countries related to the SCO. 144

Collectively, SCO member states account for 25 per cent of the world’s population, 23
per cent of its oil reserves, 55 per cent of its natural gas, and 35 per cent of its coal.145
This promotes the influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. There is a huge
gap between the military powers of the other Central Asian countries compared to the
two great continental powers. Needless to say, the SCO represents nothing less than an
evolving continental coalition between the two land power giants, which are nuclear
armed permanent members of U.N. Security Council.

In June 2006, the SCO countries held their sixth annual summit at the fifth anniversary
of the establishment of the SCO. They issued a joint statement to confirm cooperation in
fighting threats posed by three evils, as well as illegal drug trafficking. 146 In the joint
declaration, the SCO, whose regimes are either established autocracies or autocratic
leaning, indirectly criticized the United States by calling on Washington to respect
differences in civilizations, to ban the export of democracy and social development and
discard “double standards”. 147 There was a marked wariness among the SCO states, in
particular, regarding U.S. support for democratization in Georgia and Ukraine.
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The issue of uranium enrichment by Iran brought to light the problems involved in the
anti-U.S. character of the SCO. Some analysts think the SCO has been gradually
evolving to be a more sophisticated defence coalition aimed at responding to U.S.
global influence, including its military involvement in Afghanistan. 148 It has been
argued that Russia seemed to want to push the SCO toward a more defence-oriented
alliance because it views the deployment of American missile defence systems as a
significant threat to Russian security. 149 Russia has also indicated its intention to
welcome Iran’s bid for membership in the SCO. 150 Moreover, both continental giants
have been deeply concerned about the reinforcement of U.S. influence in Central Asia
as a result of the process of deploying its troops to Afghanistan. As one consequence of
these concerns, Russia and China have conducted war games in order to develop their
strategic partnership.

The SCO’s Military Exercises
In August 2003, a total of 1,300 personnel from the five countries then comprising the
SCO took part in a combined military drill held in Kazakhstan in a first phase and in
China in a second phase, in order to practice dealing with “terrorism, separatism and
extremism.” The four-day exercise codenamed “Coalition 2003” focused on promoting
skills of planning operations to counter “intrusions by terrorists.” 151

In August 2005, the first military drill between China and Russia entitled “Peace
Mission 2005” was held on the Shangdong coast of China, in which 8,200 Chinese and
1,800 Russian military personnel took part. 152 Publicly, they announced that the military
exercise was aimed at terrorism, not towards a third country. However, in the final
phase of the drill, a naval group comprised of two submarines and seven surface
warships, including the large Russian anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessel Marshal
Shapashinikov and the destroyer Burny, found and defeated enemy submarines after the
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group imposed a sea blockade. 153 They also conducted an amphibious landing operation
involving seven landing ships. Additionally, strategic bombers such as the Tu-22M3
Backfire and Tu-95MS Bear participated and launched long-range land-attack and antiship missiles. It seemed to envisage a scenario of attacking the JMSDF and U.S. aircraft
carriers amid preparations for the invasion of Taiwan. In any case, such exercises
involving significant naval capabilities could hardly be viewed as appropriate for
practising supposedly “counter-terrorism” operations. Western experts did not
completely deny the possibility that Peace Mission 2005 could represent part of
preparations to attack Taiwan. 154

In August 2007, all six member countries and a total of 6,500 personnel (2,000 soldiers,
36 aircraft and 2,500 logistics personnel from Russia; 1,600 soldiers and 46 aircraft
from China; and just 200 from Kazakhstan, 120 from Tajikistan, 30 from Kyrgyzstan
and 20 from Uzbekistan) took part in a combined anti-terrorism military drill. For the
first time, all leaders of the six nations watched the exercise, which was hosted by
Russia. 155 The exercise scenario was that terrorists had seized a small town and held
hundreds of people hostage. They made a strong display of the solidarity of the SCO
through their enthusiasm in performing the drill. This exercise cost Russia about two
billion rubles (US$80 million). 156

In July 2009, Peace Mission 2009 was conducted as a combined anti-terror military
exercise between Russia and China. Each side sent about 1,300 personnel from the army
and air force to the exercise in Jilin Province in northeastern China, involving land
forces and combat aircraft. 157

In September 2010, the SCO’s anti-terrorist exercises “Peace Mission 2010” in
Kazakhstan involved more than 5,000 troops, 1,600 armed vehicles, 100 cannons and
mortars and 50 combat aircraft and helicopters from Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan,
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Russia and Tajikistan. 158 Uzbekistan did not take part. The 17-day joint military drills
were to promote the interoperability of the SCO armed forces.
The Issue of the Northern Territories
For a sea power state, it is extremely dangerous to clash with not just one but two great
land power states at the same time; but Japan might face such a difficult situation due
not only to its growing competitive relationship with China, but also because of a
longstanding territorial dispute with Russia. The closest island from Hokkaido, Kaigara
Island in the Habamai islands, is 3.7 kilometres from Nozapp Point in Hokkaido and the
farthermost island, Etorofu, is 144.5 kilometres from Nozapp Point. The gross area of
these “Northern Territories” (or southern Kuriles to the Russians) is 5,036 square
kilometres (see Map 1). The largest island, Etorofu, is 3182.7 square kilometres in
size. 159 Until the end of the Pacific War, 15 August 1945, all 17,000 inhabitants of the
four islands were Japanese. By 1 January 2005, the number of Russian immigrants was
3,195 in Shikotan, 6,697 in Kunashiri, and 6,904 in Etorofu, totally reaching about
16,796. 160 The Japanese government announced that “The Northern Territories are an
integral part of Japan's sovereign territory that continues to be illegally occupied by
Russia. The Government of the United States of America has also consistently
supported Japan’s position”. 161

The History of the Northern Territories
In the Edo period, the Russians could not expand southward into the islands from its
own Uruppu Island (located to the north of Etorofu), because the Tokugawa shogunate,
which had adopted an isolationist policy, placed guardhouses in the islands to protect
them from foreign intrusion. 162 In the18th century, Russia colonized Uruppu Island but
withdrew again in 1805. Japan’s feudal government, the Edo Shogunate, conducted the
research of Chishima. Since 1795, the shogunate built up the defence of eastern Yezo
(Hokkaido) as a shogunate’s territory in 1799, and established a farming community
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system in Etorofu. This was the way that Japan came to take sovereignty in Southern
Chishima. 163

In 1855, both governments set a demarcation line between Etorofu Island and Uruppu
Island. This is the origin of the border of the Northern Territories. During the Second
World War, the Soviet Union unilaterally abandoned its neutrality pact with Japan. 164
Even after Japan surrendered on 8 August 1945, the Soviet forces carried on the
occupation operation. Indeed, all four islands were occupied from 28 August to 5
September 1945. 165 All Japanese inhabitants were forced to leave this area by July 1947.
In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, and in accordance with Article 2 of
the treaty, Japan renounced its rights to South Karafuto and the Kurile Islands, but the
treaty did not specify ownership of the Northern Territories. The Soviet Union,
discontented with the matter, did not conclude this treaty. As a result, both Japan and
Russia claim territorial rights over this area. 166
In 1956, even though Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō failed to arrange a peace treaty
with Russia and to negotiate the return of the Northern Territories, the Japan-Soviet
Joint Declaration was signed and the two countries resumed diplomatic relations. 167
Article 9 of the declaration stipulated that the Soviet Union agreed to return Habamai
and Shikotan under the condition of the conclusion of peace accords between them, but
the Joint Declaration left unsettled the matter on Kunashiri and Etorofu. After the JapanU.S. agreement was concluded, however, the Soviet Union insisted on the possibility of
the use of the islands as military bases by foreign armed forces and adopted a hardline
attitude, stating that “the issue is closed”. 168

The impact of the Cold War thus slowed down the process of finding a solution to this
issue. In addition, the Kremlin pushed forward with the reinforcement of Kunashiri and
Etorofu as military bases. In 1979, the Soviet Union deployed 2,300 soldiers and built
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full-scale bases on both Kunashiri and Etorofu. In August 1985, the Soviet Union
conducted a large scale naval drill in Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan, Sakhalin islands,
with more than 30 submarines and surface ships. 169 The Gorbachev administration took
a softer line towards the issue which had made no progress for a long time. Russia still
currently occupies Kunasiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai group, a position
extant ever since its initial invasion of the islands. Russian ground troops have been
deployed on Kunasiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands. Although military conflict has
never erupted since the Soviets occupied the Northern Territories, there have been a
great many incidents involving Japanese fishing boats and crews and Russian
authorities.

Incidents
On 8 May 1966, a Japanese trawler boat, Dai Jyuichi Shinyou Maru, was fishing in
waters around the northwest of Kunashiri Island. While returning home, the fishing boat
was rammed by a Soviet patrol boat, which attempted to forcefully board the boat, and
subsequently the fishing boat keeled over and sank. All Soviet personnel were saved
and safe, but six Japanese fishermen were lost. 170 On 8 August 1969, a Japanese squidfishing vessel, Dai Jyūsan Fukujyū Maru, was hit by a Soviet patrol boat, and twelve
Japanese crews died. 171 From 1949 to 2004, for example, the total number of boats and
crew arrested reached 1,249 and 8,991, respectively. Twenty-nine Japanese have been
killed by gunfire and sinkings carried out by Russian border patrols. 172

Strategic Value
The Northern Territories are rich in natural resources. On 1 February 2005, the Russian
Ministry of Natural Resources officially stated that there were natural resources such as
oil, natural gas, gold, iron, and titanium present in the South Kurile Islands (the
Northern Territories), and the Russian Far East and central governments regard the
exploitation of natural resources in the South Kuriles as a strategic target. According to
a local geologist, the estimated amount of oil deposits is 364 million tons around this
169
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area. 173 Moreover, sulphur deposits on Etorofu, agate deposits on Shikotan and gravel
beds in Kunashiri were also discovered. There was also the discovery of a strategic rare
metal, rhenium, in three of the four islands, which is essential for aerospace industries
and used as a catalyst for petrochemical processes and electronic material production. In
a volcano on Etorofu, 15-20 tons of rhenium could be produced annually. 174 Moreover,
the Sakhalin state government issued a report that stated that waters off Kunashiri and
Shikotan Islands could be profitable tourist resorts that could attract tourists from all
over the world because waters around the two islands are suitable for scuba diving, and
there are also hot springs on the islands. In fact, the natural environment of the Northern
islands is largely unspoilt. 175

Besides, there have been prosperous marine products industries exploiting the waters
around these islands since early times, because the Chishima cold current and the
Tsushima warm current cross each other in Northern Territories waters. In pre-War days,
Japanese used to catch sea tangle, salmon, trout, cod, pollack, king crabs and trepangs,
for example. In the past, this sea area was regarded as one of three major fishing
grounds in the world. The annual catch of marine resources is estimated to be valued at
about US$2 billion. On Kunashiri and Etorofu, forestry (mainly coniferous trees), fish
hatching (salmon and trout), a mining industry (gold, silver, sulphur) are prosperous.
Japan and Russia concluded some fishing agreements but frictions over maritime
interests remain. 176

Taking military strategy into consideration, this area was exceedingly valuable during
the Cold War. The Soviet Union was concerned that if it had returned the four islands to
Japan, a U.S. base would have been placed in the Northern Territories based on the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In spite of the fact that the strategic value of the islands is
no longer as important as it was in the past, Russia still takes precautions, since the
Japanese government set up a SDF base in this area, which it lets the U.S. Army use. 177
For Russia, its domination of the islands enables Russian forces to protect and control
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access around the Sea of Okhotsk, where Russian submarine fleets are deployed. From
1992 to 1993, the Russian military succeeded in drawing the Russian people’s attention
to the strategic significance of the Southern Kurile Islands. As result, hard-liners
opposed to resolving the issue with Japan by making territorial concessions were given
a boost and further reasons to continue their anti-Japanese policy. 178 Currently, the
Russian government is trying resolve the issue by the two territory demand (i.e., by
keeping just Habamai and Shikotan), but the Japanese government does not want to
give an inch in its demand for the return of all four islands.

The Korean Peninsula
Korean Strategic Culture and Japan
The Korean peninsula projects southward from the Asian continent and is faced by
China to the west and Russia to the north, while it is only 120 miles across the
Tsushima Strait to Japan to the east. 179 Effectively a land bridge connecting the Asian
mainland and the sea, the peninsula has always been recognized for its geo-strategic
significance to neighbouring great powers. 180 Geopolitical destiny has burdened Korea
with a historical legacy of humiliation and suffering. 181 According to Kang Choi, Korea
has experienced more than nine hundred foreign invasions. 182 Of these, five incidents
deserve special mention: the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century; the Japanese
invasion in the sixteenth century; the Qing invasions in the seventeenth century; the
Japanese colonial occupation in the twentieth century; and the Korean War. 183 Choi
argues that the hard experience of foreign invasions has made the Korean people
sensitive toward security issues and has created a fatalistic and paranoid attitude. 184
Geo-strategically, it is to be expected that there is a possibility that Korea might suffer
frequent foreign invasions. As a consequence, Koreans have needed to develop flexible
attitudes against external invasions in order to keep their national identity and to protect
178
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their independence. In this way, strong communal identity and a highly nationalistic
attitude have been created. 185 Kang Choi asserts further that:

Such a geographical setting has made those ruling Korea very conscious
about any shift in the balance of power, especially in the Asian mainland. As
a small state surrounded by great powers, Korea’s security has depended on
the success of the way it defines, establishes, maintains and manipulates its
relations with neighbouring great powers. In part as a result of the
tremendous power difference between Korea and its neighbours, Korea has
acquired a tendency to emphasize the importance of political/diplomatic
measures over military means and to define security in broader times. 186
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Korea was the battleground in the
wars fought among China, Japan and Russia. Japan, the winner of these wars, annexed
Korea in 1910, and ruled the country and tried to assimilate it for 36 years until Japan
itself was defeated in 1945. After the overthrow of the Japanese, the peninsula was
divided and became part of the front line between the East and the West during the Cold
War. Thus, the political status of the Korean peninsula has been at the heart of
geopolitical machinations in East Asia. Because of its location, Korea has had to repel
great power invasions to preserve or change the status quo to its advantage.

Geo-strategically, a peninsula which functions as a bridge from the continent to the
ocean carries a crucial role for surrounding countries; therefore, regional powers
invariably contest control over such a peninsula. The Korean peninsula is a typical
example. Great threats to the Japanese archipelago have arisen historically from the
Asian continent via the Korean peninsula. In recorded history, there have been a number
of great continental powers such as the Mongol empire, the Qing Dynasty and Russia in
different guises, which had ambitions of achieving maritime power. Accordingly,
Japan’s security has been greatly affected by the question of whether the Korean
peninsular is occupied by a pro-Japan polity or not. If the peninsula was under an
ambitious land power’s control, this strategic circumstance might ensnare Japan in a
fateful crisis, as occurred in the attempted Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty invasions of Japan
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in the late thirteenth century. 187 That is why the peninsula was called “a dagger aimed at
the heart of Japan”. 188 Actually, Japan itself has historically dispatched troops to the
Korean peninsula in order to hold off land power advances. In modern times, Japan
embarked upon the Sino-Japanese War to exclude the Qing Dynasty, and subsequently,
eliminated Russia’s influence from the peninsula by a narrow victory over the Russians
in the Russo-Japanese War. Maritime Japan always fought against great continental
powers for its survival, using the Korean peninsula as a battleground and buffer. 189 In
Japanese strategic thought, the geo-strategic relationship between Japan’s security and
the Korean peninsula has been akin to an immutable law.

History suggests that Korean states have had to calculate the influence of external
power for their survival because of the location of the Korean peninsula as the area
where formidable maritime powers and continental powers have confronted each other
for supremacy. Korea has always been fearful, or at least mindful, of the shadow cast by
major Asian land powers over the peninsula; hence, they came to embrace
“Sinocentrism”. As a consequence, they have tended to look down on other Asian
countries, including Japan, compared to the way they view Chinese civilization. 190 The
Korean peninsula has been historically surrounded by powerful countries, leading it to
lean politically toward the strongest. Thus, the interplay of great power relations has
been part of the Korean strategic culture. The question of a unified Korean peninsula,
and whether the hypothetical unified country embraces democracy, a free market
economy and a pro-American maritime order, or rather becomes dependent on a
strengthening China in opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance, would be highly
significant for Japan’s future.

The Syngman Rhee Line and the Takeshima Issue
Takeshima (Take Island or Dokdo in Korean) is composed of two small islands,
Higashijima and Nishiijma, and a few dozen rock reefs. It is a solitary island in the Sea
187
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of Japan located 157 kilometres from Iki Island, 220 kilometres from Shimane
Prefecture and 215 kilometres from Uljin in South Korea (see Map 1). The total area of
this island is 0.21 square kilometres. 191 In pre-War times, Japan effectively controlled
this island but South Korea has controlled it since July 1954 until the present. 192 South
Korea currently occupies the rock and its coast guard is stationed there.

In 1618, a Japanese shipping agent officially received the Edo Shogunate’s permission
to cross over to the uninhabited island to for gather abalone and hunt sea lions. 193 In
1904, a Japanese fishery operator, Yōzaburō Nakai from Iki Island asked the Edo
Shogunate to seize and loan Takeshima in order to hunt sea lions. Then, on 28 January
1905, the Japanese government officially named the island Takeshima, which was
placed under the jurisdiction of the then Shimane Prefecture in a Cabinet meeting. 194 On
27 September 1945, General Headquarters (GHQ) established the boundary of the
restraining area for fishing known as the “MacArthur Line”, but Takeshima lay outside
of the area. Since then, Takeshima has been a complicated sovereignty issue. In addition,
in the draft report of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Takeshima was regarded as South
Korean territory. However, after the U.S. State Department admitted the legitimacy of
Japan’s claim to the island, the MacArthur Line was abolished in the final plan of the
treaty and Takeshima came to be regarded as Japanese territory. 195 Although the South
Korean ambassador to the United States objected to this matter, Secretary of State
Dulles rejected the demand, saying Takeshima has never been treated as part of South
Korea. 196 Consequently, Takeshima was excluded from Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan on the renunciation of territorial rights.

Nevertheless, just before the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective on 28 April
1952, the first president of South Korea, Rhee Syngman, suddenly declared a “Korean
Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Sea”, and established a
boundary which included Takeshima within the “Syngman Rhee Line” on reasons of
191
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protecting Korea’s maritime resources. In the following year, on 12 January 1953,
President Rhee issued instructions to prevent Japanese fishing boats operating within
the Syngman Rhee Line. The Japanese government criticized Seoul and dispatched JCG
patrol boats to the area around Takeshima after the peace treaty came into force. On
account of the Korean War, South Korean forces and police exercised minimal
tolerance to assert their country’s sovereignty over the area. A volunteer garrison was
inaugurated as a militia organization to protect Dokdo and occupied the island from 30
April 1953. In August 1954, the South Korean government sent its coast guard to
Takeshima to build a lighthouse. On 25 September 1954, the Japanese Government
submitted a proposal to present the Takeshima issue to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which was refused by South Korea on the ground that there is no territorial issue
between Japan and South Korea. 197

In June 1965, the normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea was concluded.
Furthermore, the Rhee Syngman Line was abolished and a Japan-South Korea fisheries
pact was concluded, without solving the Takeshima issue. The fisheries agreement was
based on the principle of flag state jurisdiction. Therefore, even though South Korean
fishing boats overfished within Japanese waters, the Japanese government could do
nothing about the matter. 198 Even though South Korea entered into an agreement to
crack down on South Korean fishing boats operating around Japanese Waters in 1980,
the Japanese fishing industry nevertheless asked the government to deal with South
Korean violations. 199 However, under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), the
littoral state has jurisdiction over illegal activities which occur within its territorial sea.
The amount of “losses” caused by Japan’s fish catch estimated by the South Korean
government as a result of the agreement was 1,253 billion won, and that estimated by
the South Korean fishing industry was from five billion to 30 billion won. 200 In 1999, a
new Japan-South Korea fishery pact was agreed which excluded the water area of
Takeshima, set the EEZ and operating conditions and was concluded on the basis of the
197
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spirit of the LOSC. However, the two countries have a trend of growing nationalism on
this issue. The South Koreans have been especially influenced by an emotive
nationalism that often harks back to Japan’s colonial past on the peninsula.
The Japanese government position on the issue of Takeshima is as follows: 201

1. In the light of historical facts and based upon international law, it is
apparent that Takeshima is an inherent part of the territory of Japan.
2. The occupation of Takeshima by the Republic of Korea is an illegal
occupation undertaken on absolutely no basis in international law. Any
measures taken with regard to Takeshima by the Republic of Korea based on
such an illegal occupation have no legal justification.
Still, even though the Japanese government has put forward a suggestion to the South
Korean government to settle the issue in the ICJ, the South Korean government
continues to refuse to entertain such a proposal.

Incidents
A large number of incidents have occurred related to this issue. On 4 January 1952,
Japanese fishing boats operating in waters around Cheju Island, Dai ichi Daihoumaru
and Dai ni Daihoumaru, were captured and the chief fisherman Jujiro Seto was shot by
the Koreans. The South Korean side ignored the request of the Japanese crews to treat
Seto, who died on 6 February 1952. Also, South Korea ignored the Japanese request to
cremate Seto. The Japanese seamen sold their property to buy firewood, and cremated
the body themselves. The rest of the Japanese crew were not provided with adequate
food and were forced to put their signatures on record stating that they had violated
South Korean territorial waters. Later on, it was discovered that the Japanese ships had
operated on the high seas. The U.S. commander of the Fleet Escort Force blockading
the Korean littoral requested talks with President Rhee, who expressed regret for the
incident. On 15 January, the Japanese fishermen returned home escorted by a U.S.
frigate. 202
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After this incident, confrontation between the two countries escalated. On 27 June in the
same year, the Japan Coast Guard in cooperation with the Shimane Prefecture drove the
Korean garrison from Takeshima and put up a wooden sign signifying that it is Japanese
territory; yet the Koreans returned as soon as the JCG had left. This incident triggered
President Rhee to order the police to deliver mortars and rifles. Since that time, the
Japan Coast Guard has never been able to land on Takeshima. Since 1956, South
Korean armed police replaced the volunteer garrison as the occupying force on
Takeshima. 203 On 12 July 1953, when a JCG patrol boat, Hekura, arrived at Takeshima,
it came across three South Korean vessels with about 40 fishermen, including seven
who called themselves police. The JCG demanded that the fishermen who ventured onto
Hekura leave Takeshima. However, the fishermen refused, and fired a few dozen shots
when Hekura’s crew were trying to leave; one of the bullets hitting the Hekura. 204 On
23 August 1954, when the JCG patrol boat, Oki, approached to a distance of 700 metres
from Takeshima, it was shot at a few dozen times at the Nishijima cave and several
bullets hit the ship. On 21 November 1954, when both Hekura and Oki approached
north of Takeshima, they came under artillery fire. Artillery shells landed on the sea
surface one metre from the Japanese boats. The JCG crews saw three 3-inch guns and
about 15 security personnel on top of Higashijima. From the end of the Second World
War to the abolition of the Syngman Rhee Line in 1965, a total of 328 Japanese vessels
were captured and 44 Japanese killed or wounded by South Korean forces. 205

Values
The waters around Takeshima seem to be rich in methane hydrate deposits, a potentially
lucrative future fuel resource. In terms of fishery resources, there are mainly good
catches of sardine, jack, mackerel, cuttlefish, yellowtail, flatfish, flounder, flying fish,
turban shell and red snow crab. In recent years, red snow crab catches have sharply
decreased because the South Koreans also fish in the same area. 206 After Japan and
South Korea ratified a new Japan-South Korea fisheries agreement in 1996, the waters
around Takeshima were provisionally made a cooperative management area. However,
Japanese fishing boasts were shut out, and were not allowed to approach within a
203
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certain distance from the island. As a result of this, the catch of red snow crab has been
sharply decreasing in Shimane Prefecture, which stated a claim to the island and started
celebrating “Takeshima Day” to prevent the issue from being forgotten, 207 as opposed
to the Japanese government’s more cautious diplomatic approach. The South Koreans
insist that Japan took possession of Takeshima in 1905 to geo-strategically hold a
dominant position in the Russo-Japanese War. 208

The Tsushima Issue
Tsushima and Wars in Japanese History
Tsushima is an island located 138 kilometres from Hakata, and 49.5 kilometres from
Pusan in South Korea. Tsushima’s land area is 708.66 square kilometres, 209 and it has a
population of about 36,000. 210 One of the earliest Japanese history books, Kojiki (A
Record of Ancient Matters), narrates the story of two gods in Japanese mythology,
Izanagi and Izanami, who bore eight islands, one of which is Tsushima. In history,
several great wars were waged around the Tsushima Strait. Japan being an isolated
country, such wars were important events that shaped the course of the nation in
fighting foreign wars.

In 663 A.D., the Battle of Hakusukione was waged between Yamato Japan-Baekje and
the Tang Dynasty China-Silla. In this war, Yamato Japan was defeated and lost its hold
on the Korean peninsula. In the tenth century, pirates from the peninsula often
marauded around the islands of Tsushima. In 1019, a group of 50 Manchurian pirate
ships attacked Tsushima, Iki Island and the coastal region of southern Kyushu, causing
tremendous damage. In October 1274, the fleet of the Mongol Yuan dynasty and
Goryeo, with 40,000 personnel, attacked Tsushima and Iki Island and slaughtered many
people. The Mongols, however, failed to land due to effective counter-attacks launched
from the islands. In 1281, the Yuan dynasty built two vast forces to invade Japan: one
composed of 40,000 departed from the Korean Peninsula and another with 160,000 left
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for Japan from the Chinese mainland. 211 Again, a large number of people in Tsushima
were killed by invaders. In 1419, 200 Korean Joseon dynasty warships led by Jong-mu
Lee assaulted Tsushima, which was being used as a base for pirates, but they were
defeated by Tsushima troops led by Sadamori Sou. In the following year, Korea
dispatched an envoy to Shogun Yoshimochi Ashikaga with a peace proposal. The
shogunate administration and Korea concluded a peace agreement. From that time, the
issue of Japanese piracy was brought to a close, and Tsushima played an important role
in trading between Japan and Korea. 212

Later, when Toyotomi sent troops to the Korean peninsula in 1592 and 1597, a large
number of Tsushima’s residents were inducted into the army and dispatched to the
battlefields. Tsushima became the army assembly area. Before the war against MingJoseon, trade with Korea was the main source of income for Tsushima, but the two wars
seriously affected Tsushima’s economy. In the Edo period, Tsushima Domain made
efforts to construct amicable relations with Joseon and took care of diplomacy towards
Korea. 213

After Russia and Britain concluded the Convention of Peking in 1860, the two countries
were in competition over interests in the Far East. In 1861, a Russian naval vessel
arrived at Tsushima and stayed there. Russia occupied a part of Tsushima for use in
conflicts with Japan. It was also strategically important for Russia as it lies within the
narrow straits separating Japan (Kyushu) and Korea, and thus guards one potential route
to the open ocean from the Russian Far East. As a consequence of the fact that Russia
and Britain were keeping an eye on Tsushima as a geo-strategically important point,
Russia had a head start on the island. 214 The British monitored Russian movement there
and made a strong protest to Russia. Eventually, the Russian vessel left Tsushima after
the Russian foreign minister ordered it to leave because it was causing an aggravation of
the international political situation. 215 After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese
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government build 30 fortresses on Tsushima in order to protect Japanese territory. 216
And, the Tsushima Strait was the location of Admiral Togo’s momentous defeat of the
Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. 217

South Korea and Tsushima
After the end of World War II, the first president of South Korea, Rhee Syngman,
appealed to GHQ for control of Tsushima, but GHQ rejected the approach as groundless.
There ensued a competition with the enactment of an ordinance calling for a
“Takeshima Day” by the Shimane prefectural assembly and the Masan municipal
assembly (Gyeongsangnam-do, South Korea). The Masan municipal assembly chose 19
June as the Day of Tsushima on 18 March 2005, in order to send the message at home
and abroad that Tsushima is South Korean soil and to secure their territorial rights. 218 In
July 2008, 21 Korean military veterans made a visit to Tsushima to stake a claim to
Takeshima. It provoked strong reactions from the local inhabitants. 219

On the other hand, in recent years, the number of Korean visitors to Tsushima has been
steadily rising. The numbers have increased to about 65,000 in 2007 after the regular
line between Pusan and Tsushima was launched. 220 Some of them conduct political
activities to stake Korea’s territorial claim over Takeshima and Tsushima. Tsushima
residents have been plagued by their behaviour and activities. 221

The sea area around Tsushima, where a warm current flows into the waters between
Kyushu and the Korean peninsula, is a fertile fishing ground. In the area of the Korean
littoral of the Sea of Japan, catches of fish have greatly declined due to marine
contamination by advancing urban-industrial society and overfishing. For this reason,
South Korean fishing boats operate on the sea boundary between the two countries, and
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sometimes intrude into Japanese territorial waters. The JCG deployed to Tsushima are
tasked to deal with illegal Korean fishing boats and contend with potential troubles in
the area. 222

Tsushima has also suffered from the effects of the rural exodus and the number of
people living on the island has been dwindling at a rate of about 1,100 annually. This is
why Tsushima’s economy has to depend on tourists from South Korea, but Korean
tourists tend to spend money at places that Koreans frequent. As a consequence, the
impact of tourism on the economic growth of Tsushima is minimal. 223 Most importantly,
in recent years, there have been many cases of Tsushima’s land being sold to Korean
capitalists, including the land where the monument commemorating the imperial visit
lies. 224 For instance, there is a JMSDF radar facility in Tsushima, with a South Koreanowned hotel right next to it. There are a lot of accommodation facilities, parking fields
for motorcoaches and a dock at the site of the hotel. It is impossible to see the premises
from outside because it is surrounded by walls and the sea, but boats have access to
it. 225 There are also two guest houses near the JMSDF facility. The Japanese are unsure
of exactly how much land the Korean have acquired since many of these purchases are
carried out under a Japanese name or through a local corporation established by a
Korean. 226

Supposing that a conflict or destabilization breaks out on the Korean peninsula, there is
a possibility that many thousands of refugees would flood the border of the peninsula
and escape toward Tsushima. 227 In 2008, Japanese national Diet members heightened
the sense of crisis and held seminars to study the situation of Tsushima. Meanwhile,
Tsushima’s city council members have started activities to encourage the Japanese
government to enact a law for the defence of the island. On 26 January 2009, the
Tsushima city council filed a petition with the Ministry of Defense to require a build-up
of JSDF stationary troops. There is a systemic flaw in the defence of Tsushima. An
effective defence system for the island needs about one standing regiment, an air unit, a
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secure practice area, the establishment of ammunition bunkers and personnel
distribution. A Japanese newspaper, Sankei News, sent out questionnaires on land
acquisition in Tsushima by Koreans to all members of each of the Diet’s two chambers,
721 representatives, and the response rate was only a little over ten per cent. The result
of this survey is obvious proof of the lack of awareness of the importance of the
Tushima territorial issue among Japanese politicians. 228

In July 2008, 50 South Korean lawmakers introduced a resolution demanding the return
of Tsushima. According to opinion polls, 50.6 per cent of South Koreans supported this
resolution. 229 Even though the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF (approximately 700
personnel) were stationed in Tsushima, according to a report on Tsushima by the
inspection party of Japanese Diet members for the protection of Japanese territory in
January 2009, the JGSDF lacked live ammunition, the JMSDF has no ships based there,
and the JASDF lacks even a single helicopter. 230 Furthermore, illegal fishing is rampant
there among South Koreans but maritime law enforcement is not fully applied to them
by the JCG and Japanese police. 231 Afterwards, in the same month, the Tsushima mayor
and the president of the Tsushima municipal assembly visited the Ministry of Defense
to present a petition to the top Defense bureaucrat. The petition demands the following
reinforcement of the JSDF: for the JGSDF, the continuous station of one regiment, the
deployment of a helicopter unit, the securing of a place for military drills, the
construction of ammunition depot, and the securing of prepositioning space for
ammunition and equipment; for the JMSDF, the preparation of the basin for warships,
the deployment of patrol helicopters and missile ships; and for the JASDF, the
preparation of an airport at which a large transport plane can take off and land, and the
preparation of an assault course. 232

“Tsushima ga Abunai: Kokkai Giin Hikui Ryōdo Ishiki [Tsushima in Danger: Diet Member’s Low
Awareness],”Sankei News, 16 December 2008.
229
“Nihon ni Tsushima Henkan Yōkyu Subeki Sansei 50.6% [South Korea Should Reclaim Tsushima
from Japan 50.6% of South Korean Diet Member Agree],” JoongAng Ilbo (online), 27 July 2007.
230
“Tsuhima ga Abunai: Sakimori Shinpō Sagyō Chakushu e, Giren Seifu e Soukyu Chōsa Motomeru
[Tsushima in Danger: Commencing Working for New Defense Law, Group of Diet Members Calling for
Urgent Research],” Sankei News, 15 January 2009,
231
Ibid.
232
“Tsushima no Jieitai Zōkyō wo” Sichō to Shigikai Ikko Rentai Jyōchu nado Yōbō [“Please JSDF
Buildup in Tsushima”, Mayor and City Council Demanding One Regiment Station],” Asagumo News, 29
January 2009.
228

117

South Korea’s Naval Expansion
Currently, South Korea has ridden the crest of the regional trend of a seapower boom.
Koh Young Choul asserts that there are several factors that have allowed South Korea
to become a formidable maritime state. These include its geopolitical location as a
peninsula with easy access to the sea, favourable coastlines for the construction of ports,
shipbuilding capacity and 5.5 million people involved with ocean-related activities, the
pioneering spirit to developing marine resources, and a strong political will. The second
earliest Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in the world was established in
Korea. The South Korean shipping industry has maintained its top position in the world
in terms of numbers of ships manufactured. Moreover, the container handling capability
of Pusan port is the world’s fifth largest and the amount of marine fish landings is the
eighth largest in the world. South Korea also has world-class shipbuilding capabilities
that enable it to build increasingly sophisticated warships locally. 233

Still, South Korea has been embroiled in an unfinished state of war with North Korea
for a long time. South Korea has advanced considerably the strengthening of its naval
capabilities in recent years. The South Korean navy used to be a purpose-made brown
water force to deal with the North Korean navy’s small ships and mini submarines. Now,
high-speed craft and patrol ships have been acquired which constitute the heart of the
strength of the South Korean naval units focused on the North. In many respects,
compared with North Korea’s army-based forces, South Korea still needs to reinforce
its ground forces for possible high intensity land conflict. The South Korean navy was
actually a low profile force until the country experienced rapid economic growth during
the 1980s. 234 Afterwards, South Korea’s rapid economic growth made it aware of the
inseparable relationships between a strong navy and an economy tied closely to SLOC
and marine resources. As a result, new warships, including Aegis-equipped
destroyers, 235 have been developed by South Korea’s domestic shipbuilding industry.
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According to Koh, building nuclear-powered submarines and even aircraft carriers is
part of the long-term plan of the Republic of Korea Navy. 236 Koh insists that South
Korea aims to possess a blue water navy which is able to contribute to regional stability
and act as a balancer of peace. 237 In order to transform into such a navy, it has been
proceeding with what has been called the “KDX Project” to build new destroyers. The
KDX-1 Gwanggaetodaewang-class destroyer (4,000 tons) has capabilities to respond to
three dimensions, surface, sub-surface and air warfare, with the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow
anti-air missile and Goal Keeper close-in-weapon-system (CIWS), Harpoon anti-ship
missile, and Super Lynx MK-99 anti-submarine helicopter. The KDX-2 Chungmugong
Yi Sunshin-class (5,000 tons) sports the primary fleet air defence weapon SM-2 and the
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) as new equipment and the hull is equipped with
stealth technology. 238 The Republic of Korea Navy plans to build six 5,600-ton KDX2A Aegis ships between 2019 and 2026. 239 The KDX-3 King Sejong the Great-class
destroyer is modelled after the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class. KDX-3, a state-of-the-art
Aegis destroyer loaded with SM-2 long-range anti-air missiles, commissioned in
December 2008. South Korea thus became the fifth state to possess a warship with the
Aegis combat system. South Korea’s navy will build two of the three planed KDX-3
Aegis ships, and one will be launched before 2012. 240

In terms of submarines, three diesel submarines (1,800 tons) with very quiet air
independent propulsion (AIP) systems were built under the KSS-2 project. The navy
will build nine 1,800-ton submarines by 2018. 241 Also, the KSS-3 project was
announced in 2001 to build a very advanced, large 3,000-ton plus class of submarine. 242
The South Korean navy has plans to construct six KDX-3 Aegis destroyers, nine 3,500
ton KSS-3 submarines, and three substantial Dokdo-class amphibious helicopter assault
ships by 2020. Notably, it is said that South Koreans have been considering KSS-3 as a
nuclear-powered boat and even the possibility of building an aircraft carrier. These
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plans have been reported to include development of a 35,000 ton-class light aircraft
carrier equipped to carry 20 vertical take off and landing (VSTOL) fighters and ten antisubmarine helicopters. 243 In addition, the South Korean government is developing a
naval base on the southernmost island of the Korean peninsula, Jeju Island, located at a
cost of about US$850 million. When the Jeju naval base is constructed, the South
Korean navy could expeditiously deploy its fleets to the east side and west side of the
Korean Peninsula and defend its SLOC from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. 244
In April 2009, Seoul officially approved a plan to construct the new strategic base on
Jeju Island, which can accommodate two 150,000 ton-class cruise liners and will
become the home port for 20 naval vessels. These warships will compose a “strategic
mobile squadron” to be launched by 2015. The mobile squadron will consist of KDX-2
destroyers, KDX-3 Aegis destroyers, KSS-2 submarines and frigates. 245

Reasons
With such new and capable ships that might in the future form carrier strike groups,
some defence analysts point out that South Korea might have the ambition to elevate its
navy to blue water navy status. Currently, it already has enough naval power (about 190
vessels totalling 154,000 tonnes) to deal with North Korea’s navy (about 650 vessels
totalling 107,000 tonnes). In an article in The Honolulu Adviser, naval and defence
analyst Richard Halloran argues that the “South Korean navy has begun to remake itself
from a coastal patrol force intended to foil North Korea into a blue water fleet able to
project power onto the high seas, which has implications rippling out from Seoul to
Singapore.” 246 He explains the context of this tendency as follows: 247 First, is the aim of
reinforcing the honour and the prestige of the nation. On 25 May 2007, then South
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun displayed feelings of cultural pride in favour of
national unification by saying that “South and North Korea will not keep picking
quarrels with each other forever. We have to equip the nation with the capability to
defend ourselves. The Aegis destroyer could be the best symbol of that capability.” At
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the same time, he showed South Korea’s aspiration to become more independent from
the United States on security matters: “We have to build up an adequate ability in all
areas that constitute war power.” 248

Second, is South Korea’s contribution to its alliance with the United States. The
opinions of South Koreans are split on this issue. There are some who want South
Korea to continue with its alliance with the United States; and there are others who
think that South Korea should take a different path from the United States for more selfdependence or to lean towards the great continental power China, with which it shares a
long history. For a number of naval officers, who had experienced several combined
naval operations with the Americans, the preference is to maintain the alliance with the
great maritime power. An admiral has stated: “The Korean navy should build a force
that can support the South Korea-U.S. alliance.” The third reason is to protect its SLOC.
South Korea’s economy is extremely dependent on international trade transported by
shipping. Its degree of dependence has been even higher than that of Japan. South Korea
cannot conduct foreign trade through the Asian continent because of the divided
peninsula. 249

The fourth reason is an expression of the strong sense of rivalry with Japan. South
Korea still must focus its defences against a North Korea which only possesses patrol
boats, mini submarines and minesweepers. 250 Therefore, strategically speaking, South
Korea does not have to consider the necessity for such an advanced navy to deal with
the North. On the contrary, such naval officers perceive Japan with hostility, which is
shared by the general public in South Korea. Acquiring naval power to rival the
Japanese navy is South Korea’s long-cherished desire. The answer is quite obvious;
considering it even has a naval vessel it has named Dokdo. 251 In recent years, South
Korea has been trying to make Tsushima into a territorial dispute with Japan, along with
the issue of Takeshima. Japan, with its maritime disputes with South Korea, therefore
cannot ignore Korean naval expansion. Indeed, South Korea strikes an overly
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provocative attitude towards Japan. The largest amphibious ship in Asia is named
Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese). A new type of submarine is named Jeong Ji, whose
name was taken from a military officer of the Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392) who
distinguished himself in battles against Japanese pirates. The first Aegis ship is named
King Sejong the Great, during whose rule from 1418 to 1450, Korean forces were sent
to Manchuria to expand the territory and fight Japanese pirates. 252

At the same time, just as India is shifting its defence paradigm from the Himalayas
(against China) to the Indian Ocean, by expanding its naval power, so too is South
Korea shifting its paradigm from a land power-based defence strategy against North
Korea to a strategy emphasizing the sea. 253 According to Retired Admiral JMSDF
Makoto Yamazaki, the South Korean navy intends to overtake the JMSDF’s capability,
with the target year set at 2015. As a matter of fact, South Korea plans to build not only
six Aegis destroyers, but also 18 submarines, more than the 16 submarines that the
JMSDF currently possesses. 254

North Korea
North Korea’s Missile Strategy
During recent years, concerns about the transfer and proliferation of the technology of
ballistic missile have increased in the international community. In Northeast Asia,
China, North Korea and Russia possess a wide variety of ballistic missiles including
types covering Japanese territory. The strategic advantages of ballistic missiles include
the following: relatively modest cost, capability that can easily attack important
facilities even in a distant enemy’s territory, capability that let a holder nation attack
with a one-sided advantage and difficulty for an opponent to defend against them, and a
psychological function to provide enemy populations with a sense of dread. Therefore, a
number of countries recognize the effectiveness of ballistic missiles and some are
actually progressing such a missile strategy. 255
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North Korea, facing allegations of nuclear development, refused to allow inspection
required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and gave notice of
withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. In December
1993, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate was convinced that North Korea had
already created one or two nuclear weapons. 256 In 2002, at talks between Washington
and Pyongyang, Pyongyang admitted North Korea was continuing a secretive nuclear
weapon programme, even though North Korea and the United States had signed an
agreed framework in 1994 in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear
weapons programme; while the United States promised to provide North Korea with a
light water nuclear reactor and interim fuel oil and to have no intention to attack North
Korea. In October 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. Presently, it is a fact
well known that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, and various chemical and
biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction. 257

North Korea country also exports completed missiles, and missile-related technology
and parts. Its ballistic missile exports have been viewed as an important source of
foreign exchange. North Korea has exported missiles and missile-related technologies to
Egypt, Iran, Syria, Pakistan and Yemen. 258 For North Korea, nuclear armament carries a
different meaning. In the case of a conflict occurring on the Korean peninsula,
possessing nuclear weapons takes on significance as a means by which to deter attacks
by U.S. and South Korean forces. Moreover, if Pyongyang calls for suspension of
hostilities after it deployed its armed forces using conventional weapons, its possession
of nuclear weapons could put it in a better bargaining position. Also, North Korea could
use nuclear weapons as a means to threaten surrounding countries in a game of
blackmail diplomacy. 259

In terms of its ballistic missiles, Pyongyang gives different roles to the Nodong and
Taepodong. In May 1993, North Korea conducted a Nodong flight test over the Sea of
Japan. It was reported that the Nodong had a range of 1,300 kilometres, which can reach
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Honshu (the main island of Japan), which also could be used to intimidate other
neighbouring countries. 260. In August 1998, North Korea conducted the test launch of a
Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over Japan and the missile fell into the Pacific Ocean.
Taepodong-1 had a range of 1,500 kilometres. In July 2006, North Korea conducted the
test launch of several missiles including the Scud, Nodong and Taepodong-2. The
strategic targets of Taepodong missiles are Okinawa and potentially the U.S. mainland.
It was reported that the missile range of Taepodong-2 was about 6,000 kilometres.261
The test of a Taepodong missile showed North Korea’s potential for “the real possibility
of direct attack on Japan”. 262

North Korean Covert-operations Boats
It is said that North Korea’s total army force strength is about 1.1 million soldiers.
Importantly, North Korea possesses large special units that engage in subversive
activities, information gathering and guerrilla activity with 100,000 personnel. 263
Particularly in terms of maritime security, the violation of Japanese waters by North
Korean covert operations boats has remained a matter of grave concern for Japan.
According to analysis of its navy, the North Korean government has been using covert
operation vessels and submersibles for collecting information, intelligence activities,
abduction of Japanese nationals, illegal trade, smuggling, narcotics trafficking and so
on. 264 Thirty-five per cent of Japan’s seizures of drugs from 1998 to 2002 seemed to be
relevant to North Korea because of its desperation for foreign currency. 265 In addition,
Pyongyang has officially admitted to the abduction of 13 Japanese citizens in the 1970s
and 1980s to instruct its spies in Japanese customs and language. Many were taken from
beaches by boat across the Sea of Japan. 266
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On 23 March 1999, a JMSDF P-3C spotted a suspicious boat in Japan’s territorial
waters west of Sado Island and also two suspicious boats east of the Noto Peninsula. A
JMSDF escort ship navigating near the area received the report and confirmed that the
boat spotted near Sado Island and one of two around the peninsula were “unidentified”
boats. JCG patrol boats and aircraft chased the boats and fired warning shots, but the
unidentified vessels sped away and the JCG found it difficult to catch them. 267 On 24
March, the then head of the Defense Agency, Housei Norota, gave the order to carry out
“Maritime Security Operations”, which was the first time such an order was given since
the JMSDF was first established. The JMSDF continued tracking the unidentified boats
and P-3Cs dropped four 150 kg anti-submarine weapons as a warning whilst escort
ships fired warning shots near the boats; but the JMSDF eventually terminated the chase
after the boats left Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). 268 All the pieces of
evidence indicated that the suspicious boats arrived at a northern North Korean port on
the morning of 25 March. 269

At the time that the JMSDF fired warning shots and ordered the boats to stop for
violation of Japanese fishing laws, it operated its weapon based on Article 7 of the
Security Operation Policemen’s Duty Performance Law with which the Maritime
Security Operation correspondingly complied. 270 According to this law, the JMSDF was
permitted to shoot the hull of a vessel for self defence or as a means of emergency
escape, or in the case of a person convicted of a crime with a penalty of more than three
years imprisonment who escapes or makes resistance. However, the on-the-spot
commander had to judge whether an opponent had committed a crime that would carry
a sentence of more than three years in an intimidating situation. It was departure from
common sense in international relations. 271 In response to this incident, the JMSDF
initiated new projects such as an increase of the speed of its missile boats, the
establishment of a Special Boarding Unit (SBU), equipping escort ships and patrol
helicopters with machine guns, development of equipment to forcibly stop boats in a
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lawful way, and improving the rate of filled vacancies to ensure there are sufficient
personnel for boardings and inspections. A Maritime Interception Team (MIT) was also
established and a joint JMSDF and JCG manual on coping with suspicious boats was
created in December 1999. In addition, related government ministries and agencies
considered the development of the law with respect to firing shots that could possibly
harm opponents. 272 Also, experts pointed out the need to promote cooperation between
the JMSDF and JCG. There were a lot of problems between the two maritime forces
such as deficiencies in the information sharing system. At any rate, on 30 November
1999, the first joint field training exercise between the JMSDF and JCG was
conducted. 273

On 21 December 2001, a P-3C spotted an unidentified boat off Amami-oshima Island.
On 22 December, the JCG received a report saying that it is highly likely that the boat
belonged to North Korea. Patrol vessels were sent to chase it while it headed for China
under the watch of JMSDF and JCG aircraft. After repeated orders for the boat to stop
and after warning shots were fired, the intruding boat attacked the patrol vessels with
automatic weapons and a rocket launcher. The JCG vessels returned fire in self defence.
The suspicious boat was scuttled by detonation by its own crew in the East China Sea
within China’s EEZ. Three JCG personnel were injured in the skirmish. The crew of
about 15 from the suspicious boat were missing and three dead bodies were found in the
waters nearby. 274

Despite the fact that the Japanese government has revised the Self-Defense Forces Law
and Japan Coast Guard Law, which now allows Japanese maritime forces to be able to
fire with intent to harm opponents within Japanese territorial waters as a result of the
9/11 terrorist attacks, they are not permitted to fire outside of territorial waters in cases
not involving self defence or emergency evacuation. 275 As a result of the above
mentioned series of maritime incidents triggered by North Korea’s covert boat
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operations, organizational issues and legal loopholes in Japan’s maritime security
regime were thus brought to the attention of authorities almost by accident.

Conclusion
China is a great land power which is attempting to upset the continental-maritime
balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. China’s diplomatic posture to adjacent
countries is aggressive, and in particular it focuses on sharply expanding naval strength
Japan is facing this rising power which obviously regards it as a potential enemy. To
make matters worse, based on its historical experiences, successive Chinese dynasties’
diplomatic attitudes have tended to be offensive and authoritative toward other Asian
countries in order to manage possibilities of civil strife. Such strategic behaviour is
apparent in its strategy for securing its SLOC, the Taiwan Strait, and territorial disputes
with Japan. In addition, the Chinese communist regime that cites the war against the
Japanese Empire as a justification for its own reign, has made the best possible use of
strong anti-Japan sentiment to manipulate control of the people. Also, in terms of
conventional war capability, Japan sustains superior military might over China on some
level, but China has closed the gap with remarkable rapidity. Specifically, China’s plan
to build aircraft carriers for national pride without regard to the cost efficiency would
send shock waves throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Japan thus has to closely monitor
the development of China’s naval expansion and maritime strategy.

As mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, continental balance-of-power strategy is a
significant key strategy for maritime states and their seapower. Despite this, Russia and
China, with Central Asian countries, may be in the process of transforming the SCO to
become something approximating a military coalition. Added to this, the problem of the
Northern Territories makes the continental balance of power much harder for Japan.

There is a great deal of complexity in the relationship between the Koreas and Japan.
The Korean peninsula has always become involved in great power games since the
importance of the geopolitical situation of the peninsula cannot be overemphasized. As
a result, Korean strategic culture has appeared to side with the strong and turn on the
weak historically. Therefore South Korea has exploited Japan’s diplomatic weakness in
127

the relations between the two countries over such issues as sovereignty disputes over
territory. Also, North Korea takes a hostile view of Japan and the United States. It can
be said that the development of North Korean missiles and secret operations from the
sea target Japan or U.S. forces in Japan.

Therefore, overall, the Japanese islands can be viewed as being surrounded by the seeds
of serious conflict. It seems to be the case that Japan requires an unprecedented state of
alert to maintain its security and sovereign interests. Why did Japan come to have a lot
of security problems mainly focused on territorial disputes with neighbouring countries?
In general, the governments of sovereign states take a realist stance based on national
interests, hence they are basically believers in the currency of power and show no mercy
to enhance and maintain the might of the nation. Japan lost the great war and its
neighbours took advantage of its subsequent weakness. If international society is ruled
by the “jungle law” of realism, Northeast Asia then represents the perfect case study.
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CHAPTER 4
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism:
Non-State Threats to Japan’s Sea Lines of Communication
Introduction
This chapter discusses the issues related to the context between non-state threats and
Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC). The first section shows relations between
the globalized world economy and Japan’s shipping. The second section describes the
current situation of piracy, in particular looking at pirates in the Malacca Strait and
waters off Somalia; and incidents involving Japanese-related ships. The third section
focuses on maritime terrorism and the cases of the terrorism in the Asia Pacific region.

Globalization and Maritime Transportation
According to Geoffrey Till, a distinct maritime system as a medium for the exchange of
goods, information and ideas developed in the ancient era all over the world — in the
Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific, by
groups such as the Vikings, in rich Islamic maritime communities and among Chinese
traders. 1 The maritime trading system expanded because of the enormous profits made
from these voyages. This spirit of adventure and the promise of riches to be made from
faraway territories drove early seafaring explorers to make voyages, although trading
ventures involved great risks of losing ships and crews. Throughout history, marine
transportation has been in most cases cheaper, faster and safer than transportation over
land.

Over two-thirds of the surface of the Earth is covered by the oceans. For all nations with
or without a coastline, sea routes are economic and strategic necessities that cannot be
replaced. States which have possessed the power to control or influence these maritime
traffic lanes have historically found themselves to be in stronger positions to determine
their own destinies. The ocean is a lifeline to carry industrial resources: raw materials
and their processed products to world markets. Through these processes, eventually, the
current global maritime trading network has been built. 2 In the modern period, the
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following aspects characterize global maritime transportation: 3 (1) 70 per cent of the
world’s surface is covered by ocean; (2) when measured in weight and volume, over 90
per cent of international trade including most of the world’s raw materials is conducted
by seaborne shipping; (3) a large number of the world’s cities and populations are
positioned within 200 kilometres of a coastline; (4) international law provides for
freedom of the seas, in which any nation can use the sea for purposes of trade or defence
without infringement of another’s sovereignty. Today, this global exchange as a
significant feature of seapower must be carefully considered.

Japan’s Dependence on Sea Lines of Communication
Vulnerability of SLOC
In earlier times, through the process of the development of shipbuilding technology and
sailing, SLOC were expected to perform three main functions: carrying personnel and
goods; the rapid deployment of military forces; and an information and communication
function. Even after the progress of the aviation industry and electronics, maritime
transportation is still regarded as a main role for the transport efficiency of bulky
materials and large military forces. 4 However, one of the main features of the
international dependence upon such a sea-based trading system is vulnerability. 5

The international community has been going borderless, mainly through economic and
trade activities. In this trend, seapower takes a central role because of the importance of
foreign trade activity conducted on the sea. In last a few decades, globalization and
containerized transportation have flourished. As a result, the number of flag of
convenience ships has increased. 6 Currently, it is usual that nationality of the ship
owner, the flag of registry, crew, cargo, and cargo insurance, are very different. In
response to containerization, mighty container vessels and ports have emerged. 7 The
size of a huge container vessel is almost that of a U.S. aircraft carrier. Such a vessel can
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be managed in a limited number of mighty hub ports. It is extremely difficult for these
container ships and ports to prepare for any contingency. 8

Most threats to SLOC networks used to be from military movements until the end of the
Cold War. However, there are currently six major causes of impediment to the flow of
sea lane: natural disasters; 9 maritime crime such as piracy and international terrorism;
the malfunction of seaborne trade; the unilateral restriction of navigation by littoral
states; the indirect damage caused by a regional conflict; and intentional attacks on
SLOC by military forces. Provided that severe damage occurs around choke points or
gigantic hub ports, the world’s economy would be negatively impacted due to a long
recovery period. At present, acts of piracy and maritime terrorism are considered
dangerous to shipping. Increasing numbers of pirate attacks sends the insurance
premiums through the roof. And if terrorists sabotage a port or its command and control
computer, it would cause wide-ranging economic dislocations. 10

Japan’s Sea Borne Trade
Ninety-nine per cent of Japan’s total export and import volume is carried by shipping by
volume. Japan is extremely dependent upon the import of raw materials and food. Such
materials are transferred by marine transportation via the world’s sea lane network,
which is cheaper and often faster than overland routes, especially for the transportation
of bulk commodities. Notably, Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio is the lowest among
developed countries. As a result of rapid industrialization, Japan’s agricultural worker
population decreased and food self-sufficiency declined to a low of 41 per cent in
2008. 11 Japan also relies very heavily on imports of major natural resources such as
crude oil (99.6%), coal (100%), natural gas (96.4%), iron ore (100%), wool (100%),
cotton (100%), soy beans (95%), wheat (86%), and timber (80%). 12 Japan is a nation
poor in natural resources, yet it has to process large amounts of raw materials in order to
export industrial products to world markets. Nevertheless, rising nations such as China

8

Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., pp. 41-42.
10
Ibid., p. 42.
11
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan, The Situation of Japan’s Food Sufficiency in
2008, p. 1.
12
The Japanese Shipowners’ Associatio, The Current Situation of Japan’s Shipping.
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and India fiercely compete for limited resources and such international competition
makes it more expensive for Japan to obtain resources as a manufacturing exporter.
The marine transportation industry thus has to sustain this import-export cycle. 13 Japan
is a high labour cost country and attempts to cut costs are done by registering a “flag of
convenience” (FOC) ship in a country with lower flag registration fees such as Panama.
Without such cost competitiveness, Japan cannot maintain the economic cycle for its
foreign currency earnings. Taking maritime security into consideration, using a FOC
ship is a two-edged sword, because a ship’s registry country has judicial powers over
the vessel on the high seas under the legal principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction.
However, a country such as Panama lacks the capacity to protect ships flying their flag
from security threats on the world’s oceans. Thus, the globalization of the world
economy and seapower combine to complicate maritime security interests of seadependent states such as Japan. 14

As identified in Tables 5 and 6, a large number of countries are strong trading partners
with Japan. Logically, as a sea-girt country, Japan’s trading has to be heavily dependent
on marine transportation. As a matter of fact, Table 7 shows that while the type of
Japan’s trading becomes more multifaceted, and such trading is growing, the proportion
of Japan’s trade which is seaborne remains almost unchanged, nearly 100 per cent.
Namely, the total quantity of its seaborne trade and the tendency of a globalized
economy are on the rise in parallel. Table 8 shows that the gross shipping tonnage of
Japan has steadily increased, nevertheless the number of Japanese-flagged vessels is
significantly declining. Japan’s dependence on the globalized world economy is
obviously continuing to increase year by year.

In the Asia-Pacific region, notably, there are numerous threats posed by non-state
players attacking SLOC for economic and political purposes. For Japan, sea lanes from
the Persian Gulf to Japan by way of sea areas around the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian
Ocean, the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and the Bashi Channel are vital to

See Eiichi Fukami ed., Kaijyō Hoanchō Sinkaron [JCG Evolution Theory], Seiun Sha, Tokyo, 2009, pp.
6-10.
14
Ibid., pp. 10-14.
13
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convey crude oil and natural gas. Japan purchases around 90 per cent of its oil imports
from Middle Eastern countries. Annually, 1,400 very large crude carriers (VLCC)
transit back and forth between Japan and the Middle East. 15

The Malacca Strait is one of the most important strategic chokepoints in the world’s
ocean, which is vital for Japanese maritime transportation, but water areas around the
strait are notorious for piracy and, potentially, terrorism. The waters off Somalia have
been even more dangerous than the Malacca Strait in recent years because of savage
piracy conducted for large ransoms. Moreover, even though Japan has not been
regarded as a target, a catastrophe caused by maritime terrorism would be highly likely
to cause Japan’s economic activity to be badly damaged. Maritime terrorism and piracy
are heinous and potentially can cause massive damage to maritime trade. While China’s
maritime strategy might be the biggest potential threat to Japanese shipping should
hostilities between the two rival states ever break out, the Japanese government
nevertheless needs to address the issues of non-state threats linked to the safety of the
SLOC, with enthusiasm, as a matter of life and death for such a sea-dependent state.

However, Japan’s policy for sea lane defence is limited by the peace constitution. In
order to protect sea lanes and economic activities relevant to ocean space, not only
independent efforts, but also international cooperation is without doubt essential. In
spite of this, the Japanese government does not approve of the use of its right to
collective self-defence. 16

15

“Japan Must Keep Indian Ocean Presence: PAJ; Tembo Calls for Renewal of Special Law to Secure
Oil Shipments from Mideast,” Platts Oilgram News (online ed.), 1 October 2008.
16
Kawamura, “Nijyūisseiki no Sea lane Bōei towa Nanika,” p. 43.

133

Table 5. Value of Japan’s Export by Destination and Commodity, 2006 (US$ million)

17

Precision
instruments

Transport
equipment

Electrical
machinery

General
machinery

Metal
and
metal
products

Chemical
products

Textiles

Total
145,529

716

6,898

4,750

31,295

23,123

58,812

3,729

China
ROK

92,758
50,278

3,462
421

12,194
9,880

10,089
7,793

18,926
9,461

25,191
10,625

5,367
1,561

4,123
2,531

Taiwan
Hong
Kong

44,108

303

8,273

4,577

8,568

10,803

1,905

3,394

36,430

826

3,454

1,995

4,286

14,077

1,415

2,570

Thailand

22,901

285

2,352

4,277

5,470

5,355

2,278

436

Germany

20,412

184

1,459

520

4,305

5,913

4,033

1,107

Singapore

19,341

84

1,236

1,484

3,542

6,142

2,014

444

UK

15,223

78

754

616

3,746

2,770

4,498

340

Netherlands

14,725

60

279

279

6,579

2,932

1,339

483

646,693

8,405

58,392

49,714

127,225

138,132

156,760

22,133

USA

World
Total

Crude oil exported from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Qatar,
Bahrain, and Iraq to Japan is embarked on tankers. If terrorist groups attack such tankers,
the world’s economy would descend into chaos. The U.S. Navy deploys its 5th Fleet in
the Persian Gulf, and make efforts to secure the safety of the Gulf by forming
multinational task forces with other NATO members and friendly states. Even though
Japan imports a huge amount of crude oil from the Persian Gulf, the JMSDF takes no
part in policing activities there. 18 Tankers bound for Japan from the Persian Gulf have
to pass through the Hormuz Strait between Iran and Oman. If relations between the
United States and Japan, already under strain, are further aggravated, it would be
difficult for Japan to import crude oil from Iran. Were the United States and Iran to go
to war, there is a high possibility that Japanese-related tankers would be exposed to
Iran’s attack. 19

17

Foreign Press Center Japan, Facts and Figures of Japan 2008, p. 117.
Jun Kitamura, Beigun ga Mita Jieitai no Jitsuryoku (JSDF’s Ability from U.S. force’s view),
Takarajima Sha, Tokyo, 2009, pp. 76-78.
19
Ibid., pp. 78-80.
18
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Table 6. Value of Japan’s Imports by Source and Commodity, 2006 (US$ million)

20

Machinery
and
equipments

Textiles

Metal
and
metal
products

Total

Foodstuffs

Raw
Materials

Mineral
fuels

Chemical
products

118,482

8,040

1,748

2,844

5,350

48,257

22,736

7,108

USA

68,038

12,886

4,008

956

8,753

33,283

533

2,218

Saudi
Arabia

37,199

16

51

36,662

458

2

0

1

United
Arab
Emirates

31,572

2

21

31,236

1

2

2

261

Australia

27,934

4,046

6,235

14,087

269

209

12

1,820

ROK

27,330

1,191

430

3,460

2,341

13,677

640

3,583

Indonesia

24,133

882

4,715

12,010

649

2,173

511

735

Taiwan

20,336

812

600

307

1,277

11,869

356

1,254

Germany

18,458

555

148

18

4,026

11,387

142

854

Thailand

16,885

2,429

1,384

426

959

7,564

452

878

579,010

49,104

40,704

160,392

42,255

165,145

29,786

32,748

China

World
total

Table 7. Maritime Trade as a Percentage of Japan’s Total Trade
By Value (Trillion Yen)
Total

20

Seaborne Trade (%)

By Weight (Million Ton)
Total

Seaborne Trade (%)

1985

73

63 (86.6)

698

697 (99.9)

1990

75

60 (79.8)

798

796 (99.8)

1995

73

54 (74.5)

889

886 (99.8)

2000

93

61 (65.8)

940

937 (99.7)

2005

123

87 (71.9)

953

950 (99.6)

2006

143

103(71.9)

962

959 (99.7)

2007

157

108(68.5)

967

964 (99.7)

Foreign Press Center Japan, Facts and Figures of Japan 2008, p. 117.
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Table 8. Gross Shipping Tonnage of Japanese Ocean-going Vessels
Japanese-registered Ship
Gross
Ton
Ratio
Number
(million)
(ton)

Foreign-registered Ship

Number

Gross Ton
(million)

Ratio
(ton)

21

Total
Gross
Ton
Number
(million)

1975

1,317

33,485

56.3

1,152

26,003

43.7

2,469

59,488

1980

1,176

34,240

52.5

1,329

30,987

47.5

2,505

65,227

2004

99

7,569

10.7

1,797

62,967

89.3

1,896

70,536

2005

95

7,460

9.3

1,914

73,215

90.7

2,009

80,676

2006

95

7,354

8.3

2,128

81,525

91.7

2,223

88,880

Piracy
One of greatest non-state threats to Japan’s SLOC is piracy. Piracy has a long history.
Over 3,000 years ago, a group called “the Sea Peoples” operated in the Mediterranean. 22
Historically, pirates plagued the world; and in modern times, they have flexibly
responded to changing situations. 23 In Asian history, Chinese dynasties and Western
maritime powers failed to manage the safety of marine shipping against pirates. 24 After
the arrival of modern age, the threat of piracy was not taken up as a serious issue and its
presence gradually declined. Today, however, piracy has re-emerged on the
international arena as a brutal maritime threat which seriously aggravates a large
number of maritime user and littoral states whose SLOC are threatened by pirate
activity. 25

Over the last couple of decades, acts of piracy have been getting more aggressive as
evidenced by the use of heavy firearms and high-tech devices. 26 Piracy is defined by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), as follows: “An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or

Nihon Kaiji Kōhō Kyōkai, Sūji de Miru Nihon no Kaiun/Zōsen 2007 [Marine Transportation and
Shipbuilding in Figures], 2007, pp. 32-33.
22
Michael McNicholas, Maritime Security: An Introduction, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 2008, p.
162.
23
Yoshihiko Yamada Umi no Terrorism [Maritime Terrorism], PHP Kenkyujyo, 2003, pp. 86-87.
24
Bernard D. Cole, Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy Security in Asia, Praeger Security International,
Westport, CT, p. 87.
25
Yoshihiko Yamada Umi no Terrorism, pp. 86-87.
26
McNicholas, Maritime Security, p. 162.
21
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capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.” 27 In international law, piracy is
defined, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), as
consisting of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or
a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b). 28
In recent years, like terrorism, piracy has been highly organized and sophisticated. It can
be said that piracy is a low-risk, high-return activity. 29 From 2002 to 2007, a total of 63
per cent of attempted and actual attacks of piracy occurred in waters off Southeast Asia
and Africa. 30 According to Martin Murphy there are seven major conditions for the
piracy epidemic: legal and jurisdictional weakness, favourable geography, conflict and
disorder, under-funded law enforcement/inadequate security, permissive political
environments, cultural acceptability, and promise of reward. 31 It can be said that pirates
aim for financial benefits while terrorists aim to advance political objectives. 32 However,
it has been asserted that there is a link between terrorism and piracy. It is complicated
even for experts to explain the connection between piracy and terrorism, since “pirates
collude with terrorists, terrorists adopt pirate tactics and policymakers eager for public

27

ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2006,”
ICC Publishing Barking, 2006, p. 3, quoted in Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, Adelphi Paper 388, Routledge and The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 11.
28
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Publication, New York, 1997. p. 57.
29
See Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, pp. 12-18.
30
McNicholas, Maritime Security, p. 168.
31
Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, pp. 12-13.
32
Rupert Herbert-Burns and Lauren Zucker, “Malevolent Tide: Fusion and Overlaps in Piracy and
Maritime Terrorism”, Maritime Intelligence Group, Washington DC, 30 July 2004, p. 1, quoted in
Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Policy and Terrorism,” in Peter Lehr,
Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 122.
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support start labelling every crime as maritime terrorism.” 33 In practice, terrorist groups,
like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has a strong maritime tradition in the southern
Philippines, use piracy in order to procure funds for its operations and as a
camouflage. 34

The Number of Pirate Attacks
Since the IMB began to compile statistics on piracy, the global incidence of piracy
peaked at 469 in 2000, as set out below in Table 9. At that time, piracy occurred
frequently in the region from the Malacca Straits to the South China Sea and
international criminal syndicates worked behind the scenes. In the 1990s, pirates
hijacked whole ships carrying freight such as gasoline and diesel oil, because on-selling
fuels was easy and it was comparatively easy to do so surreptitiously. After 2000, the
number of pirate attacks began a downward trend since many Asian states heightened
the sense of crisis over the growing menace of piracy. Such states attempted to improve
domestic security and to strengthen regional cooperation with other Asia-Pacific states,
with initiatives often proposed by Japan to share information to curb piracy. In 2005, as
an impact of the Asian tsunami, pirate bases in the coastal region were damaged which
led to the decline in frequency of piracy incidents. 35

In 2007, globally, piracy increased again compared with the previous year, especially in
Africa. 36 The number of attacks off Somalia doubled from the previous year. In terms of
incidents of piracy by geographical region, the number of piracy cases has steadily
decreased in the Malacca Strait since 2004, roughly correlating with the time of the
establishment of the MALSINDO coordinated patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore. 37 In 2008, the number of pirate attacks around the world increased to 293
from 263 in the previous year. Notably, acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in waters
off Somalia have steadily increased since 2007. Japan’s shipping industry is bound up
with this region. By 2009, piracy in waters off Somalia had increased by a factor of 15
33

Rubert Herbert-Burns and Lauren Zucker, “Malevolent Tide: Fusion and Overlaps in Piracy and
Maritime Terrorism”, Maritime Intelligence Group, Washington DC, 30 July 2004, p. 1, quoted in
Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group,” p. 122.
34
Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group,” p. 122.
35
Yoshihiko Yamada, Umi no Seiji Keizai Gaku [Political Economy of the Sea], Seizando Shoten, Tokyo,
2009, p. 86.
36
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37
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compared to 1999. As a result, the number of pirate attacks worldwide has sharply
increased and has reached over 400 (see Table 9 below).
Table 9.The Number of Pirate Attacks

38

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

World

300

469

335

370

445

329

276

239

263

293

406

Southeast Asia

161

242

153

153

170

158

102

83

70

54

45

The Malacca
Strait

16

80

24

21

30

46

19

16

10

8

11

Africa

55

58

86

78

93

73

80

61

120

189

264

Off Somalia

14

22

19

17

22

10

45

20

44

111

217

Table 10. Shipping Tonnage in the Malacca Strait
Number of Ship
Increasedecrease
1994
2004
Rate
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DWT

1994

2004

Increasedecrease
Rate

Tanker

18,185

22,995

1.26

1,19233,9

1,857,067

1.56

Container
Roll-on
/Roll-ff
Bulk
Carrier

15,295

29,672

1.94

399,508

10,13,552

2.54

3,041

4,454

1.46

40,468

59,771

1.48

10,280

13,599

1.32

503,176

138,636

1.24

LNG/LPG
General
Cargo

2,935

3,933

1.34

111,739

772,555

1.54

23,080

14,064

0.61

202,577

133,560

0.66

2,245

5,038

2.24

53,988

14,180

0.26

75,061

93,755

1.25

2,503,755

3,989,321

1.59

Others
Total

The survey included ships over 2,000 tons.

Piracy in the Malacca Strait
There have been serious threats to the stability and safety of maritime Asia, especially
to maritime Southeast Asia and parts of the Indian Ocean, since the end of the Cold War.
The distinctive feature of the Asia-Pacific region is diversity. Indeed, there are various
religions, cultures, languages, historical backgrounds, geographical features, national
strength characteristics, and insurgencies. Taking these features into consideration, it is
38

Ministry of Infrastructure, Land, Transport and Tourism of Japan, The Situation of Act of Piracy to
Japanese-related Ships and, and the World’s Situation of Act of Piracy in 2009.
39
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tough to organize and combine various national players together with common goals. 40
Several sea lanes intersect the maritime Southeast Asia region. Indeed, even though
Southeast Asia is the hub of maritime Asia and, increasingly, considering the centrality
today of Northeast Asian economies to global economic growth, the world, there are a
large number of threats to the region’s sea lanes. In particular, the strategic importance
of the sea lanes of the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and Indonesian and Philippine
archipelagic waters, cannot be overemphasised, The geographic features of maritime
Southeast Asia, including innumerable nooks, corners and islands, enable pirates to
escape and hide easily, and are thus ideal for the conduct of piracy, armed robbery at sea
and other illegal activities. 41 For instance, Indonesia has an 81,000 kilometre coastline.
Indonesia’s islands officially number about 17,000 but even the government cannot
exactly figure out how many islands lie within its territorial waters. 42 Indeed, the
number of islands of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos combined total over
20,000. This geography provides the right conditions for criminal activity at sea such as
piracy or terrorism to flourish. 43 Many areas of archipelagic Southeast Asia are unsafe
and littoral state coast guards, marine police and navies lack the necessary capabilities
to maintain peace and order; even more so on the high seas.

Not only is the Southeast Asian region at the crossroad of this vital global sea lane
network, it is also a sea area where abundant marine resources lie, which could be a
potential cause of territorial disputes. Especially, the complicated territorial sovereignty
issues over the Spratly Islands might lead to an armed conflict among the countries
concerned. Besides, half of the world’s oil and one-third of the world’s trade pass
through the Malacca Strait, 44 since it is the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. It is also the main corridor of oil from the Persian Gulf and West Africa to the
large consuming countries of Northeast Asia such as China, South Korea and Japan.
This gives the Malacca and Singapore Straits added strategic, as well as commercial,

Yoshitaka Tōi, “Kaijō Hoanchō Chō Chūmoku no Mission: Maritime Security [Missions of Japan
Coast Guard: Maritime Security]”, Sekai no Kansen, (The World’s Warship), July 2006, pp. 126-127.
41
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42
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43
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Asia Quartely Vol. IX, No. 4. Fall 2005. available at
http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/30/.
44
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significance: in fact the sea area of the Strait of Malacca is the most significant strategic
choke point in the world.

The Malacca Strait is also the shortest sea route to East Asia from the Middle East,
Europe, and Africa. Compared to the second shortest route via the Sunda Strait, the sea
route via the Malacca and Singapore Straits makes a voyage shorter by at least 2,000
kilometres. 45 If the Malacca Strait becomes impassable, the Sunda Strait between Java
and Sumatra and the Lombok Strait located on the eastern side of Bali would be
considered as the alternative sea routes. Lombok remains the preferred route, though,
for the largest oil tankers with drafts too deep to safely navigate the Malacca Strait.
Nevertheless, the navigation and control systems of both alternative straits are less well
developed than those of Malacca and each is more costly to transit compared to the
Malacca Strait due to the longer nautical distances involved. 46

There is no doubt about the significance of the Malacca Strait with respect to both
security and economic efficiency. Eighty-six per cent of oil imported into Japan passes
through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. 47 Also, two-thirds of the world’s liquid
natural gas (LNG) is carried through this trade route. 48 Also, in 2008, Japan imported 96
per cent of its LNG consumption to reach 681.3 million tons, accounting for 40 per cent
of the world’s imports of LNG. 49 Marine accidents constantly happen in this area
because there are many shallow waters, sunken rocks and foundered boats at the bottom
of the strait. The port of Singapore, which handles the world’s largest amount of cargo,
is located at the eastern end of the Malacca Strait. Over 90,000 ships pass through the
strait annually (see also Table 10 above), and 15,000 of them are relevant to Japan:

45
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indeed, it has the largest number of ships passing there among countries from other
regions. 50

In addition, several radical Islamist groups which seek to enhance their potential to
conduct terrorist operations are found all across maritime Southeast Asia: in southern
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 51

Japanese Shipping Interests and Piracy in Southeast Asia
The Case of the M.V. Tenyu
The M.V. Tenyu, a small, 2,660-ton cargo ship of Panamanian registry and owned by a
Japanese company Masumoto Kisen, was loaded with about 3,000 tons of aluminium
ingot at Kuala Tanjung, Indonesia and left for Inchon, South Korea on 27 September
1998. 52 The M.V. Tenyu disappeared on the way along with its crew of two South
Koreans, twelve Chinese, the captain and the chief engineer. The Tenyu Incident
exposed problems in the practice of Japan’s maritime affairs. There are about 35,000
shipping companies in Japan, 95 per cent of which are small companies with
capitalizations of less than 100 million yen, an example of which is Masumoto Kisen.
Such companies usually have an overseas subsidiary, most often based in Panama; with
their ships flying the flags of flag of convenience registries such as Panama. 53

The Tenyu’s last known location was outside of Japan’s jurisdiction and at that time, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Transport (currently called the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism or MILT), and Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) could not provide specific information on the matter. Masumoto Kisen
attempted to gather information on the missing ship by contacting its insurance
companies. The Nippon Foundation received information through the marine navigation
control centres managed by the Singaporean and Malaysian governments that the M.V.

50
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Tenyu had not passed through waters off Singapore. 54 A well-known maritime lawyer,
Yoichi Ogawa, who assembled the information, told Masumoto Kisen that there was a
high possibility that the Tenyu had been taken over by pirates and put forward a
suggestion to consult with the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
It was said that Masumoto Kisen had never even heard of the IMB before the incident
and it did not occur to the missing ship’s owners that it could be a case of piracy. The
IMB immediately sent detailed information on the Tenyu to every maritime-related
organization across Asia. 55

In December 1998, the Tenyu was discovered at the port of Zhang Jia in China. The
Tenyu was renamed SANEI 1 and had been repainted in a different colour. It was soon
revealed that the Tenyu had been renamed four times since it went missing. Chinese
authorities contacted Masumoto Kisen to inform the company that a ship which is
similar to Tenyu has been discovered and requested Tenyu’s manufacturing number
(located on its engine) to confirm the ship’s identity. Even though the ship was renamed
SANEI 1 and the registry changed to Honduras, the engine number clearly identified it
as the Tenyu. The Chinese government demanded from Masumoto Kisen a deposit of
over US$1 million for the costs of seizing and managing the ship. 56 The Tenyu was held
in China until May 1999 and Masumoto Kisen paid about 20 million yen in expenses to
the Chinese authorities. The ship’s 16 Indonesian crew members were repatriated to
Indonesia.

Subsequent information gathered revealed that 28 pirates aboard another ship
pretending to enter Yangon Port, Thailand, had assaulted the Tenyu on 10 October 1998.
A subsequent investigation uncovered that two of the Indonesian crew were involved in
an incident where pirates attacked a cargo ship named Anna Sierra navigating from
Thailand to the Philippines. 57 The South Korean Coast Guard actively conducted an
international investigation of the incident since the captain and the chief engineer were
South Koreans. Consequently, three South Korean trading merchants involved in selling
off aluminium ingots were arrested. The aluminium ingots were sold at US$300 million
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by South Korean trading merchants in Singapore to a Chinese-owned commercial firm
in Burma. 58

The Chinese government demanded US$1 million as the delivery cost to Masumoto
Kisen. Masumoto Kisen wasted a lot of time to negotiating with the Chinese
government to lower the amount. After five months, the ship was finally returned to the
company. China came under fire from the international community for the manner in
which it dealt with the issue. 59 The Tenyu incident caused an economic loss in the realm
of 450 million yen and the loss of the lives of 14 of the crew. 60 The Tenyu incident
showed clearly that piracy can be transnational in nature, with criminal syndicates
operating across a number of countries. It is therefore difficult for any single country to
deal with the problem without cooperation from other states.

The Case of the Alondra Rainbow
Another well-known incident of piracy involved another cargo carrier, the Alondra
Rainbow, which was owned by Imura Kisen, another Japanese shipping company. The
Alondra Rainbow, laden with 7,762 tons of aluminium ingots, left Kuala Tanjung Port
for Miike Port in Fukuoka, Japan, on 22 October 1999. Like the Tenyu, the Alondra
Rainbow was flagged with the Panamanian registry. On the same day, about ten pirates
with guns and knives attacked the carrier and its crew members, composed of the
Japanese ship captain, the Japanese chief engineer and 15 Filipino seafarers. The crew
members were forced onto an old vessel and to stay there for six days, and then they
were forced into a rescue raft on 29 October. On 8 November, a Thai fishing boat found
the raft and rescued them. After the Alondra Rainbow was attacked, the IMB Piracy
Reporting Centre offered monetary rewards in exchange for useful information gathered
and actually obtained.

On 14 November 1999, the IMB received information that a suspicious ship resembling
the Alondra Rainbow was navigating in waters around the south of India and reported it
to the Indian Coast Guard. The Indian Coast Guard chased the ship, firing warning shots,
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for three days, and finally seized and held the ship. On board the vessel were fifteen
pirates who were members of a piracy syndicate. After a trial, the pirates were
sentenced to seven years imprisonment in Mumbai. However, 3,000 tons out of the
7,000 tons aluminium ingot cargo had been already sold by a Chinese broker. 61 This
incident was reported to the Japanese government through the Nippon Foundation and
the Japan Shipowner’s Association on 27 October. Because there were two Japanese on
board the missing vessel, the JCG immediately issued a navigation warning and tried to
obtain information from witnesses. The JCG also made requests to the coastguards (or
equivalent authorities) of Singapore, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam,
the Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China and South Korea, through whose waters the
Alondra Rainbow was supposed to pass, for cooperation in the provision of information
on the ship. Importantly, at this time, the JCG sent a large Patrol vessel equipped with a
helicopter, Ryūkyū, to Southeast Asian waters to follow planning a navigation track
from Japan. It was the first time that the Japan Coast Guard had sent a ship overseas for
an operational investigation. 62 Furthermore, it was highly significant that the Indian
Coastguard and the Indian Navy cooperated with the IMB, a civil agency, leading
ultimately to the arrest of the pirates. With this case as a starting point, Asian countries
started to engage more seriously in international anti-piracy cooperation. 63

The Case of the Idaten
On 14 March 2005, five pirates on a fishing boat carrying AK-47 and M-16 assault
rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) attacked the 498 ton-Japanese tugboat
Idaten in the Malacca Strait. The pirates took some of the vessel’s cargo and kidnapped
three of the crew (two Japanese and one Filipino) as hostages, taking them and their tug
into Indonesian waters. The Idaten is owned by the Japanese shipping company, Kondo
Kaiji. At the time it was attacked by the pirates, the tug was towing a plant barge, the
Kuroshio 1, from Batam, Indonesia, to Burma. 64 The pirates assaulted the boat within
Malaysian waters and then fled into Indonesian waters, making use of the national
sovereignty of the surrounding states to elude the chase. The president of Kondo Kaiji
talked about measures to deal with the incident with Japanese governmental
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organizations such as MOFA, MILT and the Japan Coast Guard, and then went to
Malaysia with a governmental person in charge on 15 March. The following day,
Idaten’s Japanese captain told them he received a phone call asking for a ransom of
US$250,000. Kondo Kaiji asked a local person to negotiate for the release of the
hostages, which was concluded on 17 March. On 20 March, the three hostages were
taken to southern Thailand by the Thai Coast Guard. 65 There was some speculation that
there was a possibility that Indonesian anti-government forces or Indonesian military
personnel were involved in the attack, because the pirates were heavily armed. It
became clear that pirates in the region had potentially become a more dangerous threat
to littoral states. The pirates made use of the littoral state’s respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of other states. It made the investigation particularly difficult
because it involved several multiple jurisdictions and multinational organizations. In
fact, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand individually conducted the investigation into the
Idaten incident. Around the Malacca Strait, piracy and armed robbery against ships
often have been carried out as transnational activities, which is impossible for a single
nation to address alone. 66

Somali Pirates
In recent years the waters off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been the focus of
world attention because of their notoriety as sea areas infested with pirates. The Gulf of
Aden is a seaway about 1,800 kilometres in length, much longer than the Malacca Strait.
Since the Siad Barre government collapsed in 1991, Somalia has been in virtual
bankruptcy due to the absence of foreign aid and the presence of ethnic conflict.
Somalia plunged into a state of anarchy and it has been plagued by a prolonged civil
war. 67 It has about 3,700 kilometres of unpoliced waters and coastline. Twelve per cent
of world crude oil shipments passes through the Gulf of Aden, connecting Europe with
the Persian Gulf and Asia via the Suez Canal. Annually, some 22,000 ships carrying
eight per cent of the world’s trade use the Suez Canal as a shortcut to link Europe with
Asia, running between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. 68 If a ship has to take the
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route around the Cape of Good Hope, avoiding the canal, it has to travel about an extra
6,000 kilometres, which can impose an additional cost of about 40 million yen,
depending on the size and type of ship and the current fuel price, and will take six to ten
days longer. 69

Many Somali pirates are poor fishermen or former militia members. Initially, they
attacked small cargo boats navigating adjacent seas and deep-sea fishing vessels; but,
since 1995 they raided bigger vessels with more sophisticated automatic weapons such
as the AK47 and RPG-7 grenade launchers. Indeed, after the Iraq War, it has been easy
to obtain weapons at the border zone between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and a massive
amount of weapons flowed into Somalia. 70 In 2005, off the coast of Somalia, the
number of pirate attacks sharply increased from two incidents in 2004 to 35. Somali
pirates are known for taking hostages and demanding a high ransom. In 2008, it was
reported that Somali pirates held a total of over 800 ship crewmembers as hostages and
received over US$100 million in ransom. 71 Insurance costs for some ships navigating
off Somalia have exponentially increased, some from US$500 to US$20,000. All
containers shipped via the Gulf of Aden have been charged an extra US$23; hence the
largest vessels that can hold 14,000 containers have been required to pay up to
US$300,000 extra per transit. 72

In Somalia, being a pirate is a coveted “profession,” bringing considerable riches, with
the leaders of pirate groups living in luxurious houses. Somali pirates demand much
higher ransoms than the pirates of the Malacca region. One of the main reasons for this
is that most pirate and armed robbery at sea attacks that take place in Malacca and
elsewhere in Southeast Asia are targeted against small vessels, usually plying local or
coastal trade or engaged in fishing, rather than against larger merchant ships transiting
the area on international trade. By contrast, most attacks in the Somalia region are
against large merchant ships, which are far more lucrative targets, with shippers and
marine insurers often willing to pay considerable ransoms for the return of crews, and
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their very valuable ships and cargoes. As a consequence, many Somali coastal cities
have experienced an economic boom because of the proliferation of piracy. 73

In 2007, a ship carrying World Food Program (WFP) relief supplies was attacked by
Somali pirates and was robbed of provisions and the ship’s crew taken as hostages. It
was reported that the hostages were released in exchange for a ransom of US$1 million,
which was mediated by an Islamic religious leader. The potential linkages between
pirates and Islamist militant groups have thus been a subject of some conjecture. 74

In 2008, Somali pirates gradually became even more brazen and extended their
activities from the area of the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia further out to sea
and to the Gulf of Aden. Today, the Somali pirates are armed with machine guns and
other automatic weapons and RPGs. They usually operate on small boats connected to a
mother ship, and attack ships making full use of the latest technology such as radar,
satellite phones, the Global Positioning System (GPS), ship Automatic Identification
System (AIS), and high-performance outboard motors. 75 The IMB has advised ships
passing by the Somali coast to stay more than 200 nautical miles from the shore;
although attacks involving mother ships have taken place as far as 1,000 nautical miles
from the coast. In 2008, about 20,000 vessels and about 2,103 Japan-related ships pass
through Somali waters. In 2008, 130 merchant ships were attacked, with the number
doubling from the previous year. 76

Japanese Ships and Somali Pirates
There have been a number of attacks against Japanese shipping interests in the Gulf of
Aden/Somalia region, detailed below. 77
•

On 28 October 2007, the Japanese-operated chemical tanker, Golden Nori, was
seized off the coast of Somalia by gunmen. The 6,253 ton tanker was carrying
10,000 tons of highly explosive benzene. One U.S. destroyer, which patrolled near
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sea area, hurried to the scene and tried to chase the pirates and the Golden Nori.
The U.S. destroyer destroyed a motor boat that the pirates used to attack the Golden
Nori with gunfire, but the pirates escaped into Somalia’s territorial waters. 78 On 12
December 2007, eventually 23 hostages from the Philippines and South Korea were
safely released after the shipowner Dorval Kaiun K.K. paid a ransom of US$1
million. The tanker was returned under the escort of a U.S. naval ship. According to
the Japanese ship owner, the release was brought by its persistent negotiation and
with the assistance of the U.S. and British navies. 79 The Japanese government was
not in a position to participate in the incident because the ship was registered in
Panama. Ultimately, South Korea negotiated the release of the hostages. Japan
could do nothing in the circumstances because of flag state jurisdiction. It was a
tough negotiation because Somalia was an unfamiliar country; in particular because
of the state of anarchy prevailing within the country. 80
• On 21 April 2008, a 150,000 ton crude oil tanker, the Takayama, was attacked by
pirates with RPGs and machine guns off the coast of Yemen in the Gulf of Aden.
After the Japanese-operated Takayama sent distress signals, a German frigate, which
belonged to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) comprising Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Pakistan and the United States, hastened to the ship’s location and
drove the pirates away. The tanker, which belonged to a major shipping company,
Nippon Yusen, was damaged, but no one was injured. 81
• On 20 July 2008, a Japanese-owned cargo ship, the Stella Maris, with 20 Filipino
crew, was hijacked by gunmen in the Gulf of Aden. The 52,500 ton cargo ship was
carrying 25,000 tons of lead bullion and 15,000-23,000 tons of zinc concentrates. On
26 September 2008, all crew members were released, after a ransom of US$2
million was paid. 82
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• On August 2008, the AIZU, a ship of Panamanian registry, managed by a Japanese
company, was raided by two pirate speed boats. 83
• On 21 August 2008, a 11,920 ton chemical tanker by operated by a Japanese
company, Koyo Kaiun, the MT Irene, was seized off the coast of Somalia by armed
men. After a US$1.6 million ransom was paid, its crew of 16 Filipinos and two
Russians were released. 84
• On 15 September 2008, the 25,000 ton chemical tanker, Stolt Valor, managed by a
Japanese company, Central Marine, was hijacked by gunmen in the Gulf of Aden.
On 16 November the hostages were released. It is said the Japanese company paid
up to US$2.5 million in ransom. Incidentally, 18 out of the 22 crewmen were Indian
(and two from the Philippines, one from Bangladesh, one from Russia); hence, the
incident became a hot topic of conversation in India. After the Stolt Valor was
seized, Indian maritime unions temporarily boycotted seafaring in the waters off the
coast of Somalia in order to promote national awareness about Somali pirates and
protest against government inaction in spite of the rising risk of merchant ships
being hijacked, as was shown clearly by the piracy data. 85 The Indian government
eventually gave permission for formal anti-piracy patrols off Somalia by its
warships. 86
• On 15 November 2008, a 20,000 ton Panama-flagged chemical tanker, MT
Chemstar Venus, operated by a Japanese shipping company, was hijacked the Gulf
of Aden. In February 2009, the crew, 15 Filipinos and five South Koreans, and the
ship were released after a ransom was paid. 87
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• On 23 March 2009, an automobile transport vessel, the Jasmine Ace, belonging to
Mitsui OSK Lines, was fired at by two speed boats containing more than 20 pirates,
900 km east of Somalia and 1,500 km south of waters where JMSDF destroyers
were operating. 88 The 13,000 ton Japanese ship carrying 380 used cars was pursued
for about 40 minutes barely escaping by taking evasive action, sailing in a zigzag
movement. 89 This was the first strike on a Japanese-operated ship in the region in
2009 after the dispatch of two JMSDF destroyers to waters off Somalia, a
deployment discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
• The MV Sanderling Ace operated by the Japanese MOL shipping line was attacked
by seven pirates in a small boat. An Indian Navy frigate, INS Godavari, received a
distress signal from the Japanese car carrier registered in the Cayman Islands. A
helicopter sent by the Indian naval ship fired a warning shot at the pirate boat, which
subsequently escaped. There was no damage to MV Sanderling Ace or injury to its
crew. 90

Maritime Terrorism
The word “terrorism” originated from the French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror,” which
resulted in the execution of 12,000 people suspected as being enemies of the revolution
(although terrorism as a method of warfare is as old as war itself). Modern terrorism has
evolved into an activity targeting innocent civilians and economic activities.

91

Terrorism has been defined as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through
violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” 92 There is also a
distinction to be made between terrorism and irregular warfare: “Terrorism seeks to
bring awareness to a political grievance but rarely, if ever, results on its own in political
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change. Irregular warfare by contrast, is an attempt to bring about political change by
force of arms.” 93

Maritime terrorism has been defined by one commentator as “any illegal act directed
against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the intention to
influence a government.” 94 After September 11, maritime terrorism in the Asia-Pacific
region came under much closer scrutiny. Successful terrorist attacks in this region might
cause catastrophic damage to the world economy. Non-state terrorist groups have been
attempting to strengthen their operational capability. In recent years, they have attained
the ability to conduct their plans with advanced telecommunications, using various
platforms. Furthermore, they allegedly have been waiting for an opportunity to purchase
and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 95 There is also a threat of terrorist cyber
attack which could cause tremendous damage to information network systems in
connection with marine transportation and commerce systems, and thus paralyse
economic activities. 96

The sea and maritime transportation systems have been often used for crimes such as
the smuggling of people, drugs, and weapons, piracy and armed robbery. In common
with some piracy and other transnational criminal activity, the more advanced terrorist
groups have often been well organized, and possess advanced equipment such as
communication devices, weapons, and even aircraft. 97 Maritime terrorist attacks could
also cause pollution to the marine environment. Environmental disasters could cause
considerably damage to the economic activity and hence political stability of the region.

According to Martin Murphy there are six conditions that contribute to the potential
success of maritime terrorism: legal and jurisdictional weakness, geographical necessity,
inadequate security, secure base areas, maritime tradition, charismatic and effective
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leadership, and state support. 98 In spite of advanced satellite and other modern detection
systems, it is still difficult to pursue terrorists and their vessels on the sea. These
conditions are very similar to those of piracy. Unfortunately, it is a fact that there are a
number of areas in the Asia-Pacific region which satisfy these conditions. There is
always a possibility that Japan’s economic activities and SLOC will be adversely
affected by maritime terrorism.

Maritime Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region
The Southeast Asian region is notorious for acts of piracy and terrorism by radical
Islamic groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), operating throughout the region but with
a focus of activities in Indonesia; and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
ASG in the Philippines. JI has been known to be interested in conducting attacks on
maritime targets. In 2001, even though JI was not able to carry out its plan owing to a
lack of operational capacity, it had prepared to attack U.S. vessels at Changi Naval Base
in Singapore. As an alternative to this plot, according to U.S. Intelligence, JI had the
intention to hijack a ship in transiting regional SLOC. Also, in 2004, it was warned that
JI had plans to capture a ship using local pirates. 99

In the southern Philippines, the MILF has targeted inter-island ferries carrying members
of the armed forces and Christians for its bomb attacks. 100 The ASG is notorious for
attacking the MV Superferry 14 in Manila Bay in 2004, an attack that killed more than
100 people. Further, the Al-Qaeda network was found in possession of a video
recording of Malaysian police patrols along the Strait of Malacca that showed an intent
to attack shipping in the vital sea lane. In addition, the capacity of Al-Qaeda to attack
ships was revealed through interrogating Abd al-Rahim al-Nashri of the terrorist
network who seemed to be an expert in maritime operations. 101 Usually, maritime
terrorist attacks are conducted in narrow waters like a strait because geographical
restrictions and navigational hazards force ships to navigate slowly. It is also easier for
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non-state actors to conduct attacks close to the shore rather than out on the open ocean,
which requires larger, more capable platforms and greater seafaring skills. Hence, in the
maritime region from the Middle East to the East China Sea, which contains strategic
choke points including the Bab al-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and East Asian straits
such as Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, Lombok, Makassar, Basilan, Surigao, San
Bernandino, Luzon, and Taiwan, each authority has to take special precautions against
terrorism. 102

The waters of the Indian Ocean are also unsafe from maritime terrorist attacks. The sea
area, like other regions has narrow water passages which are considered significant
choke points such as the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and
the Mozambique Channel, which rogue states and non-state actors may easily disrupt. 103
This geographical environment is an enabling factor by which rogue states and nonstate players might disrupt marine transportation. The northern Indian Ocean and areas
around Indonesia are amongst the world’s most pirate-infested waters. An important
aggravating factor is that most littoral states do not have sufficient capacity to ensure the
safety of their sea lanes. 104

The Strait of Hormuz is crucial in terms of energy security because 90 per cent of all oil
exported from Gulf countries passes through the Strait. 105 The American warship USS
Cole was attacked in Aden in 2000. On 6 October 2002, the French oil tanker Limburg
was attacked by a suicide bomber using an explosives-laden small boat near the Yemeni
coast in the Gulf of Aden. These terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda-connected extremists
made the world realise the horridness of maritime terrorism. Rumours of a connection
between pirates and Al-Qaeda have also persisted. 106 In spite of the presence of navies
from a number of countries, waters around the Gulf states still remain dangerous spots.
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Actually, the shadow of Al-Qaeda and the possibility of threats are still present in Iraq
and in Iraqi waters. 107

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) operated some general and
some hijacked ships for the narcotics and arms trade. The drugs were carried from
Burma to Turkey, and money transferred to Bangkok was arranged to purchase arms.
The LTTE’s vessels conveyed the arms to the east coast of Sri Lanka via the sea area of
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These loads were then transferred to small trawlers
in some uninhibited islands to escape detection at times as occasion demanded. 108 This
maritime transportation of arms was vital for Tamil Tiger acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka.
Indian maritime forces put these sea areas under tight surveillance to capture a ring of
smugglers. In 1999, in Chennai, in southeastern India, the Indian Coast Guard found
and retrieved the missing hijacked Japanese bulk carrier, Kobe Queen, which had been
renamed Gloria Kopp and had disappeared on a voyage from Istanbul to the Caribbean.
This ship was investigated for being used for the drug trade, which seemed to ultimately
become sources of funding for terrorists. 109

From the night of 26 November 2008 to the morning of the 29th, Pakistani Muslim
extremists carried out acts of terrorism aimed at innocent civilians by using bombs and
automatic weapons in Mumbai, a huge harbour city and South Asia’s financial hub
located on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent. Even though the Indian Coast
Guard and Navy understood the possibility of terrorists arriving from the sea, 110 and the
fact that the United States had warned India to be on alert for a terrorist attack via the
ocean before it happened, 111 a series of terror attacks killed more than 180 people.

On 28 July 2010, a double-hulled VLCC owned by Japanese shipping company, Mitsui
OSK Lines, the Marshall Islands-flagged M Star, was damaged by a blast in the Strait of
Hormuz. The 160,292-ton vessel was carrying 2.7 million barrels of crude oil from the
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port of Das Island in Abu Dhabi to Japan’s port in Chiba prefecture. Even though the
explosion dented the hull, oil did not spill into the Gulf. One crewmember was slightly
injured. 112

On 4 August, a group linked to al Qaeda, the Brigades of Abdullah Azzam, claimed in a
message on jihadist websites that they had carried out a suicide attack on the ship. 113
Relevant players did not rule out the possibility of the terrorist attack in this incident.
Indeed, it was reported that United Arab Emirates officials believe that it was a terroristrelated explosion. 114 According to the Transport Ministry, the ship’s voyage data
recorder captured radar images displaying three small boats making suspicious
movements around the M Star before the explosive impact. 115 The Japanese government
organized a special committee to investigate the suspected attack, examining and
gathering information from the tanker with officials from the Cabinet Secretariat, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Japan Transport Safety Board,
the National Police Agency and the Japan Coast Guard. 116 According to a Transport
Ministry official, “There are two major reasons (for the inspection) ― to take a close
look at the ship for the first time and to search for more physical evidence regarding the
blast.”
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On 19 November, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime

Administration said, “Government and industry sources can confirm that the claim by
the Abdullah Azzam brigades ... is valid,” and “The group remains active and can
conduct further attacks on vessels in areas in the Strait of Hormuz, southern Arabian
Gulf, and western Gulf of Oman”. 118

Conclusion
Compared to Mahan’s era, maritime states have an increased need to respond to the
reality of a new international economy centring on globalization. Japan’s shipping
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industry relies on the feature of international interdependence in the globalization age
by using the huge global SLOC network and FOC ships at a high rate. Japan’s SLOC
and shipping industry is apparently vulnerable against many types of incidents. Piracy is
a traditional and rapidly evolving threat to SLOC. Modern pirates are heavily-armed
and cunning enough to raise complex issues related to national sovereignty due to often
politically and legally problematic issues related to maritime borders. A large number of
Japanese-related ships sail through the Malacca Strait. Japan cannot increase its
economic strength without a serious commitment to solving potential threats to shipping
in the strait. Furthermore, piracy in sea areas around Somalia has been regarded as a
bigger issue by many countries. Perhaps more importantly, an act of terrorism in the
maritime arena could cause a catastrophe that involves a number of innocent people and
the global economy. Therefore, even though Japan has been not a main target for
maritime terrorist attacks so far, it must nevertheless contribute to the construction of
international maritime order, as a seapower state which lives in a world of
interdependence.
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CHAPTER 5
Japan’s Seapower and the United States:
The Alliance with the Greatest Sea Power

Introduction
The number of analyses on U.S-Japan relations from the perspectives of seapower and
navy-to-navy relations is relatively limited. In this chapter, relations between the United
States and Japan will be discussed by considering the context of navies and the geostrategy of sea power states and the true nature and the significance of the alliance
between the two maritime states. It is intended here to consider the interdependent
relationship based on navy-to-navy relations. The first section will examine Japan’s
post-War pacifism, which is without parallel in history as a major nation. It has
contrasted starkly with past history and has cast a large shadow on Japan’s security and
maritime strategies. The second section will review the influence of the U.S. on the
birth and development of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to recognize
the bond and the importance of navy-to-navy relations, which have become the
centrepiece of relations between the two partners. The third section will discuss how the
JMSDF contributes to maintaining the alliance in the post-Cold War era. The fourth
section will explore which capabilities the JMSDF lacks and needs, and which United
States Forces Japan (USFJ) supplements and it will discuss why the Japanese
archipelago has been vital for U.S. global strategy, based on considerations of power
projection capability from the sea. The final section will focus on the friendship
between the two navies based on the human interaction that is an essential foundation
for the alliance.

The Loser after the Great War: Japan’s Pacifism
The Road to Catastrophe
From the perspective of the development of Japan’s seapower, Japanese strategic
culture was shaped as an “island country” that preferred being an isolated country to
being a “maritime state” that assertively ventured out upon the broad ocean, throughout
most of Japanese history. After the Meiji Restoration, however, Japan attempted to
change that strategic culture based on rapidly expanding its naval strength, akin to
Mahan’s concept for survival against competition other great powers. In addition, since
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1870, the Meiji administration adopted British methods for the new Japanese navy.
Accordingly, a British naval assistance advisory group led by Major Archibald L.
Douglas was invited to Japan in 1873 to demonstrate the development of human
resources. As a result, Japan’s vanity and national power were promoted by its victories
by the war against Qing Dynasty China and the war against Russia. 1

After the war against Russia, America built the large-scale naval base at Pearl Harbour,
Hawaii. Japan also built up the world’s third greatest navy after the United States. As it
turned out, both countries’ growing sea power set up the other as an imaginary enemy.
The Japanese Empire, with its formidable naval power was ranked one of the “Big Five”
at the Versailles Peace Conference after the First World War. Consequently, such a
series of developments obviously provided the West with lingering suspicions, 2
especially apparent with respect to the United States. Eventually, Japan was deeply
ostracized by European great powers, and then fell into a fateful solitude in international
society. 3 That Japan could not maintain the alliance with the greatest maritime state,
Britain, led to deadly consequences; indeed, the Japanese descended into miserable war
until 15 August 1945. During those times, Japan was dominated by political leaders
who were ultra-nationalist and militarist in nature. Until the attack on Pearl Harbour,
Japanese were taught such a spirit as ethics in elementary schools. 4 The strength of the
samurai tradition was reflected in practice as a Banzai charge or Kamikaze attack
against stronger enemy forces and persistence under severe pressure in the Second
World War. 5

American Policy toward Japan
In 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry sailed to a point off Uraga with four war
vessels with a letter from then U.S. President Millard Fillmore. His objective was to
conclude a treaty and amity between the United States and Japan for the sake of using
the Japanese islands as a supply-base for the American whaling industry. This
1
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represented a successful example of gunboat diplomacy. Consequently, the arrival of
Perry ended Japan’s closed-door policy. Relations between the two countries have
seemed to reflect a manifestation of their policy towards seapower, such as the
Washington Conference that included the Washington Naval Treaty and the
denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Pacific War, and the conclusion of the
U.S.-Japanese alliance. After two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese islands,
Japanese traditional ethics such as Bushido (the moral code of samurai) were denied as
vicious spiritual cultures by Americans who considered the occupation policy, and some
Japanese who had suffered a painful experience in the war. Japanese strategic culture
was drastically changed after the end of the Second World War. 6 Since then, although
Japan has depended on maritime transportation in order to focus on increasing its
economic strength, it became an introverted country again with respect to diplomacy
and security.

The United States effectively put the defeated nation in chains, constraining future
Japanese actions through Article 9 of Japan’s post-War constitution:

Chapter II. Renunciation of War
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means
of settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized. 7
The American victors, mainly under the direction of General Douglas Macarthur and
the Occupational authority of the General Headquarters (GHQ), led the new Japan to be
a peaceful democratic country characterized by an “extreme pacifism.”

6
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Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of
the militarists and the influence of militarists and the influence of
militarism will be totally eliminated from her political economic, and
social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and
aggression will be vigorously suppressed….
Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the
military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with
determination….
Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police
organization, or any civil aviation. Japan’s ground, air, and naval
forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial
General Headquaters, the General Staff and all secret police
organizatons shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military
and navy vessels and military and naval installations, and military and
civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as
required by the Supreme Commander. 8
There were a number of taboos on the security policies considered in the post-War era: 91)
the exclusively defense-oriented policy (EDOP) 10; 2) no overseas deployments of troops;
3) no military use of space; 4) no offensive weaponry; 5) no alliance or collective
security arrangements that committed Japan to use force to defend others; 6) no
possession or production of nuclear weapons, nor are any to be brought into Japan; and 7)
no weapons exports.

In 1951, Japanese Prime Minster Shigeru Yoshida signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
that granted key policies for Japan’s defence such as nuclear deterrence, the capability to
defend against aggression, the stability of the region, and the free passage of sea lanes. 11
The security treaty stated, “Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its
own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament
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which could be an offensive threat.” 12 The international stability of the Cold War period
allowed Japan to accomplish these needs, helped by the security framework of the
alliance with the United States, which possessed sufficient seapower to control the World
Ocean. During the Cold War era Japan adopted pacifist policies based on Article 9 of the
constitution. United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and America’s power projection
capability compensated for this limitation, creating a heavy Japanese reliance upon the
alliance. 13

At that time, Japan’s priority was policy for post-War reconstruction such as providing
for the nation, general rise in living standards, and growing economic power. 14 Although
the Japanese gradually came to doubt the United Nation’s capacity for collective security
to stabilize international society after the war, Yoshida recognized that the close
relationship with the U.S. would guarantee a seapower-protected international trading
structure, in order to secure the import of natural resources. 15 At that point, Yoshida
thought “that Japan should and could live as a maritime nation and that cooperation with
(the United States) would be the best way to acquire access to the world market and its
resources and to safeguard her sea routes”. 16

Japan’s Post-war Pacifism
The security framework in the Cold War, political West vs. East, forced the pattern of
the showdown between Japan’s ruling and opposition parties in the Diet to be inflexible.
The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) was the party in power over this extended
period. On the other hand, the Japan Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist
Party vehemently opposed the existence of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the
alliance with the United States.
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all the time cautious and timid due to the tenuous political situation and the restrictions
of the peace constitution. 18

On the one hand, through censorship, GHQ forced the Japanese to deny the fundamental
values which had shaped the policies, strategies and tactics until the end of the war and
respect a Western sense of values. Additionally, in post-War Japan, groups composed of
thoroughly pacifist left wingers, socialists or communists who strongly backed Article
9, 19 had an impact on society. For instance, the Japanese Teachers’ Union, which could
put enormous political pressure on the government, adopted a curriculum that
encouraged the Japanese people in effect to worship an unrealistic pacifism, far from the
realities of international society. 20 This influential pressure group opposed the display of
Japan’s national flag and singing of the Japanese national anthem, and will not allow
teachers to foster patriotism among children in schools.

In addition, Japan is the only nation to suffer an atomic attack. The experience places
most Japanese in vehement opposition to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, although it is
said that the JSDF is one of the most advanced military forces in the world, high
personnel expenses eat up a large part of the defence budget, which is only one per cent
of gross domestic product (GDP). As another restriction, most defence equipment is
domestically produced, and thus its purchase price and cost of maintenance is very high
because of low quantity production. After the war, even though heavy industrial firms,
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and influential politicians
planned to revive the arms industry, the Ministry of Finance and Yoshida strongly
opposed such “Defense production”. 21 This situation eventuates largely as a result of the
fact that such weapons cannot be exported due to the nation's three-point ban on
exporting weapons. This situation strains the defence budget. 22 Hence, realistically, it is
impossible to possess a truly formidable navy characteristic of a “natural” maritime
state within the limits of the budget.
18
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The means by which to settle the problem is public understanding and cooperation
about the importance of seapower, but, as mentioned above, the domestic political
situation does not allow people to change their mind on defence. Actually, in terms of
“sea-mindedness”, the Japanese government and public have lacked a sense of crisis of
national interests in disputes over territorial waters and marine resources. How
seapower impacts on the lives of people has barely been grasped. 23 Namely, Japan has
not chosen to become an independent great power in regional and global politics in the
post-War years. As is known well, Japan has never waged any war in that time, sticking
strictly to Article 9 of the constitution. Most importantly as a maritime state, the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau’s view on collective self-defence is that Japan has the right of
collective defence but that it cannot be exercised because of the prevailing interpretation
of Article 9, in spite of the fact that an interdependent relationship among friendly
countries is crucial for a maritime state.

On the other hand, just after the Second World War, the United States had placed high
expectations on Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese government as its junior partner in the AsiaPacific region, but Chiang was eventually relegated to Taiwan after losing the civil war
on the Chinese mainland. In the meantime, the Japanese islands burst into the spotlight
as the U.S. force’s logistical base in place of the China of Chiang and his Nationalist
Party. Accordingly, America assisted in the post-War reconstruction of Japan. Japan’s
economy made an almost miraculous comeback through the industriousness of the
Japanese people, the support from the United States and special procurements due to the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. 24 In spite of this, initially, the United States had had no
thought to expect Japanese involvement in military affairs, hence Washington attempted
to set up only the National Police Reserve (NPR) and the Maritime Safety Agency
(MSA). 25

The Influence of the United States upon the JMSDF until the End of the Cold War
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The U.S. Navy devastated the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), and then Washington was
going to force Japan to be a country without modern war making potential after the
Second World War. Yet the challenge from the powerful communist block changed
America’s plans. In keeping with changes in the international situation, navy-to-navy
relations between the Japanese post-war navy and the U.S. Navy grew over time. For
the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy is its parent, teacher and friend in many respects.

The Birth and Development of the JMSDF
Maritime Safety Agency Japan
On 30 November 1945, the IJN’s nearly 80-year history ended. In a real sense, however,
the navy did not completely disappear and it continued to transport demobilized soldiers
and clear the sea around Japan from mines until August 1946. These operations were
useful for maintaining seamanship, organized maritime navigation, and above all, a
sense of solidarity of Japanese naval personnel. As a result, it significantly contributed
to the birth of the JMSDF. 26 When U.S. occupation forces made their entry into Japan,
there were over 60,000 mines in the surrounding sea areas. 27 From the autumn of 1945,
around 350 ships and 10,000 Japanese naval personnel engaged in minesweeping. 28
Meanwhile, cholera invaded Japan when a large number of Koreans smuggled
themselves to Japan in the midst of devastation and turmoil at the end of the war after
an outbreak of cholera in the peninsula in 1946. From 1946 to 1950, over 200,000
Koreans entered into Japan and cholera carriers became a pressing problem. Moreover,
Korean illegal immigrants who were not entitled to food rations came to trade in the
black-market, smuggle and engage in other illegal activity. 29

For this reason, the occupying forces ordered the government to take full measures to
deal with the illegal immigrant problems. As it turned out, on 1 May 1948, the MSA
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was established, effectively as a de facto Japanese “coast guard,” after the government
was instructed to set up an organization modelled on the U.S. Coast Guard; and 1,415
Japanese ex-naval personnel together with 76 vessels that belonged to the
minesweeping section of the Ministry of Transport transferred to the MSA. 30 Although
the transferred minesweepers were small and wooden, the civil affairs section of the
occupation authorities and the delegates of the Far Eastern Commission from the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, and Australia opposed this, arguing that the establishment of the
MSA was a sign of the rebirth of the IJN. The arguments were accepted, and the MSA
was limited by the following conditions: it was not to exceed 10,000 personnel, not to
exceed a total tonnage of ships of 50,000 tons, no vessel was to exceed 1,500 tons,
vessels were to be restricted to a maximum speed of 15 knots, and limited to only
carrying small arms for maritime safety officials, and the operating area of vessels was
to be limited. 31

The Korean War and Mine Sweepers
In addition to the appearance of the Cold War, the communist victory in the Chinese
Civil War and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 became driving forces
behind the changing U.S. attitude toward Japanese rearmament. General MacArthur was
anxious about an internal security vacuum due to the deployment of three U.S. divisions
from Japan to the peninsula after the eruption of the Korean War. 32 In July 1950,
MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to establish units to support the police,
called the NPR composed of 75,000 men. In a letter to Yoshida, MacArthur stated:

Insofar as maritime safety in the harbors and coastal waters of Japan is
concerned, the Maritime Safety Board has achieved highly satisfactory
results, but events disclose that safeguard of the long Japanese coast
line against unlawful immigration and smuggling activity requires the
employment of a larger force under this agency than is presently
provided for by law.
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Accordingly, I authorized your government to take the necessary
measures…to expand the existing authorized strength of personnel
serving under the Maritime Safety Board by an additional 8,000. 33
“This act is often heralded as the beginning of post-War rearmament, the first violation
of the spirit of Article 9 of the new Japanese constitution”. 34 Thus, on 10 August 1950,
the NPR was established.

In the Korean War, the United States needed to remove all mines in waters around
Wonsan because MacArthur planned to carry out a landing operation on Wonsan.
However, in the western Pacific, U.S. forces possessed only ten minesweepers and it
was extremely difficult to reinforce the corps. Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke was
concerned about the capability of U.S. minesweepers and current influence mines made
by the Soviet Union. 35 For this reason, Burke talked with the administrator of the MSA,
Takeo Okubo, and explained how skilled Japanese minesweeper corps could play an
important role in the operation. The Japanese government hesitated to send
minesweepers because minesweeping the sea area around the peninsula was obviously
participation in combat and represented a violation of the Japanese constitution.
Nevertheless, then Prime Minister Yoshida ordered Okubo to dispatch minesweepers as
the U.S. requested. This matter was kept top secret. 36 Yoshida sent 43 minesweepers,
ten patrol boats and 1,204 men, in secrecy, with the occupation forces. 37 On 2 October
1950, the Japanese minesweeping corps was developed and engaged in this activity for
two months. Even though, in this period, two minesweepers sunk, one sailor died and
eight were injured, U.S. naval personnel greatly appreciated the capability of the
Japanese navy and gave unstinted praise. Through this process, Burke became the
strongest supporter of establishing the JMSDF.

38
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minesweeper units just after the Korean War broke out created an opportunity for the
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rebirth of the Japanese navy because this event proved the great potential capacity of
Japanese navy to Americans.

Nomura Group
In January 1951, former IJN Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura and vice admiral Zenshirō
Hoshina heard that America intended to rebuild Japanese land forces and take charge of
navy and air forces for Japan. Nomura and Hoshina were alarmed by this situation;
therefore a study group to rebuild the Japanese navy was established by Nomura,
Hoshina and other ex-naval officers. 39 The Nomura Group and Burke worked together
to encourage U.S. officials such as U.S. special envoy John Foster Dulles, Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) Forrest Sherman, the Commander Naval Forces Far East
Charles Turner Joy, and the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet Arthur Radford. 40

In January 1951, The Nomura group consulted with Joy and Burke about a draft on
rebuilding a Japanese navy. Receiving Burke’s advice, the Nomura Group revised the
draft and Hoshina submitted this to Burke. 41 Burke praised it and reported it to Sherman.
Burke received a strong pledge of support for this plan from Sherman, assuming the
Japanese government accepted this proposal. After hearing this, Nomura visited
Yoshida to give a copy of the proposal to him. In this process, the ex-IJN officers’
efforts to create the new navy developed into cooperation between Japanese and
Americans. 42 In January 1951, during negotiations for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,
Dulles urged Yoshida to transform the NPR into an army of 350,000 personnel in order
to hold out against attacks from the Soviet Union. 43 The Nomura Group developed the
detailed rebuilding plan, adopting Burke’s advice. On 3 February 1951, Nomura had an
opportunity to meet Dulles at a cocktail party. Nomura had sent his private plan to him
for a complete defence organization, including a total personnel strength of 205,000
(96,000 army, 39,000 air force, 40,000 navy, 30,000 other), 1,789 aircraft and 329 ships
(totalling 260,000 tons). 44 Nevertheless, Dulles had not read it through and he seemed to
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remain uninterested in rebuilding a Japanese navy, only showing interest in a ground
force. 45

Burke, however, strongly backed the Nomura Group. He told Dulles’ accompanying
personnel the fact that Japan sincerely insisted upon the necessity of its own navy and
air force and sent the revised plan written by the study group. Burke also sent it to CNO
Sherman under the name of vice admiral Joy, and it then gained Sherman’s agreement.
In addition, on a visit to Washington, Burke exhorted the commander of U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Arthur Radford, of the need to create a Japanese navy. Burke’s endeavour worked
well: Nomura and the ex-naval officers succeeded in forging strong links to the
headquarters of Naval Forces Far East, the centre of the U.S. Navy in Washington and
the U.S. government. 46

On 17 March 1951, as instructed by GHQ, the Nomura Group submitted data, arguing
the number of personnel for the remobilization of the new navy. 47 According to a
demand from Burke, on 10 April 1951, the study group completed the research material,
including announcing fundamental policies positioned as the crux of Japanese navy
rebuilding: integration of the navy with the air force and looking toward a two service
defence system; intending to create an independent navy, not a subject navy of the
United States; and an intention to attempt to strive for the creation of the new navy at a
Joint U.S.-Japan Research Commission.

48

But if the barriers were to prove

insurmountable, a new organization would be established within the MSA as a
temporary measure, and wait for an opportunity to become independent from there. 49
After the Nomura Group showed the presentation to Burke, Burke made approaches to
the American side to rebuild the Japanese navy and cooperate closely with Japanese exnaval officers. Such sincere efforts had a strong effect on U.S. officials’ views on this
matter. Indeed, during this period, Americans in Washington came to revise their former
disrespectful attitude toward both a Japanese navy and air force, and it occurred to them
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that equal importance should be placed on the Japanese army and sea and air forces. 50
On 19 October 1951, eventually, the new Supreme Commander for Allied Power
(SCAP), General Matthew B. Ridgway made a formal offer to Yoshida for the loan of
68 vessels composed of 18 patrol frigates and 50 Large Support Landing Ships
(LSSL). 51

Y Committee and the Birth of the Post-War Navy
In October 1951, as the loan of ships from the United States to Japan was arranged, a
Japan-U.S. joint research committee was established to deal with significant matters,
such as which organization would receive the vessels: the new Japanese navy? The
MSA? Or another organization? This led to a fundamental debate on how to establish
the new navy. This joint committee was called “Y Committee” in Japan. 52 Y Committee
consisted of eight ex-naval officers including former rear admiral, Yoshio Yamamoto,
from the Nomura Group and three MSA officers including Yonekichi Yanagisawa, the
head of the MSA. 53 The two sides traded opposing viewpoints on the organizational
structure of a revived Japanese maritime force. The ex-naval officers insisted that the
new maritime force should be independent from the MSA but the MSA side held the
opposite opinion, suggesting that the existing MSA corps should become the post-war
Japanese navy. There were serious clashes of opinion amongst the Japanese side. 54 As a
consequence, the Japanese referred the case to the advisory group from Commander,
Naval Force, Far East (CNFE) and the U.S. side of the committee for a settlement. 55

Finally on 13 November 1951 the Americans approved of the scheme supported by the
ex-naval officers. Since they had an understanding with the ex-naval officers at some
level, accordingly, Y Committee reflected the ideas of the group. 56 Besides, the military
nerve centre in Washington began to show an understanding of the utility of the
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establishment of a Japanese navy and shifted their position in support of this matter
regarding the budget. Burke’s efforts paid off: the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were
conscious of the conception of rebuilding the new navy propounded by the former IJN
officers through the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Both sides ― the U.S.
military and Y Committee were drawing closer. In fact, the contents of an article by
Nomura that appeared in US News & World Report on 8 May 1952 ― “Study on
Defensive Plan for Japan” ― coincided with the defence plan counselled by the JCS,
taking into consideration the emphasis on the new navy as well as a new army. 57 Also,
according to an agenda by Y Committee, 30 personnel selected from ex-naval officers
and MSA members were trained in military science and operation and maintenance by
using one 1,400-ton patrol frigate and four 350-ton LSSLs. The cadre of men were
dispatched to the United States to receive the education in sequence. 58 On 26 April 1952,
the Coastal Safety Force was established within the MSA, which was a core
organization in the transition to the JMSDF.

Furthermore, in July 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called on the Defense Secretary to
convey heavy armaments and approve of the loan of LSSLs and patrol frigates to Japan
immediately. 59 On 1 August 1952, the Coastal Safety Force was transferred into the
National Safety Agency (NSA), the predecessor of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA),
and then the name changed to the Maritime Safety Force (MSF), the predecessor of the
JMSDF. Finally, through the loan agreement with the United States, Japan would once
again possess a navy. 60 For ex-naval officers, this event meant that the maritime force
became independent of the MSA and a watershed as the point of departure for the new,
genuine navy. 61

On 28 July 1952, the Joint Chiefs asked then Defense Secretary Robert Lovett to
support the building of Japan’s military strength to create a self-defence capability. As a
result, on 7 August, U.S. President Harry S. Truman gave his approval to U.S.
diplomatic policies dealing with Japan. Namely, this included that the United States
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should back Tokyo so that Japan itself could act in self-defence against external threats,
because Japan and the United States shared mutual interests in terms of the security
environment in the Far East. Still, CNO William M. Fechteler was discontented with
Japan’s current defence capability. Hence, on 18 September 1952, he reported to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff criticism concerning the passive posture of SCAP Commander
Ridgway toward the Joint Chiefs’ policies on Japanese defence forces and required the
them to ask Ridgway to show a willingness to improve the potential of Japanese
maritime forces. 62

When the Coastal Safety Force was set up it had only 43 minesweepers (8,900 tons)
transferred from the MSA; and 68 vessels were rented from the U.S. Navy according to
the agreement with the U.S concluded on demise charter, and resulting in the handing
over of 18 patrol frigates and 50 LSSLs to Japan beginning in November 1952. 63
Continued friendly relations between the United States and Japan were not only
concerned with ships, but also the potential contribution of Japan’s naval aviation:
Japanese naval officers were concerned about the adequacy of their naval strategy
without command of the air. At that time (1951-1952), the Japanese regarded support of
ground and maritime air arms as more important than that of an air force. U.S. military
officers put forward a suggestion that all Japanese aircraft belong to a new organization,
the future Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Some former Japanese naval officers
enlisted in it. 64

On 16 October 1952, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), via the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, urged the defence secretary to afford military assistance to Japan, and
requested agreement from Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 65 On 30 October 1952,
Acheson told U.S. ambassador to Japan, Robert Murphy, of the budget compilation
including an aid budget to the Japanese defence forces (US$521.7 million in total: 308
million for the army, $30 million for the navy, and $183.7 million for the air force),
unlike former budget plans that laid emphasis solely on rebuilding the Japanese army.66
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After the Eisenhower administration entered office in January 1953, the United States
further demanded rearmament from Japan. In fiscal 1953, America provided additional
financial support only to the army in Japan, but it decided to offer financial aid to the
army of $40 million, the maritime force of $30 million and the air force of $73.4 million
in fiscal 1954. 67 By the end of March 1953, the total number of the ships in the MSF
reached 127 (30,500 tons). In the same year, the personnel increased to 10,323 and an
aviation corps with four Bell 47 helicopters was set up in Tateyama, Chiba Prefecture.
Such reinforcements were conducted under the influence of demands of the U.S.
military, especially the U.S. Navy, for support to the Japanese defence system.

On 19 January 1953, the Commander of United States Naval Forces, Far East
(COMNAVFE), John Hull, gave advice that the Japanese navy should be composed of
four defensive light aircraft carriers, three anti-air cruisers, 30 destroyers, 75 escort
destroyers, 50 large minesweepers, ten patrol squadrons, and so on. Notably, this
conception was very similar to the plan prepared in secrecy by the Nomura Group
earlier. As a matter of fact, on 23 January 1951, Hoshina handed it over to Burke. 68 The
Joint Strategic Plans Committee’s report on Japan’s defence capability was approved by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 August 1953, and followed the COMNSVFE plan. 69
Thereafter, however, there were debates on aircraft carriers and cruisers listed on the
plan among the commander Hull, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JSPC. Eventually, in
February 1954, the Joint Chiefs decided to delete the aircraft carriers and cruisers from
the list, taking into account the role of complicated political and social situations
insisted on by Hull, such as Article 9, stirring up anti-American sentiment and attracting
foreign criticism. 70

In May 1954, Secretary of State Dulles declared assistance to Japan on the basis of the
Mutual Security Act (MSA), 71 which was signed by Japan and the United States in
March 1954. On 25 May 1954, the CNO indicated in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs
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that Japan should have capabilities to secure its long and massive sea lanes in wartime
as a self-sustaining trading nation, especially antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and
minesweeping capabilities, taking threats from the Soviet Union and needs to maintain
U.S. naval power in the region into consideration. 72 In July 1954, the JDA was
established as the predecessor to the Ministry of Defence and the Coastal Security Force
changed its name to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). At this point, the
JMSDF possessed 18 patrol frigates, 50 LSSLs, 43 minesweepers, and so on, totalling
302 ships (68,000 tons), and 15,808 personnel. 73 Based on the Mutual Security Act,
American-built escort ships, minesweepers, landing ships and submarines were
delivered to the JMSDF, and local-procurement ships built using the U.S.-provided
funds were introduced. Also, the United States provided the P-2V7 maritime patrol
aircraft, which enhanced long-range patrol capability, and the S-2F antisubmarine
aircraft. In terms of the cultivation of human resources, an education and training
system was organized through the adoption of the Military Assistance Advisory Group,
Japan (MAAG-J), and the U.S. Navy’s doctrine and tactics were also adopted. 74 In 1957,
for a training mission, the Japanese government carried out a plan to dispatch four
JMSDF ships overseas for the first time: to Midway and Hawaii, including Harukaze
(1,700 tons), which was the flag ship and the first domestically-produced war ship after
the war, albeit facing opposition that cited the violation of the legislative resolution of
1954 that defined the restrictions of the JSDF as a reason. 75

The Defense Build-up Program
In 1955 Foreign Minister Shigemishu and U.S. Secretary of State Dulles discussed a
six-year defence development programme preparing for a navy of 205 ships (123,900
tons). 76 In their joint statement, “Cooperative efforts would be exerted so that conditions
would be established enabling Japan to assume the primary responsibility for her own
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defence and thus contribute to international peace and security in the Western
Pacific.” 77 Although this plan was not approved, it created a considerable controversy in
the Diet. In August 1956, a five year defence plan from 1956 to 1960 demanding 211
ships totalling 111,300 tons and 223 aircraft was proposed by the National Defense
Council (NDC). Japan sustained and deepened bilateral relations with the U.S. slowly
but surely: the Basic Policy of National Defense was formulated in May 1957: 1)
support the United Nations’ activities and promote international cooperation to achieve
world peace; 2) stabilize the people’s livelihood and establish the foundations for
national security; 3) establish effective defence capabilities; 4) defend the nation on the
basis of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. 78

In June 1957, the last three years of the programme planned in 1956 was approved by
the cabinet. This First Defense Buildup Program (1958-60) called for 124,000 tons of
warships and 222 aircraft for the JMSDF. 79 The purpose was not only to lay the base for
Japan’s defence structure. Actually, the main reason was that “The United States
expressed feelings of welcome on the defence build up of Japan and would contemplate
within 1958 to conduct a large-scale withdrawal of her troops stationed in Japan, and
such a withdrawal would include a speedy withdrawal of all her ground forces.” 80 A
few days before the training mission was released, the Japanese government announced
that two destroyers for the JMSDF would be built with U.S. assistance under the Mutual
Security Assistance Program. In this programme, it was decided to conduct the
domestic production of escort ships, submarine chasers, minesweepers, and submarines
and the licensed production of P-2V7, the supply of the S-F2 from the U.S. Navy, the
purchase of the HSS-1 patrol plane from the United States and the construction of
advanced Tartar missile-armed escort ships. 81

In 1960, two new destroyers were constructed by Japanese domestic industry, funded as
“Grant-Aid-offshore procurement” (OSP). The two vessels were transferred under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP). Until around 1960, over 40 per cent of the gross
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tonnage of the Japanese navy was owned by the United States. 82 At the end of 1961, the
JMSDF possessed 218 ships (121,964 tons) and 222 aircraft. 83 In 1960, the U.S.-Japan
Security Arrangement was significantly revised, adding a “Far East clause” that more
clearly codified the necessity of the closer alliance for the safety of Japan’s nautical
environment and showed the collective view on the definition of “the Far East”, which
included the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the northern Philippines. 84 Even though the
Finance Ministry and the Defense Agency had to undertake the necessary adjustment
efforts on the budget, in June 1961, the outline of the Second Defense Buildup Program
was officially approved by the NDC. According to Auer, then Prime Minister Ikeda,
“wished it to appear that Japan was not merely reacting to United States demands, while
the U.S. felt that the new level of spending indicated for the Second Buildup Plan
lessened the need for direct pressure.” 85 In the first half of this plan, the commission of
the vessels loaned and supplied by the United States almost concluded and the
modernization of domestic-built vessels was planned and the domestic production of
aircraft such as the P-2V and HSS-2 progressed. Besides, the U.S. Navy provided the
JMSDF with 217 aircraft worth $100 million. Long-range ASW patrol aircraft
constructed in Japan were partly funded by $40 million in financial assistance from the
United Sates. Aircraft lent from the United States accounted for about 40 per cent of
Japan’s naval aviation by 1968. 86

A high-quality training manual was made with the support of the United States, as were
training aids and, ammunition, costing over $115 million. The United States provided
over $320 million of financial aid to the JMSDF until U.S. military assistance to Japan
was concluded in 1967. 87 MAAG-J changed its name to the Mutual Defense Assistance
Office (MDAO) in 1969. This organization supported Japan in foreign military sales,
including equipment and training and monitoring of the industrial security of U.S.-
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designed Japanese military equipment as licensed production. 88 The target of the Third
Plan was essentially improving maritime defence power. In November 1969 the outline
was approved by the cabinet. For this target, a concrete plan was created. As the priority,
to secure the safety of peripheral water areas and ensure the safety of maritime
transportation, the first item was planned for the reinforcement of its maritime defence
capacity by constructing 56 ships totalling 48,000 tons, including 14 destroyers with
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), plus helicopters, five submarines and 60 fixed-wing
antisubmarine aircraft and 33 ASW helicopters. 89 “The First and Second Defense
Program laid the foundations of Japan’s defence potential. Liken it to building a house.
The foundation and the pillars have been put in the place. Next comes the wall. The
Third Plan is to build the wall.” 90 Ultimately, at the end of 1976 after the Fourth
Defense Plan, the JMSDF possessed 481 ships (totalling 194,000 tons). 91

The JMSDF and the United States in the Cold War
Sea Lane Defence against the Soviet Navy
During the Cold War, both the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy had similar strategic
goals such as strategic deterrence, destroying enemy maritime forces, and presence; 92
one, however, was the complete polar opposite of the other. The U.S. Navy aimed to
protect its maritime communications whilst the Soviet Navy aimed to disrupt or destroy
its foe’s maritime transportation advantages. 93 Compared with the case of a ground
battle in which a garrison force must hold a fortress, protecting sea lanes from an
attacking force is a much more difficult duty, sometime involving naval battle. To make
matters worse, even though the U.S. Navy had never engaged mighty navies since the
Battle of Midway, the Soviet Navy was about to challenge the U.S. Navy as a
formidable challenger during the Cold War. 94 At that time, Western countries were
composed of states that depend on use of the sea for survival such as the United States,
Western European countries and Japan. The allies were separated by the sea. By
contrast, in the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact involved neighbouring countries of the
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internal region of the European continent. So, a bipolar confrontation between sea
control nations and sea denial nations emerged. 95 The Soviets focused on developing
submarine fleets that played a central role for sea denial, which led the United States to
provide Japan with a large number of P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft. As it turned
out, the JMSDF and the geopolitical position of the Japanese islands were successful in
blocking Soviet ambitions to expand into the Pacific Ocean. 96
In the 1960s, Japanese economic strength was returning and that of the U.S. was
relatively declining. Due to the whole morass of the Vietnam War, U.S. financial
conditions were becoming tighter. U.S. and European defence planners were anxious
about greater foreign policy and military burdens. Such sequences of events naturally
made defence planners ask Japan to contribute more to achieving a favourable
international security environment. As a result, U.S. President Nixon and Japanese
Prime Minister Sato stated in 1969 that “Japan would make further active contributions
to peace and prosperity in Asia.” 97 By 1980, President Carter’s Secretary of Defense,
Harold Brown, was demanding that Japan increase its defence budget by 7.6 per cent. 98

Another perspective came from Hideo Sekino, a former IJN officer, who stated in the
1970s that, “the protection of the sea communications of Japan should be given first
priority in the national defence of Japan, and the prevention of direct invasion of Japan
should be made the secondary function of the maritime defence force of Japan”. 99 In
addition, Sekino argued that Japan was extremely dependent on vast sea lanes for the
import of natural resources and had to consider a Soviet Navy attack on merchant
shipping. However, Osamu Kaihara, the former head of the Defense Bureau and a
secretary general of the National Defense Council, insisted that securing a huge network
of sea lanes was infeasible, with the limitations of Article 9 of the constitution, public
support, and JMSDF resources, against the powerful Soviet Navy. 100 He insisted that
the Japanese government should rebuild the JMSDF to resemble a coast guard
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specialized in defending the home islands from a direct invasion. 101 After the oil crisis
in 1973, the credibility of Sekino’s view, which recommended that Japan enhance
military strength enough to secure sea lanes as far as northern Indonesia, was further
enhanced. Sekino asserted that such a defence policy would achieve a good balance
between Japanese and U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. 102 After all, Sekino’s
JMSDF sea lane defence plan was reinforced with driving forces such as “a long-range
vision, a definite organizational preference for that vision, earnest allies in the Liberal
Democratic Party and important business leaders, a government that at least did not
quash the plan but kept the option open, and a geopolitical situation in which sea lane
defense become attractive to Japan’s ally.” 103

The Evolution of the Maritime Alliance
In October 1976, in order to prevent Japanese military weakness leading to a power
vacuum and a source of regional instability, 104 the National Defense Program Outline
(1976 NDPO) was released. The 1976 NDPO stipulated guidelines for the JMSDF’s
operation such as defence to deal with a direct invasion; warning and defence against
threats to its coastal area; protecting ports and straits; and reconnaissance and
surveillance of the seas adjacent to Japan’s coast. 105 The JMSDF in total possessed 38
destroyers and frigates, and 180 maritime patrol aircraft focusing on ASW and
reconnaissance by 1971. The NDPO argued for a force of 60 ASW ships, 16 submarines,
two minesweeping flotillas, and 16 ASW squadrons supplemented by 220 aircraft.106
“The expansiveness of the Outline and Guidelines sealed the ascendancy of Sekino’s
vision and emphasized the complementary role Japan could play in U.S. security
strategy.” 107
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The 1970s evolution of the JMSDF occurred in a strategic context of heightened
American concerns with Soviet naval expansion. Japan and the JMSDF thus began to
take on greater importance in U.S. global strategy. U.S. Navy concerns included the
Soviet deployment of the aircraft carrier Minsk to the Far East and considerable
reinforcement of its nuclear-powered submarine force in that theatre. 108 In 1978,
Moscow deployed land forces in the Northern Territories located to the north of
Hokkaido and deployed advanced Backfire bombers to the Far East. The United States
took the situation so seriously that it urged the Japanese government to build up its
defence capability. At that time, the JMSDF was striving to enhance interoperability
with the U.S. Navy. Over the course of the 1970s the JMSDF gained a fine reputation
because of its proficiency and high morale. U.S. Navy came to count on the JMSDF as a
detached force focusing on ASW as detachment forces. 109

Furthermore, in November 1977 the Japanese government decided to purchase 100
leading-edge F-15 fighter aircraft and 45 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. 110 Eventually,
the JMSDF deployed a total of 100 P-3C ASW planes to prevent the Soviet Navy from
passing through the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits. Interoperability with the
United States was enhanced by the fact that JMSDF P-3Cs applied the same weapons,
sensors and tactics as those of the U.S. Navy. As a consequence, the two navies started
to divide up time and areas to patrol between them. 111 Information gathered by P-3C
aircraft was used to advantage for the 7th Fleet. It has been argued that the Soviet Union
could not sustain military expenditure to counter the cooperative system composed
chiefly of the JMSDF surveillance capability complemented by the 7th Fleet. 112

On the one hand, in spite of being called “a continental state,” the Soviet Union had a
long coast line; however, suitable characteristics for leveraging seapower were
extremely limited due to geography, climate and weather. Hence the Kremlin had to
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deploy a large number of naval vessels in the Russian Far East. In order to freely deploy
its naval power in the region, the Soviet Union had to use the Tsushima, Tsugaru and
Soya Straits. For the United States, blockade of these straits was the most effective and
efficient way to choke off Soviet naval power. Accordingly, the strategic value of the
Japanese archipelagos was immeasurable in the Cold War years. 113 Looking back, it can
be said that this was a significant factor in the winning of the Cold War. Ultimately, the
Japanese archipelago, situated close to the Russian Far East, made a great contribution
to U.S. strategy in the Cold War era, with its advanced commercial technology and its
form of democracy. 114 On the other hand, without the presence of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet in the Far East, which was able to contain other Soviet military movements,
Japan’s status as a trading nation, with its high level of dependence on shipping and the
worldwide sea lines of communications (SLOC), would have been in an extremely
precarious position. 115

Even though the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty provides a platform for the alliance, there is
no definite normative guideline for combined defence against armed attacks in Article 5.
To deal with this issue, in November 1978, “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation” were agreed by the two countries. The guidelines represented a milestone
in practical security cooperation. Under the guidelines U.S. forces and the JSDF would
bilaterally conduct operations for the defence of waters surrounding Japan and for the
protection of sea lines of communication. The JSDF would have primary responsibility
for the protection of major ports and straits, for the protection of ships in surrounding
waters, and for other operations; U.S. forces would support the Self-Defense Forces’
operations and conduct operations, including those which may provide additional
mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the JSDF. 116

In May 1981, following a meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister
Zenkō Suzuki stated:
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It is natural for Japan to defend its surrounding waters, which is (sic)
our country’s back-yard. We will strengthen our defence capability
in order to defend several hundred miles of surrounding waters and
the sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. 117
This statement strongly surprised U.S. high government officials. With Suzuki’s
statement as a start, in 1983, the United States and Japan began a major study on sea
lane defence and U.S. reinforcement. 118 In this period, the Cold War was escalating and
the Soviet Union deployed a great number of SSBNs and Tu-22 Backfire strategic
bombers, becoming a big threat even to U.S. forces to protect the Japanese islands and
sea lanes in the western Pacific. 119 During the period between Prime Minister Suzuki’s
suggestion and the successor Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone’s, policy to officially
embody it, the JMSDF launched a plan to enhance its capacity by the newly-purchased
40 P-3Cs and advanced destroyers. 120

In 1980, the JMSDF, including a helicopter destroyer (DDH), a guided missile destroyer
(DDG), eight P-2J MPA and about 800 personnel participated in the U.S.-led Rim of the
Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC) for the first time, to develop cooperation in maritime
defence. 121 By 1984, the JMSDF was sending a flag officer, four destroyers and eight
ASW aircraft to RIMPAC. 122 In addition, a joint declaration affirming the alliance
relationship was signed in May 1981. In Yokosuka in July 1984, the commanders of the
Self Defense Fleet and U.S. 7th Fleet participated as training controllers in the first
combined naval exercise to involve training which employed the system of command
for combined operations, as a consequence of research and development advances into
combined operations plans. 123
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In June 1987, a combined command post exercise was launched at the U.S. Naval War
College to evaluate the effectiveness of combined operations and the defence
cooperation guidelines. 124 The close ties between the two navies made a meaningful
contribution to the victory of the U. S.-led free world countries in the Cold War.

In fact, the JMSDF played a central role in defence cooperation between the two
countries. On the premise of combined operations with by far the world’s most
advanced navy, the JMSDF made a concerted effort to enhance its capability and live up
to America’s expectations. Without doubt, the security partnership between Japan and
the United States developed through such a close navy-to-navy relationship. JMSDF
collaboration with the United States in activities such as sea lane defence thus moved
beyond the thinking of the Japanese bureaucracy, as represented by the defence
outline. 125

The U.S.-Japan Maritime Alliance and Naval Operations in the Post-Cold War
Era
Following the end of the Cold War, far from a situation of world peace, a number of
troubles erupted around the world, such as regional and domestic conflicts, religious
and ethnic conflicts, and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Such
incidents of instability often threaten Japanese or American national interests, with
implications for the alliance bond between the United States and Japan, which had
strengthened since the end of the Second World War, as had the status of Japan in the
international community. That bond was threatened by the new instability, triggering
alliance crises centred on national controversies over the interpretation of Article 9 of
the Japanese constitution. In this context, the JMSDF as the naval power of a maritime
state that can assume an active role in the implementation of the country’s foreign
policy was in a strong position to assist in ameliorating the growing sense of crisis.
Such is the diplomatic value of naval power. 126
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In 1987, the Reagan Administration asked Nakasone to dispatch Japanese minesweepers
to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Nakasone warmed to this imperative.
However, it was shelved on the grounds that Masaharu Gotōda, Chief Cabinet Secretary,
showed strong opposition because of the possibility of a danger that the JMSDF would
be involved in combat, and some difficulties lying ahead such as the issue of the
development of a legal framework for military deployments. 127 From 1987 to 1988, ten
Japanese merchant vessels were seriously affected by attacks in the Persian Gulf and the
Strait Hormuz. At that time, 55 per cent of Japan’s imported oil passed through this
region. 128 Many countries’ oil tankers were suffering from attacks or the threat of attack
in the so-called “tanker war” stage of the Iran-Iraq War. As a measure corresponding to
this situation, the U.S. Navy, several Western European navies, and the Soviet navy
made efforts to escort and protect merchant ships passing through international waters
in and around the Persian Gulf. As a logical consequence, the Japanese government was
requested to participate in deploying naval ships to escort and sweep the sea for mines
in cooperation with some of these other states. Japan became worried over how to deal
with the situation, and then, eventually, rejected the request. Instead of contributing
actual forces, Nakasone adopted “chequebook diplomacy,” namely, financial support to
the U.S.-led naval operations, in the form of a “cash payment to Washington.” 129

The Persian Gulf War of 1991
On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops made a surprise attack on Kuwait and occupied the
whole land. International society responded quickly to the military invasion. The U.N.
Security Council passed resolutions in rapid succession, and the United States and
others, totalling 42 countries, deployed 600,000 soldiers. 130 On 17 January 1991,
Operation Desert Storm was launched by the U.S.-led coalition of forces and a cessation
of fighting was secured on 28 January. Even though, on 11 April, a ceasefire was
officially achieved, Japan made almost no contribution to the international arena in this
period. The Japanese government stated that it would provide financial support and send
a medical assistance team at the end of August 1990. Then Prime Minister Kaifu took a
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cautious stance to a possible dispatch of the SDF to the Persian Gulf, and the majority
of opposition parties and bureaucrats strongly opposed it. However, Japan was looked
upon with scorn by other states, despite the fact that it contributed about $US13 billion
to the war effort. Far from being offered gratitude, Japan was the target of severe
criticism through international society due to its unwillingness to commit its own forces
even to a United Nations-sanctioned operation. Above all, the U.S. was increasingly
frustrated with the gap between Japan’s response and that of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries. 131

Just after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, USFJ Command asked the Maritime Staff
Office to send Japanese minesweepers to escort the aircraft carrier USS Midway from
Yokosuka to the Middle East in anticipation of their close relationship. However, taking
into consideration the circumstance at the time that Japanese avoided a serious debate
over relations between the JSDF and Article 9, it was impossible for the JSDF to
operate in the Middle East, thus it was effectively limiting itself to the region around the
Japanese islands. 132

While the number of states joining the multinational force was increasing, Japan was
unable to remain a spectator without personnel contributions. As the pressure increased
from the United States, 133 Japan tried to send the JASDF’s C-130 cargo planes for
refugee protection in order to save its international reputation, but it was cancelled
because Jordan’s domestic situation was unsuitable for operating transport aircraft and
there were only small refugee numbers 134; and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB)
was hostile to such a proposal. 135 However, the German government, which was also
constrained in its ability to deploy its military out-of-area, nonetheless dispatched
minesweepers and supply vessels to the Persian Gulf on 7 March 1991, exacerbating
Japan’s diplomatic and alliance difficulties. Germany used to be the same position as
Tokyo, sharing in the financial cost of coalition commitments without making direct
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military contributions, but Japan was left increasingly isolated following the new
German policy. 136

At one time during the Iran-Iraq War, America dispatched a task force as a
countermeasure against Iran’s threat to make indiscriminate attacks against tankers
under way in the Persian Gulf. Japan seemed to be a prime beneficiary of U.S. action.
Once again, in 1991 Japan would have been blamed and isolated internationally, as a
primary beneficiary of coalition efforts, while not taking any risks herself when others
put the lives of their forces in danger. 137 Iraq placed 1,200 mines around the coast of
Kuwait. It was a serious threat to ships in the Persian Gulf. Many countries such as the
United States, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
France, and Belgium, operated minesweepers; a difficult task in the extremely hot
climatic conditions of the Persian Gulf. Around that time, Japan depended on the
Middle East for around 70 per cent of its oil requirements. 138 In fact, as soon as the
United States began to dispatch its troops to the Middle East around 7 August 1990, the
naval headquarters of USFJ asked the JMSDF to send its escort vessels, minesweepers
and replenishment vessels. Although the JMSDF declined the request, the Chief of Staff,
MSDF, Hajime Sakuma, directed JMSDF Maritime Staff Office (MSO) to conduct a
desk study on this matter. The so-called “ME [Middle East] team” evaluated the
dispatch of Japanese forces, and reported the results to the JDA. 139

The First Operations
After the end of the war, in April 1991, the Japanese government was urged to send
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf by the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations,
the Japanese Shipowner’s Association, All Japan Seaman’s Union and the Petroleum
Association of Japan. 140 After the Japan Socialist Party, which opposed the dispatch of
minesweepers, was severely defeated in the nationwide local elections on 7 April and
136
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the ceasefire was formally concluded on 11 April, the political dove, Japanese Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu, who procrastinated about the issue, eventually established a
policy in favour of contributing a mine countermeasures complement. 141 The Japanese
government carefully prepared, in strict confidence to resist criticism, to send mine
countermeasures force. On 16 April 1991, JDA chief Yukihiko Ikeda ordered the
JMSDF to examine sending a unit. The force had to leave for the Middle East in April
to avoid the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. The JMSDF hastily prepared to
arrange the unit while some parts of the Japanese media demonstrated a cool response to
the dispatch, making arguments such as: “When Japanese minesweepers arrive there,
minesweeping might be completed already.” 142 On 24 April, the Japanese government
officially announced that JMSDF minesweepers would be deployed to the Persian Gulf
to clear about 1,200 sea mines. Finally, on 26 April, one minesweeper tender, four
minesweepers and one supply vessel, involving 511 JMSDF members, left Japan for the
Gulf.

The Americans provided the information the Japanese flotilla needed in order to begin
minesweeping operations, such as the depth of water, tide, the situation of the sea
bottom, and the types of mine involved. 143 There were still 200 mines in the most
difficult spot that Japanese minesweepers were expected to deal with. The conditions
for the minesweeping operation were difficult because of the heat and funnel fumes
from Kuwaiti oil fields that Iraqi forces had set fire to. 144 The U.S. Navy formed a
powerful support for this operation with essential intelligence and logistical assistance.
Without such cooperation, the success of this operation would have been an extremely
difficult task. The operation encouraged a deepening of the relationships between the
two allies and also enhanced JMSDF exchanges with the Royal Navy, the German Navy,
the Iranian Navy and personnel from the local Gulf states. 145

Barely Saving Japan’s Face
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Before the dispatch of the JMSDF, China’s official news agency made a statement
declaring it “a dangerous first step in sending troops overseas.” 146 Compared with
people in neighbouring Asian countries, the U.S. public did not show any interest in
Japan’s deployment, because the primary concerns of Americans were the outcome of
the war and the fate of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the major U.S. mass media outlets
allowed little space for this topic: 147 “Newspapers in the United States had found space
enough to criticize Japan’s hesitant responses in the fall of 1990 when the Persian Gulf
crisis dominated the news, but they had little enthusiasm left to report this drastic
change in Japan’s policy after war had been concluded.” 148 Generally speaking,
Americans watched this event with cool detachment. Typical characterizations of
Japan’s policy change and subsequent deployment belittled or ignored the political
difficulties involved for Tokyo, describing it, for example, as a “belated dispatch of four
small wooden minesweepers two months after the hostilities ended.” 149

The international environment since the end of the Cold War has required Japan to
change its security policy outlook. It is broadly said that the first impact was brought by
the Gulf War. 150 Japan could contribute to anything in the crisis. As a result, for
example, even though Japan provided $12 billion to wards war expenses, it was not on
the list of the countries to which the Kuwaiti government showed gratitude after the war
in an advertisement placed in The New York Times. 151 The impact of these events can be
viewed as the origin of the factors which have begun to change Japanese diplomatic
attitudes. Japan was thus forced to fully realize its loss of reputation and the importance
of adaptation to the standards and expectations for contributions to international
stability and security by all major democratic powers after the Cold War. 152
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The JMSDF flotilla returned to its home base in October. In the words of one American
analyst, “Harking back to the Korean War, Japanese forces again performed functions
that outstripped U.S. Navy capabilities.” 153 Although the average Japanese was not
particularly interested in the operation, those who were involved in trade-related work
around the Persian Gulf region understood the importance of the success of the
minesweeping duties and thus were more supportive of it. And eventually, the Kuwaiti
government inserted a full-page advertisement in a Japanese News Paper, The Daily
Yomiuri, to express cordial gratitude in April 1992. 154 Whilst Japan had been looked
down on as a “rich coward” by some, the deployed JMSDF minesweepers compensated
for the loss of international reputation and succeeded in maintaining at least the minimal
confidence in the maritime alliance with the United States.

This issue has driven many Japanese to reconsider their security in a less stable, more
uncertain world. Nevertheless, because Article 9 of the Constitution has been strictly
interpreted as restricting Japan’s military capacity, government policy continues to be
developed on the basis of concentrating on the capabilities of the forces to operate in a
self-defence territorial mode.

9/11 and the Dispatch of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean
Just after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a Japanese officer noticed the
difference in the situation as compared to the Gulf War, ten years previously. At that
time, the U.S. government demanded that Japan contribute in such ways as sharing the
cost of war and, deploying the JSDF, and harshly criticized the government for delay in
taking action. However, the United States made no claim against Japan after the terrorist
attacks in New York. 155

This posed a different kind of dilemma for Japan, and Japanese naval officers had a
strong sense of crisis about the unforseen emergency situation, a new experience for
them. 156 At the time, The United States stressed the importance of transforming the
concept of coalition operations into a reality, whereby no single nation can deal with the
153
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innumerable contingencies without the cooperation of coalition members to share
intelligence and specific geographic knowledge. U.S. policy for the new era has been
one of encouraging the formation of “coalitions of the willing”. 157 The object of each
contingency would determine the members of each coalition headed by the United
States. Unlike the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the U.S.-led coalitions will usually be
multilateral in character, whereby each member must itself determine its contribution to
operations and reconstruction support after a war or crisis, and also coordinate these
with other coalition members as well. 158 JMSDF officers thought that a possibility
existed that a poor showing of support for the United States in such circumstances
would cause significant damage to the alliance. 159

Unlike before 9/11, Japan had to make a plan for operations led by a U.S. orientedcoalition, but without explicit U.S. demands. Thus, the JMSDF made a list of possible
responses to the war against terrorism and support for U.S. armed forces, including
supply missions and ship inspections in the Indian Ocean and escorting U.S. carrier
strike groups. Both the JMSDF and the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs started coordination and collaboration without regard to the antipathy
of the Defense Agency ― which was concerned with the issue of the exercise of the
right to collective self-defence ― because both shared common perceptions of the
implications of the current situation for the alliance. And to be able to carry out such
support to its alliance partner, new laws would have to be enacted by the government,
involving a time-consuming process. 160

Three days after the 9/11 terrorist attack, however, the USS Kitty Hawk, which was the
81,123-tonne carrier and could 75 aircraft, was trying to leave Yokosuka because USFJ
had become extremely intimidated by the situation. Indeed, a great number of civil
aircraft were flying around Haneda Airport. Accordingly, in order to securely navigate
the aircraft carrier through cluttered waters that were potentially vulnerable to terrorist
attack, such as Tokyo Bay, the U.S. Navy asked for a Japanese escort. The JMSDF
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wanted to show a strong political message of support that “We stand by you” 161; but it
had never officially escorted U.S. aircraft carriers throughout the post-War era. On 18
September, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Japan officially called on both the
JCG and the JMSDF to escort the aircraft carrier from Yokosuka to a position off Miura
Peninsula, a total 30 kilometres. Hence, as expected, the JMSDF had a heated
discussion with the JDA, which insisted upon the need for a new theory to handle the
Diet. Ultimately, Defense Agency chief Nakatani explained at a press conference, “The
act (act of the ships) constitutes survey and research needed to carry out routines under
the law on the establishment of the Defense Agency”. 162 The JMSDF and the JDA came
up with an idea based on the Law to Authorize the Establishment of the JDA,
suggesting that the JMSDF “has to provide warnings and surveillance in surrounding
sea areas in order to use the port safely, assuming that a state of confusion would be
created when Kitty Hawk departed.” 163 In the early morning of 21 September, 26 JCG
patrol vessels surrounded Kitty Hawk and two JMSDF escort ships accompanied the
ship’s exit from port, positioned at the front and the rear of the carrier, respectively. 164
Defense Agency chief General Nakatani said that “They are patrolling in waters
surrounding Japan, because if a terrorist attack takes place in the region, it would cause
a serious impact on the safety of Japan.” 165

This made the news across the U.S. media outlets due to the North American Affairs
Bureau in Ministry of Foreign Affairs assiduously spreading the story. Typically, some
Japanese politicians blamed the JMSDF for “getting ahead too much”. 166 Although the
JMSDF officers were prepared for the controversy, they were assisted by public support
from the Americans for the role of Japanese maritime forces during the operation. Kitty
Hawk later returned to Yokosuka following the conduct of carrier landing training in
seas close to Japan, and subsequently it left for the Indian Ocean to support Operation
Enduring Freedom: the U.S. war against terrorist forces. This time, it was escorted by
24 JCG ships without the attendance of the JMSDF vessels. 167
161
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The Anti-Terrorism Law and Indian Ocean Refuelling Mission
In October 2001, the Koizumi Cabinet subsequently enacted “The Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Law” to allow Japan to combat international terrorism as a member of
the U.S.-led coalition, through refuelling missions for other navies participating in
maritime interception operations. The tense situation of the alliance urged then Prime
Minister Koizumi to promote the enactment of the bill. 168 Indeed, the JMSDF made a
step toward becoming a more “normal” force as a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. On 9 November 2001, two JMSDF escort vessels and a replenishment vessel,
together involving 700 personnel, were dispatched to the Indian Ocean based on the
Law to Authorize the Establishment of the JDA to gather data, because the basic plan
on the dispatch had yet to be worked out in spite of the anti-terrorism special measures
law that had been enacted. On 16 November the plan was approved by Cabinet. And on
2 December the supply vessel Hamana started to supply fuel to a U.S. replenishment
ship in the Arabian Sea; an area which was believed to be a routine line of
communication for al Qaeda terrorists. However, the JMSDF quickly became nervous
operating in that stretch of ocean due to the fact that there were around 100 unidentified
aircraft and 30 boats passing through the area daily. As a result of the JMSDF’s
concerns, the Japanese government dispatched an Aegis ship to assist, with its
extremely advanced and effective surveillance capability. 169 Therefore in December
2002, the Kongō-class Aegis escort ship, Kirishima, was dispatched to the Indian Ocean.
This inevitably fuelled the domestic controversy, however. By sharing the surveillance
data gathered by the Aegis destroyer with its U.S. ally, the opposition parties accused
the government of infringing the antiterrorism law. The main opposition Democratic
Party of Japan opposed the dispatch of Kirishima because its air defence capability and
data sharing capabilities, in commonality with the U.S. Navy’s own Aegis-equipped
destroyers and cruisers, could be linked to combat operations, which in turn could
infringe upon Article 9 as the effective implementation of the right to collective self-
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defence. Even the LDP’s coalition partner, Kōmeito, and doves in the LDP itself,
crossed the floor to show their disapproval. 170

The importance of the JMSDF’s role in the Indian Ocean was subsequently further
enhanced, with JMSDF vessels supplying fuel not only to the U.S. Navy, but also to
other navies such as those of Great Britain, France, and Pakistan; in all, Japan’s navy
supplied naval vessels of eleven different coalition members participating in “Operation
Enduring Freedom”. This naval cooperation was regarded as significant, because each
naval vessel routinely needs fuel and water supplies to operate on 24-hour schedules.
Without supplies on the ocean, such a vessel has to return to a port for replenishment
during its campaigns, which would require an extra vessel and expose a gap in the
maritime surveillance system. 171

The difficulty of such re-supply operations at sea, including avoiding minor collisions
due to wind or waves, is largely unknown to the public; a warship and a replenishment
vessel must sail side-by-side in formation for many hours. Such difficult maritime
supply operations require great skill and sound training: refuelling operations require
advanced techniques as both ships are navigating. The JMSDF has a proven ability to
handle such operations. As a result of its Indian Ocean operations, the JMSDF has
demonstrated its value not only to its ally but also to its several coalition partners by
practising a technically very difficult capability that few other navies possess. 172 Unlike
the United States and Japan, not many countries have a capability to dispatch a fleet
10,000 kilometres from their home waters for such an extended period of time. In
addition, during the operation naval vessels put themselves in significant danger,
because the two vessels are connected by a refuelling hose and are restricted in their use
of various sensors and weapons. 173 Therefore, escort ships and helicopters have to keep
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a strict watch on the surrounding area, and should they spot unidentified ships, the
JMSDF and foreign ships would share the information through a communication link.174

Anti-terrorism and maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean by coalition navies
have been successful in preventing terrorist attacks against marine transportation, and
terrorist supply of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition, and in preventing terrorist
activity at sea generally. At the same time, probably as a result of a collateral effect of
these operations, the number of reported incidents of piracy decreased. For Japan, which
is highly dependent upon the safety of sea lanes as its maritime lifeline, backing off
from this mission would effectively be abnegating its responsibility, losing Japan credit
with international society and, above all, producing a negative impact on U.S.-Japan
relations. The dispatch of JMSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean was thus a very effective
diplomatic option, as well as proving useful practical training for the JMSDF. 175

Nevertheless, the JMSDF’s Indian Ocean operations operated under severe constraints.
Whilst coalition navies have been conducting maritime interception operations covering
the whole area from the Strait of Hormuz to the northern part of the Indian Ocean, the
JMSDF cannot participate because of the lack of its legal authority to inspect
shipping. 176

The Expired Law
Even though the ambassadors of eleven recipient navies jointly expressed gratitude to
Japan and the JMSDF for the refuelling mission and called for continued efforts in this
regard, and the heads of state of the United States, Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
directly urged Japan to continue the supply mission, it was in fact discontinued because
of the expiration of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in November 2007. 177
After a battle between the coalition government that advocated the early resumption of
the supply mission and the opposition parties that attempted to block it, JMSDF
174
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refuelling operations started again on 21 February. The legitimacy of the operation
internationally was assured by a broad consensus in support of the coalition’s antiterrorism activities in Afghanistan. Even China did not oppose the deployment of the
JSDF for such activities. Without operations undertaken by the JMSDF, it appears that
the Pakistan Navy would have found it difficult to carry out its own tasks. This is
important in the larger strategic context because it is crucial for the U.S.-oriented antiterrorism coalition to anchor Pakistan firmly to its side. 178 Some commentators in the
media think light of this JMSDF operation by calling it “a free petrol station at the sea”;
whereas in fact Japan’s supply operations lighten a financial burden on Pakistan and
enables Pakistani participation in coalition activities. Pakistani support to the coalition
is also vital, such as when the JMSDF ships call in to Pakistan ports, where the danger
of terrorist attack reaches its peak. 179

After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control of the government in September
2009, a new liberal-minded administration never displayed a desire to extend the
effective period of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Therefore, on 16 January
2010, the special law finally expired and the JMSDF supply units pulled out of
operations in the Indian Ocean. During the refuelling mission for eight years, the
JMSDF conducted 939 operations that supplied 510,000 kilolitres of marine fuel (24.5
billion yen) to twelve nations. 180 As an alternative for this replenishment mission,
Hatoyama administration committed US$ 5 billion in humanitarian aid. 181

The director of international security studies at the Royal United Service Institute,
London, Jonathan Eyal, has said, “If the Japanese government intends to express a
return to the previous chequebook diplomacy, I am extremely regretful for this.” 182
According to Eyal, there are two problems with this situation: 183 Japan’s removal of its
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vessels participating in the operations against terrorism would not send a good political
message, especially considering that the United States and Great Britain had decided to
send additional forces to Afghanistan, and other allies of NATO were also considering
reinforcement there; and withdrawing the JMSDF would give an impression that Japan
was determined to lessen its security relationship with the United States. Besides, he
insisted that if Japan should decrease its presence in the international arena, which of
China would increase, without doubt. Provided that Japan promotes the supremacy of
United Nations as an alternative to the alliance with the United States, in terms of the
deployment of the JSDF, it would imply that Japan leaves its security and diplomatic
policy to China, which has veto power at the U.N. Security Council. 184

Missile Defence as the Modern Maritime Barrier and the Bond of the Alliance
The U.S. and the Missile Defence
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union intensified their deadly
arms race regarding strategic ballistic missiles. The development of ballistic missile
defence (BMD), however, did not progress due to technological difficulty and the
restrictions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, concluded in 1972, based on the
concept of Mutually Assured Destruction. 185 In the final years of the Cold War, U.S.
President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, with a core plan of
deploying anti-ballistic missile weapons in space. This concept set off shock waves with
the Soviets and parts of international society, but the United States was unable to
surmount technological challenges for the defence system in the end. 186 After the Cold
War, in the Gulf War of 1991, U.S. forces deployed Patriot Advanced Capability-2
(PAC-2) surface-to-air missiles to intercept Iraq’s Scud ballistic missiles. The
deployment of PAC-2 attracted tremendous interest in the world community around that
time. In addition to this experience, the fact that North Korea and Iran have been
desperate to advance schemes to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads drives
the U.S. to eagerly develop missile defence systems. 187
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The current American rationale for the development of a ballistic missile defence
capability has been to negate the ballistic missile-delivered nuclear weapons ambitions
of the “rogue” regional power proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. As well as
providing a potential defensive shield, such a capability may enable the United States to
give full play to its conventional weapons capability in any conflict with a rogue state.
In history, some states have accrued such strong power and then seemed to be
unbeatable. It is often said that one nation cannot simultaneously retain both superb
seapower and land power. In rare cases, such as the mid and late Roman Republic, the
Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium, became superstates that had a first class navy and
army for a period of time. 188 The U.S. can be also be viewed as a super power that
possesses all forms of strategic might, as earlier elucidated in Chapter 2, involving not
only the army and navy, but also airpower, nuclear power, and space power, subsumed
within the land/sea classification in general. 189 However, even if rogue state, whose
national power is minimal compared to that of greater states, could adopt a hard line,
autarkic, potentially effective foreign policy towards opponents by possessing nuclear
weapons as a tool for intimidation. For this reason, defending against ballistic missiles
by constructing a missile defence system has been a significant national target for
America in order to maintain its position and enhance its influence as the global power.

Japan’s BMD System and Information Sharing with the United States
From the Japanese perspective BMD is expected to deter and defend against an
opponent’s ballistic missile attack and discourage rival nations from developing and
proliferating ballistic missiles. 190 There are some significance aspects of missile defence
systems for Japan. 191 A missile defence system covering the Japan islands is potentially
able to prevent ballistic missiles from being used as a tool of political intimidation. If
Japan can build countermeasures such as a missile defence system to protect her from
the threat of ballistic missile attack, it would reinforce the credibility of the U.S.-Japan
alliance and make the alliance more bilateral. In fact, assuming the Japanese BMD
188
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system works well, Japan can protect not only Japanese nationals, but also U.S.
facilities in Japan. Japan and the U.S. can thus be united by common strategic interests.

BMD cooperation measures have included, or potentially include, research and
development of aspects of the missile defence system, to confront missile crises in the
Far East. Such BMD cooperation can improve the stability of the alliance with the
United States, which would lead the security environment of the East Asia to be more
stable as well. Besides, not only North Korea, but China and Russia also deploy a large
quantity of ballistic missiles whose firing range can reach Japanese territory. Japan thus
has to prepare countermeasures to cope with their missile strategy. It is well suited to
the context of Japan’s security environment, considering the constitutional limitations of
Article 9 which tightly constrains Japan’s security capability in terms of using armed
forces. For many Japanese, revising Article 9 is still unacceptable due to the prevalence
of post-War pacifism. It is also strongly unacceptable to them for Japan to have the
capability, as a deterrent, to be able to conduct even limited military strikes overseas as
a deterrent, even though adjacent countries possess nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile power.

Previously, the sea was regarded not only as a highway, but also as a barrier to prevent
an enemy’s invasion from overseas. 192 The effect of this role has been fading in relative
terms as the technology of weaponry has been drastically developing, although it still
makes sea power states much safer than the security circumstances of adjacent
continental powers. The advent of sea-based missile defence systems might restore the
ocean’s reliable role as a strong bulwark for sea-girt countries in the 21st century. It has
been argued that the advantages of sea-based BMD systems are the following
capabilities: 193 conducting BMD operations from advantageous locations at sea where
ground-based systems cannot reach; operating in forward locations in international
waters without permission form foreign governments; clearer visibility relative to that
ashore; and readily moving to a new maritime location as needed. Meanwhile, potential
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limitations of this system include: 194 possible conflicts with performing other ship
missions, higher costs relative to ground-based systems, the availability of BMD ship
quantities (i.e., numbers) for forward deployments, vulnerability to attack when
operating in forward locations, and rough waters that might inhibit a crew’s ability to
operate a ship’s systems.

Direct contracts between the U.S. government and Japanese companies for a Western
Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study (WESTPAC) started from 1989. Japan thus
came to be engaged in the research for BMD at a very early stage. 195 With North
Korea’s nuclear test 1993, the U.S. and Japan began to implement joint development
activities for BMD. In December 1993, the two governments agreed to set up a U.S.Japan Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Working Group (TMD WG) and discussed the
analysis of threats and technological difficulties. In December 1998, after the launch test
of North Korea’s Taepodong-1 in the previous month, the United States and Japan
agreed to start to engage in cooperative technological research on Navy Theater Wide
Defense (NTWD). Four components of the interceptor missile Standard Missile (SM)-3
were chosen for the joint research: lightweight nose cone; stage-two rocket engine;
advanced kinetic warhead; and two-color infrared sensor. 196

In June 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) presented a new strategy for BMD,
a multilayered missile defence system, 197 divided into three segments: Boost Defense
Segment, Mid-course Defense Segment, and Terminal Defense Segment. 198 Taking the
progress of the U.S. BMD programme into consideration, in December 2003, the
Japanese government made its decision to introduce its own BMD system. Japan’s
BMD system is composed of: 1) launch detection of ballistic missiles using satellite194
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based and ground-based radar; 2) ballistic missile interception with Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD)-equipped Aegis ships in the Mid-Course Defense Segment; and
3) interception of ballistic missiles using ground-to-air Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
Additionally, Command Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) is
required to enable integrated and organized operation of linkages between BMD sensors
and weapons. 199

In Japan’s BMD system, firstly, the Japanese government would receive information on
the launch of a ballistic missile from Japan’s information-gathering and U.S. Defense
Support Program (DSP) satellites. The U.S. launched several DSP satellites for early
warning that cover the entire Earth’s surface. The Japanese government does not
possess such a constellation of early-warning satellites. 200 Even though Japan launched
information-gathering satellites for the first time in 2003, Japan’s satellite can provide
only relatively low-resolution images akin to those of commercial satellites because the
government limited the use of space for so-called “peaceful purposes,” due to a 1969
parliamentary resolution. As a result the Basic Law on Space was enacted in 2008: other
than its use for a military invasion, the Japanese government can make space more
operational and can pave the way to possess better satellites, including a missile launch
observation system. At the moment, Japan does not possess any early-warning satellites
similar to U.S. DPS satellites that deliver information on the launch of ballistic missiles
as a Shared Early Warning (SEW) for BMD. In January 2008, a Joint Tactical Ground
Station (JTAGS) set up at the U.S. military base in Misawa commenced operations to
receive information from U.S. early-warning satellites. 201 Also, Japan’s phased array
radar and U.S. mobile X band radar are operated to track ballistic missiles. Importantly,
the U.S. information network and Japan’s BMD system have to be integrated to operate
smooth combined operations between the two countries. Accordingly, the Bilateral Joint
Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) was organized to strengthen collaboration
between both command centres and share information in 2006. 202
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Aegis BMD
The U.S. government has regarded its Aegis ballistic missile defence as the core of the
sea-based BMD programme for midcourse and terminal phase interception. The Aegis
BMD system is designed to detect and track missiles of any range, including
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and intercept short and medium-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs, respectively) above the atmosphere during their
midcourse phase of flight. 203 The Aegis BMD system builds on the capability of the U.S.
Navy’s Aegis ship combat system, which was originally developed for defending ships
against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface
threats. 204 The Aegis system was first introduced by the U.S. Navy in 1983, focused on
providing protective countermeasures for their carrier battle groups against Soviet
aircraft and ASCMs. This system consists of advanced equipment such as the SPY-1
radar 205 , a suite of computers running the Aegis fire control and battle-management
computer programme and the Standard Missile, the Navy’s longer-ranged surface-to-air
missile. 206 The maximum effective range of the SM-3 interceptor missile is over 1,200
kilometre. Two Aegis destroyers can theoretically provide defensive cover over almost
the whole of Japan. 207

Originally, the JMSDF’s Aegis ships were intended to strengthen the defence system for
Japanese airspace and the surrounding sea areas for Japan’s sea lanes under the
assumption of attacks from long-range anti-ship missiles delivered by Russian longrange bombers such as the Tu-22 Backfire. 208 Currently, Japan possesses six Aegis
destroyers, four Kongō-class (costing about 120 billion yen each) and two Atago-class
(about 145 billion yen each). Japan has conducted a cooperative programme with the
United States for researching and developing technologies for the Block II/IIA versions
of the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptor focusing on risk reduction for four parts of
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the missile noted above: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage
propulsion unit, and a lightweight nose cone. 209

U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation has been going through a process of development and
sharing of advanced technologies and concepts for a missile defence system. This
partnership is expected to produce improved synergies with respect to a missile defence
command and control system by improving its combined operational systems and its
ability to share vital information. Also, the United States anticipates Japan’s removal of
the ban on military exports in order to share Japanese developments in BMD technology.
The effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship as a result has been strongly
enhanced by such cooperative activities. 210 On 18 December 2007, a Japanese Aegis
vessel successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target with the Aegis BMD system,
with advance notice of the target ballistic missile launch time, at a combined naval drill,
designated “Japan Flight Test Mission-1 (JFTM-1)” with the U.S. Navy in waters off
the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. 211 On 20 December 2008, without advance notice of
launch time, the second test failed to intercept a missile. The third test was successful
without advance notice of launch time on 28 October 2009. According to the U.S. Navy,
the cost of a joint U.S.-Japanese missile defence programme is going to be in the
vicinity of US$3.1 billion. 212

BMD against North Korea’s Missile Strategy
When North Korea fired a stream of ballistic missiles in July 2006, the United States
and Japan set up a multilayered missile-tracking system: the United States incorporated
its Defense Support Program Satellite, Aegis warships, RC-135S Cobra Ball
reconnaissance aircraft, Observation Island T-AGM-23, and an X-band radar deployed
in Aomori; and Japan used Aegis ships, EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft, P-3C
and YS-11E MPAs, and its FPS-XX radar. 213 Had North Korea’s Taepodong 2 missile
reached as far as mainland U.S., the United States would, in principle, have intercepted
209
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it. A Bilateral Joint Operation Coordination Center (BJOCC) was established at the
Yokota Air Base to exchange information and secure close coordination between the
alliance partners, but they nevertheless will need further improvements in cooperation
procedures in order to be able to conduct genuinely combined operations. 214

The increasing threats from missile proliferation, including Chinese and North Korean
nuclear-armed missiles, have made cooperation in missile defence technologies and
concepts more urgent. BMD cooperation represents research and development and
technology sharing arrangements for some of the most advanced and high-priced
technology by the world’s two largest economies. In theory this represents a new bond
that further strengthens alliance ties and has enabled their respective national
capabilities to be augmented by the synergistic effects of interdependent cooperation
between sea-power allies. 215

Ultimately, the missile did not pose a direct threat to Japanese territory. Compared to
the Taepodong-1 that passed over the Japanese islands in 1998, Pyongyang increased
the range of the missile so that it could reach the U.S. mainland. In 1998, the first-stage
booster plunged into the Sea of Japan about 180 kilometres from the launching platform
in North Korea, and the missile was delivered 1,600 km by the second-stage booster.
Unlike the two-stage Taepodong-2 launched in 2006, which had an estimated the range
of 6,000 km ― placing Alaska at risk ― the April 2009 Taepodong-2 was a three-stage
rocket estimated the range of 10,000 km, meaning that it could reach as far as the U.S.
west coast. 216 In April 2009, the first-stage booster plunged into the Pacific about 320
kilometres west of Akita Prefecture (about 540 km from the launch site in North Korea).
Although it was not confirmed, the second-stage booster seems to have landed over
3,000 km from the launch site. 217 It is believed that the third-stage booster plunged into
the Pacific together with the second-stage, but this has not been confirmed.
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When North Korea launched a ballistic missile on 5 April 2009, Japan deployed a
missile defence system operationally for the first time. Japan and the United States both
carefully tracked the missile and analysed the tracking data. In June 2006, the United
States had placed its latest X-band radar system at the JASDF’s Syariki Sub Base in
Tsugaru, Aomori Prefecture. Before the launch of the missile, the U.S. forces used the
X-band radar system, five Aegis destroyers and two Cobra Ball reconnaissance aircraft
to precisely gather as much missile data as possible. 218 The Japanese government
deployed two Aegis destroyers with SM-3 interceptor missiles, and land-based PAC-3
interceptor missiles at five locations in Japan. 219

Legal Limitation
In future, there is a possibility that Japan might possess a BMD system that could
intercept ballistic missiles in their Boost Defence Segment. At that point, however, it is
difficult to tell whether the target of the missile would be Japan or not. This creates a
problem for Japan that intercepting such a ballistic missile might not be regarded as the
right to individual self-defence. 220

This incident highlighted issues of Japan’s right to collective defence. The United States
gave Japan the initial information about the preparation for the missile launch sourced
from its reconnaissance satellites. Despite the fact that Japan depends greatly on its
American ally, it cannot exercise the right of collective defence on behalf of the United
States; even though Washington has requested that Japan use its defence system to
intercept any missiles fired at the United States. 221 Tokyo remains hamstrung by its
constitutional limitations.

In response to North Korea’s missile strategy, the LDP began to raise the possibility of
acquiring capabilities to directly strike missile bases on enemy territory, “in order not to
sit and wait for death.” 222 As an easily identifiable threat, North Korea and its nuclear
218
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and missile policies have driven Japan to strengthen its alliance with the United States,
and accelerated a tendency for Japan to evolve its defence policy towards that of an
ordinary country. 223 Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe established a council
of advisers to discuss the issue. The advisory body drafted a report stating that if Japan
changes the constitutional interpretation with regard to the exercise of the right of
collective defence, Japan could conduct four types of operations: protect U.S. vessels on
the high seas; intercept missiles fired at the United States; deploy the JSDF on
international peacekeeping missions; and provide rear-area support for other countries’
units in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 224 However, Abe’s sudden resignation upset the
original schedule. Therefore the report was submitted to Prime Minister Fukuda, who
had succeeded Abe, and who showed negative attitudes toward the exercise of the right.
In response to the launch of the North Korean, however, Prime Minister Taro Asō, who
in turn had succeeded Fukuda, met to hear the contents of the report with the chairman
of the panel, former Ambassador to the U.S., Shunji Yanai, in April 2009. 225 However,
more recently, Democratic Party of Japan Prime Minister Hatoyama announced that his
administration has no intention to invoke the right of collective self-defence. 226

Despite these ongoing political difficulties, missile defence effectiveness is still
discussed. This matter has the potential to be used as an opportunity to advance military
technical cooperation and the right of collective self-defence, which deepens and
develops bilateral relations between Japan and the United States.

The Maritime Alliance as a Mutual Complementary Relationship
Spear and Shield
Japan’s defence budget is about 4.7 trillion yen. The JSDF’s military force is totals
about 227,000 personnel (JGSDF: 138,000, JMSDF: 44,000, and JASDF: 45,000).227
Currently, the JMSDF’s budget is about 1 trillion yen. The JMSDF possesses 148 ships,
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including 16 submarines. 228 The JCG’s budget is about 180 billion yen. 229 It has about
13,000 personnel and 442 ships. 230 There are strong doubts about whether the size of
Japan’s military and naval power could protect the Japanese archipelago and sea areas
relevant Japan’s security. On the one hand, Americans have long thought highly of the
allied navy:

Japan has the capability to defend itself against all but perhaps a resurgent
Soviet Union. They have invested a lot of money to build a very capable
self-defense force….We operate with the Japanese navy a lot; they are good.
We have mutual defense arrangements with Japan, but they really have the
capability to defend themselves. 231
There are some reasons why the JMSDF’s capability did not become widely understood
by the public. 232 Even though JMSDF capability steadily increased, it was concealed by
obvious U.S. and Soviet naval developments. As matter of fact, it was difficult to
precisely assess and compare the capability of the various navies. A number of defence
experts had the habit of seeing not only the JMSDF but all Japan’s armed forces as
limited by constitutional and legal constraints, and public sentiment. Also, Japan was
not perceived as a potential threat to the United States and its other allies. For example
China was perceived as a threat because it was a potentially destabilizing and
hegemonic regime, rather than as a result of its modernizing armed forces.
Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was noticed much more
widely than the JMSDF, which was seen as a harmless friend.

On the other hand, the JSDF has to rely heavily on U.S. forces for nuclear deterrent
power, and their role as the “spear,” through U.S. power projection capability; while the
JSDF plays a role as a “shield” in case of emergencies in areas surrounding Japan and
securing more distant SLOC. 233 The main structural feature deficit of the JSDF is a lack
228
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of power projection capability. 234 That is why the Japanese navy has developed in such
an unbalanced way, as a result of Article 9 restrictions. 235 When discussing Japan’s
defence policy, the exclusively defence-oriented policy comes to be a constant issue.
The operational capability of the JSDF is only sufficient for the homeland and the
surrounding area of the Japanese islands. Additionally, the JSDF possesses no assault
capability against enemy bases. Therefore, without maritime power projection
capability, the JMSDF has inevitably been charged with playing the role that focuses
defence as a “shield.” As a logical consequence, the U.S. Navy possesses tremendous
power projection capability, with aircraft carrier strike groups playing the primary role
of the “spear”. 236 For an island country like Japan, comprising a widely dispersed set of
archipelagos, possessing a large number of landing craft and other amphibious
capabilities is essential, in view of considering flexible military actions throughout the
nation’s different island groups. 237

The JMSDF thus developed the Ohsumi-class amphibious ship (with a stated
displacement of 8,900 tons ― although this is believed to be an understatement of the
actual displacement), which is in effect a type of flat-deck dock landing ship (LSD),
substantially larger than earlier classes of landing ship such as the Atsumi-class.
However, there are only three ships in the class, and they are still relatively small and
limited in capability compared to most comparable vessels in other advanced navies.
The ships possess only a small flight deck area which can accommodate rotorcraft and
support their continuous operations. The internal space that exists is instead designed
for a docking well (from which smaller landing craft operate), and vehicle, personnel
and cargo storage. 238
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During the Cold War, the JMSDF developed two main components, the Self Defense
Fleet in charge of defending the sea lanes around Japan and the Regional Districts in
charge of defending each assigned area and providing operational and logistical support
to the Self Defense Fleet. 239 The collaborative support of the Self Defense Fleet and the
Regional Districts have been of significant assistance to the U.S. Navy’s operation,
principally in regard to logistic support in the western Pacific in areas near Japan and
matters related to anti-submarine warfare. 240 The JSDF in effect is not a balanced, selfcontained force at all. Accordingly, Japan has two main responsibilities in view of
current strategic circumstances and immediate security concerns. 241 The first is to
provide the U.S. with military bases and facilities, and secondly, to undertake
cooperative training with U.S. forces on a routine basis for the close partnership in order
to immediately respond to ballistic missile launches and carry out anti-terrorism
operations.

Anti-Submarine Warfare and Mine Countermeasures
There are extremely large gaps in JMSDF capabilities. Although two particular
capabilities, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures (MCM), have
attained a first-rate level, others have remained rather limited or non-existent, resulting
in a highly specialised, unbalanced naval force structure. These strength and weaknesses
represent the starting point for the JMSDF’s future bilateral cooperation with the United
States. 242 In fact, the JMSDF developed during the Cold War into one of the world’s
leading exponents of ASW; yet its unbalanced force structure lacks many of the
elements which tend to characterize truly first-class navies such as nuclear-powered
submarines, and power projection assets such aircraft carriers, and assault landing craft.
Unbalanced force structure afflicts not only the JMSDF, but also the JASDF, which has
first-rate air defence capabilities but no long-range striking power, such as strategic
bombers. Indeed, Japan has no power-projection capability for deterrent effect at all, 243
even though it is surrounded and regarded as a potential enemy by adjacent countries
which are increasing their offensive capabilities.
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However, such unbalanced capabilities reflect American demands for JSDF
development over the years. 244 Indeed, Japan possesses more than 100 P-3C, antisubmarine aircraft. The quantity of these types of weapons was increased during the
Cold War as a result of U.S. requests in order to conduct anti-submarine operations to
prevent Soviet transit of the Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits, and thus to cage the
Soviet navy within the Sea of Japan should war break out, and also to maintain the
security of sea lanes and strategic chokepoints in the areas around the Japanese
islands. 245 The JSDF has thus been regarded as one of the world’s most advanced forces
in terms of ASW and air defence, involving such force structure elements as modern
conventional submarines, ASW maritime patrol aircraft, escort ships, surface-to-air
missiles, and fighter interceptors. The JMSDF has been noted, in particular, for its
advanced submarines. 246

Another Japanese forte has been mine countermeasures. This capability has developed
not only the reason that, if mines were to be laid around Japan, the country would
become economically paralysed, but also in order to assure free access to the sea to U.S.
Navy ships home ported in Japan. Thus, Japanese MCM forces are important to the U.S.
7th Fleet, and for supporting U.S. landing operations in case of an emergency on the
Korean peninsula. 247 Indeed, they have had the experience of removing a great number
of mines sown by the U.S. Navy and air forces during the Pacific War. In 1945, in
“Operation Starvation against Japan”, B-29 bombers dropped mines around the main
ocean routes and ports in order to disrupt maritime traffic as part of the economic
warfare campaign designed to reduce Japan’s willingness to continue the fight. GHQ
launched minesweeping operations just after the end of the war. On 18 September 1945,
about 350 ships disarmed by the Allied Forces and 10,000 Japanese ex-naval personnel
reactivated Japan’s mine countermeasure capabilities. 248
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The JMSDF took over the minesweeping operation in waters around the Japanese
archipelago and finished the task only in 1985. Such minesweeping operations not only
served to hone Japan’s MCM skills, but also contributed to the independent recovery of
Japan, post-war reconstruction and economic development. 249

The JMSDF and the U.S. 7th Fleet
As already noted, the central tasks of the JMSDF were anti-submarine operations, sea
lane defence and maritime defence against direct attack. 250 Unlike the Imperial Japanese
Navy, which did not have a concept of sea lane defence, the JMSDF could concentrate
on improving and strengthening the force for sea lane defence since there was no need
for it to establish a new fleet for offensive operations, a role played instead by the U.S.
7th Fleet. 251 The 7th Fleet is well-known as the strongest fleet in the world, with its
home ports in Yokosuka and Sasebo. No country other than Japan provides a home port
for U.S. warships. A naval port must meet a number of requisite conditions related to
size, water depth, and various specialized facilities. In the case of home ports for the
U.S. Navy, a country which provides such ports must attain a high level of industrial
and technological sophistication in order to satisfy the demands of the world’s leading
navy. 252

In brief, Yokosuka and Sasebo are in a different class from other ports of call and naval
facilities outside the United States. Usually, the 7th Fleet is composed of about 60 to 70
ships, 200 to 300 aircraft and 40,000 navy and marine personnel. 253 The 7th Fleet’s area
of responsibility (AOR) is the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, except for the
Arabian Sea. In August 2006, according to Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, the newlyrenovated Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser upgraded for BMD, USS Shiloh (CG-67)
was deployed to Yokosuka. The Ticonderoga-class cruiser’s vertical launch system
(VLS) has 122 cells for a variety of missile armaments, including BMD interceptors,
while the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers’ VLS has 90 cells. Such warships can launch
attacks against land targets and an opponent’s air defence system using Tomahawk
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land-attack cruise missiles. Usually, one or two accompany the Carrier Strike Group
(CSG) and depending on circumstances, the assault landing ships comprising the
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) would also accompany the CSG. 254 The 7th Fleet
thus has power projection capabilities for long-range attack and to support ground
operations that the JMSDF lacks.

The Self-Defense Fleet and the U.S. 7th Fleet are leading forces of each countries. The
two forces usually conduct around 14 combined exercises each year, including the
JMSDF’s annual naval drill, specialized anti-submarine warfare, and MCM training.
Moreover, a combined naval drill without ex-ante coordination called “PASSEX
(passing exercise)” is frequently operated. The number of combined naval exercises
conducted by the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy is greater than any other U.S. ally,
including the Royal Navy. In addition, naval officers from both navies have become
linked in friendship beyond professional working relations: because both headquarters
are in Yokosuka they can strengthen the close relationship through the interconnections
between each level of the two organizations. As a consequence, this relationship is
based on close military and friendly relations which have served as an impetus to U.S. Japan relations. 255

The U.S Pacific Fleet has listed two areas of cooperation to enhance its relations with
allies. First, a commitment to anti-submarine warfare in the Asia-Pacific region is a
crucial point for the Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet and its allied navies have a critical
mission of maintaining the stability of the region in this ocean area to secure sea lanes.
For this purpose, the role of the Self-Defense Fleet is granted a great responsibility.
Second is ballistic missile defence to protect U.S. allies. The Self-Defense Fleet is the
only naval force which has Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 BMD missiles other than
the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Therefore, the JMSDF has gained a leading role for BMD in
collaboration with the 7th Fleet. 256
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The JSDF has persistently been treated as possessing military potential which has
complemented the U.S. forces since its establishment. In terms of power projection
capabilities, the JMSDF largely depends on those of the 7th Fleet. An American defence
planning document states the generic position of its naval relations with its allies clearly:
“The United States will work with allies and partners to integrate intelligence sensors,
communication networks, information systems missile defences, undersea warfare and
countermine-mine warfare capabilities.” 257 This statement seems to reflect an exact
representation of the U.S. alliance relationships.

In order to become a truly independent sea power state, Japan realistically requires a
power projection capability, but considering strong public sentiment in Japan and
regional opposition it is not simple for the government to build “attack” carriers and
nuclear-powered submarines. Japan might not need such military power, as long as the
alliance is undoubtedly solid, based on strong navy-to-navy relations. If Japan simply
throws itself into the role of the shield, it would not need the weaponry of power
projection capability; yet, could such a shield maintain a stable balance of power in the
region? It cannot be completely denied that the possibility exists that such a defensive
posture, which is highly dependent upon an alliance, may actually foment a conflict
rather than create peace and friendship. As discussed earlier, in international society,
and Northeast Asia, in particular, the weakest tend eventually to perish.

The Japanese Islands as a U.S. Power Projection Hub
After the end of the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet Union disappeared. In response
to this, in 1993, the LDP, a conservative and pro-American political party, had
experienced losing power for the first time since 1955. Although the LDP-led ruling
coalition, including the Socialist Party of Japan, marched back into power in the
following year, there were new indications that Japan’s diplomacy would create some
distance from the positions of the United States. Even though the Cold War was over,
far from a situation of world peace, a number of troubles have erupted around the world.
There appeared to be various elements of uncertainty in the areas surrounding Japan: for
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example, North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions, and Chinese maritime strategy,
which shakes the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region.

Under the Clinton administration, which was relatively more pro-Chinese than former
governments, the “East Asia Strategy Report” of 1995, produced by a team led by
Joseph S. Nye, regarded the location of the Japanese islands and the maintenance of
USFJ’s strength as significant for U.S. global strategy and a stable balance of power in
Asia, where were still various elements of uncertainty. This “Nye Report” led to the
restoration of a forward-looking relationship between the United States and Japan. In
order to respond fully to the changes in the security environment, in 1996, the “JapanU.S. Joint Declaration on Security － Alliance for the 21st Century” intended to
reconstruct the framework of security cooperation between the two alliance partners
was signed by the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutarō Hashimoto and U.S. President Bill
Clinton. It led the two governments to announce the “Joint Statement on U.S.-Japan
Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines” in New
York in September 1997, including defence cooperation such as bilateral training and
logistic support. 258 Furthermore, the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace
and Security of Japan in Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan” guidelines-related bills
were enacted in May 1999, allowing to the SDF to provide logistic support for U.S.
forces beyond Japanese territory. 259

At the moment, even for the United States, which possesses the greatest maritime power
and power projection capability in the world, it is difficult to carry its weight around the
globe due to the high demand for U.S. forces across a wide range of commitments and
responsibilities; and set against a context of a navy significantly reduced in size since
the Cold War and under severe budgetary pressure as a result of the spiralling cost of
military technology, the financial burden of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, and the
impact of the global financial crisis and U.S. economic recession. Consequently, the
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island country ally positioned in the Far East assumes potentially great significance for
U.S. global strategy.

Spykman’s Prediction
In 1942, a Yale University professor, Nicholas J. Spykman, published his signature
work of geopolitical thought, America’s Strategy in World Politics. In spite of fact that
the United States was engaged in a fierce battle against Japan in the Pacific region,
Spykman accurately prophesied the rationale for a U.S.-Japan alliance, taking the global
geopolitical environment into account. His clairvoyance has left an indelible impression
upon today’s geopolitical circumstances.

Japanese sea power lies between the Continent of Asia and the
Pacific-and, therefore, between Asia and the United States. With
naval superiority in Asiatic waters, Japan can control all
communications through the marginal seas of that continent from
Siberia to Amoy. She can act as a buffer and balance against
continental threats to the United States and against American
threats to the Asiatic mainland. The United States can be effective
on that mainland in a military sense only in alliance with Japanese
sea power and not against it. As in the case of Great Britain,
Japan’s sea power can become available as an instrument for
distant operations only when the continent is balanced and Japan’s
insular security assured. 260
Also, during the war, he predicted even about geo-strategy with respect to a possibly
hostile China:

…the dominant power in the Far East will undoubtedly be China,
providing she achieves real unification and provided that Japan’s
military power is completely destroyed. Russia’s strength in the
north will be the only continental balance to the Chinese position.
If the Western Powers are to retain any influence at all in the
region, they will have to establish island bases for their power. In
view of the limits which there undoubtedly are to the power
resources of the Chinese state, such bases will probably be
sufficient to counterbalance any future attempt of China to
dominate the Far East completely. 261
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Becoming widely known to American elites in charge of diplomatic policy, Spykman’s
thought has been influential in establishing America’s post-War geo-strategic world
view, regardless of whether such officials were consciously aware of Spykman’s
“rimland” concept. 262 The idea of the rimland can be linked to the thinking of various
geopolitical theorists and policymakers such as George Kennan’s “containment” policy,
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “arc of crisis” and “Eurasian and Balkan zone of instability,”
Saul B. Cohen’s “shatterbelt” and the Pentagon’s “arc of instability.” 263 Also, in Japan,
then foreign minister Taro Aso advocated an ”arc of freedom and prosperity” as Japan’s
diplomatic policy, 264 which can be conceptually associated with the rimland theory. 265

In fact, “Perhaps most important from an Asian perspective is that the United States,
although not geographically an ‘Asian’ nation, is so powerful a maritime power that it
dominates the ‘Rimlands’”. 266 The two former enemies have, since the end of the
Second World War, both come to understand the interdependence of Western sea
powers, and the potential for rival land powers to pose a strategic challenge to their
mutual interests. During the Cold War, compared to the European central front, the
Soviet Union’s power was relatively limited in the Far East, the edge of Eurasian
continent. Therefore, importantly, Japan’s geographical location played a central
connective role in the U.S. strategy of leveraging the East Asian maritime chain in order
to contain Soviet power. Accordingly, the United States adopted the strategy of
combining East Asian allies, maritime power and nuclear weapons to counterbalance
the advantage of the Soviet Union in the west of the Eurasian continent. The
geographical importance of the Far East was regarded as a key geo-strategic factor in
allowing the United States to exert pressure upon such an enormous land power
empire. 267
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Post-War Japan was powerless to defend itself against the combined military power of
the continental alliance between the Soviet Union and China formed in 1950, which
targeted the island country. Protecting Japan from the great land powers was actually
one of main American reasons for intervening in the Korean War, as Spykman
foresaw. 268 The United States needed to defend Japan, a valuable industrialized country
host to vital American bases. Eventually, Japan’s economic recovery was able to
contribute to the recovery of other non-Communist East Asian states. 269 James Auer and
Robyn Lim assert, “During the Cold War, Japan was neither an economic threat to the
United States nor a free rider, as so many now seem to think. To the contrary, Japan
played an important role in bringing down the overextended Soviet empire”. 270 In short,
Japan’s geographical location has brought huge advantages to the grand strategy of the
U.S.-led maritime coalition against formidable Eurasian continental powers. The
Japanese islands thus have been a tool of allied maritime strategy in the great geostrategic rivalry of the Cold War: the U.S.-Japan alliance admirably functioned to
contain the Soviet Union in the Far East by exploring the advantageous geographical
location of the Japanese islands in combination with the presence of U.S. forces and the
potential of the JSDF. 271

The U.S. engagement strategy for the security of Asia Pacific region consists of forward
deployment and an alliance strategy: two sides of the same coin. The essence of the
strategy is maritime strategy. With strengthening of alliances with Japan, South Korea,
and Australia, involving both bilateral, and increasingly, multilateral, military drills, the
United States has been maintaining the alliance network for the stability of Asia. The
alliance system is, so to speak, a maritime coalition which preserves a regional power
projection capability to deter and, if necessary, contain, the potentially negative
consequences of an Asian arc of instability and aggressive land powers. 272 A pillar of
U.S. strategic policy is its global deployment strategy based on a navy facilitated by
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scattered naval bases the world over, and its latent sea control capabilities, each an
essential element in maintaining its global seapower network.

From a U.S. vantage point, the location of the Japanese islands is on the opposite side of
the Pacific Ocean from mainland America. It takes over a dozen hours flying and about
two weeks for a ship at a speed of 15 knots to travel from the U.S. mainland to the
archipelago. As long as the U.S. secures the forward deployment of U.S. forces on the
Japanese islands, which even hosts a home port for a USN Carrier Strike Group, it can
drastically reduce the cost and time for the deployment of forces. 273 The aircraft
carrier’s home port in Japan enables the U.S. Navy to facilitate operations from the
western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. According to a testimony by the commander in
chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the port is worth as much as one aircraft carrier. 274 As
viewed from the centre of the island of Okinawa, on which the main force of U.S.
Marine Corps are based, Sakhalin and the Siberian Pacific Ocean coastline lie north,
and the South China Sea and a large part of Indochina lie south, both within a 2,000
nautical mile radius. Thus, a number of major cities in the Asia-Pacific region are in
range: Vladivostok, the Korean peninsula, Hainan Island and the Philippines all are
situated within 2,000 kilometres from Okinawa. It takes twelve days to sail from
Okinawa to the centre of the Indian Ocean, 14 days to the U.S. base on Diego Garcia,
and 16 days to the Hormuz Strait. However, it takes U.S. forces based in the continental
United States 14 extra days to transit to each location. After the end of the Cold War
Okinawa became the frontline American base in the region. 275

Annually, U.S. forces conduct a significant number of combined military exercises with
allies and friendly countries. In most cases, supplies that U.S. forces use in military
exercises with Southeast Asian countries are shipped from Sagamihara, Sasebo and
Okinawa in Japan. And much of the materiel originally transported from the U.S.
homeland is transhipped through ports and facilities in Japan. 276
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U.S. Bases in Japan
The Japanese islands have thus been geo-strategically vital in regard to U.S. strategy
and defence requirements. There are 135 institutions and areas set aside for USFJ in
Japan. USFJ accounts for 2.5 per cent of 5,458 bases and institutions globally for U.S.
forces. The number of major overseas U.S. bases has been stated as numbering 28. 277
According to a military commentator, Kensuke Ebata, if Misawa, Yokota, Camp Zama,
Atsugi, Yokosuka, Iwakuni, Sasebo, Camp Courtney, Zukeran Camp Foster, Futenma
and Kadena are regarded as “major” bases, then fully 39 per cent of all American major
bases are located in Japan. 278 The United States has classified overseas bases into six
categories: Power Projection Hub (PPH); Joint Main Operating Base (JMOB); Joint
Forward Operating Site (JFOS); Joint Cooperative Security Location (JCSL); Joint
Preposition Site (JPPS); and En Route Infrastructure (ETS). 279 USFJ’s main bases are
graded as the highest category: Power Projection Hub. 280
USJF has three primary roles: 281 to be a deterrent power to secure the safety of Japan
and Asia based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; to deter aggressive action by the
region’s land powers, Russia, China and North Korea; and to maintain staging bases and
deployment capability to cope with emergency situations in the Middle East. Even after
the end of the Cold War, a large number of U.S. forces have been deployed to Japan.
USFJ is composed of 2,751 army personnel, 19,461 marines, 5,836 naval and 13,943 air
force personnel. 282
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Map 2. Japan and the Location of Major U.S. Bases

USFJ headquarters is at Yokota Air Base, about 30 kilometres west of central Tokyo. In
addition, separately, the U.S. 7th Fleet numbers 12,000 personnel The site area of
Kadena Air Base is 1,996 hectares and there are two broad 3,700 metre landing
fields. 283 Kadena is regarded as a Main Operating Base (MOB) because it is located
near the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, and can be used as a launch base
toward the South China Sea. 284 MEF-3 in Okinawa is the only Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) placed overseas of three American MEFs. It accounts for 60 per cent of
27,000 American personnel in Okinawa. Only MEF-3 can be deployed to Asia within
283
284
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seven days. 285 The command centre of “I Corps” (First Corps) was moved to Camp
Zama in 2007. In the future, USFK army forces in South Korea will become a
subsidiary of the headquarters.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has engaged in a number of wars and
conflicts. U.S. armed forces have been highly dependent on its military bases in Japan
in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War and the Iraq
War. Without the presence of its forces in the Japanese archipelago, the United States
would have been unable to support high intensity campaigns and strikes against
strategic targets. During the Vietnam War, American bases in Japan directly linked to
the battleground. Above all, Okinawa is stocked with a huge stockpile of weapons and
acts as a central information and operating base. It has been noted that when U.S. forces
used up munitions during the Gulf War, the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area also
emptied: without Kadena Air Base, such sustained air operations could not have been
prosecuted. 286 Though the Japanese government contributed $12 billion during the Gulf
War, it did not directly contribute to combat operations. On the other hand, as a power
projection platform host to U.S. forces, it did make an indirect strategic contribution.
Eighty per cent of the fuel and ammunition used by U.S. forces during the war was
transported from Japan. Moreover, the U.S. Navy and Marine participants in the war
were under the command of the Japan-based USS Blue Ridge. The7th Fleet and USFJ
played a central role in the Gulf War. 287

The naval headquarters is Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. There are
many facilities and areas such as Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Fleet Activities Sasebo,
and the White Beach Naval Facility on Okinawa, Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Naval Air
Facility Misawa, and Naval Air Facility Kadena, under control of the U.S. Navy (see
Map 2 above). The 7th Fleet is under the direct command of U.S. Pacific Fleet, not
USFJ; however, naval bases in Japan are practically home ports for the 7th Fleet. The
flagship USS Blue Ridge and the nuclear powered aircraft carrier George Washington
are home ported in Yokosuka. Yokosuka is the only base that possesses a dock large
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enough to host a full-sized aircraft carrier between Hawaii and the eastern shore of
Africa. 288 In fact, Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka (COMFLEACT) can provide
whatever the U.S. Navy needs, except atomic reactors. This facility, in which IJN battle
ships were built, has the capability to repair any American naval vessels, including
aircraft carriers, and Japanese technicians have the skill to maintain the condition of the
vessels. 289 Atsugi air station located near Yokosuka is used to maintain the skills
required for carrier deck takeoffs and landings. As a result of the closing of Subic Bay
Naval Base in the Philippines in 1993, the functions of the Fleet and Industrial Supply
Center (FISC) were also transferred to Yokosuka. FISC Yokosuka is the largest FISC in
regard to management dollars expended amongst eight that the U.S. Navy possesses. It
involves 16 storage plants, two refrigeration stores and 125 fuel storage tanks. 290

According to a military commentator, Kazuhisa Ogawa, Japan is an enormous fuelstorage depot for the U.S, Navy. There are 5.7 million barrels stored at Tsurumi,
Kanagawa, 5.3 million barrels at Sasebo, Nagasaki, 0.07 million barrels at Hachinohe,
Aomori, totalling 11.07 million barrels across Japan. Of such facilities under the
jurisdiction of the Pentagon, including within the United States itself, the capacity of
Tsurumi is the second largest and that of Sasebo is the third. 291 Such large amounts of
fuel enable the 7th Fleet to carry out tactical operations for half a year; in the case of the
JMSDF, for two years. 292 Indeed, Japan represents the U.S. Navy’s greatest oil
terminal. 293 Moreover, in addition, there are huge U.S. Army ammunition storage areas
in Japan. There are three ammunition stores in Hiroshima, Akituki (Edajima),
Kawakami (Higashi Hiroshima) and Hiro (Kure). The total storage capacity of these
facilities is 119,000 tons. This is more than the total amount of the JSDF: 115,000 tons.
USFJ army personnel number less than 2,000, composed of special forces and units for
management of facilities and military intelligence. Hiroshima’s storage facility is not
used only by the army, but also by the navy, marine corps, and air force. In general,
such munitions are intended for use overseas, not by USFJ army personnel themselves.
Furthermore, Sasebo hosts the greatest ammunition storage facility for the U.S. Navy
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and Marines in the entire area of the 7th Fleet’s sphere of activity, which stretches from
Hawaii to Cape Town, a much larger area than that previously served by the Subic
facility. In addition, Kadena is also a huge storage facility for the air force, defended by
the largest ammunition maintenance command in the U.S. Air Force. 294

The Japanese archipelago has also had a great significance as an “unsinkable
intelligence-gathering vessel” for the United States. 295 Japan’s location is a great place
to undertake information gathering activities targeted at governments and regions
regarded as destabilizing factors by the United States, such as China, Russia and North
Korea. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) gathering
based on ships and airplanes from the islands in the Far East can closely observe targets
for acquisition of information. 296 In Misawa, there is “the elephant cage,” the
wullenweber, a type of Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA). This type of
antenna, officially designated AN/FLR-9, has been placed in Great Britain, Alaska,
Germany, Italy, and Japan. As the only one of the type in the western Pacific, Misawa’s
elephant cage seems to be predictably effective against China. 297 Its diameter is 440
metres, the world’s largest such class of antenna array. At Sobe, Okinawa, there is a
smaller elephant cage, 200 metres in diameter. These huge facilities are directly linked
with the National Security Agency (NSA) and seem to play a role in ECHELON, the
global eavesdropping system involving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and the United States, known as AUSCANZUKUS. 298

Anti-U.S. Base Movement in Okinawa and Relocation Plan
In 1995, a young Japanese girl in Okinawa was raped by two U.S. Marines and a U.S.
sailor. This incident triggered a strong anti-U.S. base movement in Okinawa. In the
following year, the two governments agreed to the return of Futenma Air Base within
five to seven years. 299 Since then, the issue of where to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps
Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture become complicated. In 2006, Tokyo and
Washington agreed on the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan, including the
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relocation of Futenma facilities. However, after the Democratic Party of Japan took the
reins of the government from the Liberal Democratic Party, Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama intended to conduct a review of the relocation plan. 300 His decision upset
relations between the two countries. A 2006 agreement to relocate U.S. forces in
Okinawa includes a plan to transfer some 8,000 Marines and 9,000 of their dependents
from their current base in Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The Japanese government agreed
to pay about 60 per cent of the total estimated cost of US$10.3 billion. 301 However,
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada stated, if the plan to relocate the Marine’s Futenma Air
Base is unsuccessful, the transfer plan would be affected. 302

On the other hand, on 17 February 2010, Lt General Keith Stadler, the commander of
the U.S. Marine Corps of the Pacific, said in Tokyo, “I want to make this clear — all of
the marines standing in this room, all of my marines on Okinawa are willing to die if
necessary for the security of Japan … That is our role in the alliance. Japan does not
have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States, but it absolutely must provide
the bases and training that U.S. forces need.” 303 Stadler emphasized the deterrence
power of the Marines: “Foreign governments are watching to see whether the United
States-Japan alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the current issues again and
ensure that the awesome deterring power of the U.S. Marine Corps remains based on
Okinawa for decades to come”. 304 He also stated that Okinawa was located at the centre
of an earthquake andcyclone region, hence U.S. bases were also significant for disaster
relief missions. 305
Still Unequal
To summarize, the whole Japanese archipelago has been treated as an essential strategic
base in order to secure and preserve U.S. leadership throughout the Asia-Pacific
region. 306 Auer and Lim state:
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The United States has obligations to protect the maritime security of Japan,
the world’s second-largest economy. That is a matter of great convenience
to both parties, as well as to the wider region, since the U.S.-Japan security
treaty provides Japan with maritime protection in ways that do not disturb
Japan’s neighbours. Freedom of the sea is also an essential interest of the
United States in its strategic capacity as the global off shore balancer. 307
Meanwhile, the JMSDF has grown as an advanced maritime force as a result of
America’s devoted cooperation originally focused on an alliance-based maritime
strategy to counter the Soviet navy. The JMSDF’s existential presupposition has thus
been combined operations with the U.S. Navy. Even after the end of the Cold War, this
condition has remained unchanged. Japan still lacks the capability to defend itself
effectively, but the United States can fulfil that role. Japan does not have the capability
to conduct and successfully conclude a significant war by itself.

Some Japanese think the Japanese islands are geo-strategically significant for American
national strategy; hence it is an alliance of equals. However, at the current time Japan
cannot revise Article 9 or properly remilitarize in order to be able to effectively defend
itself, and so depends on the alliance with the United States for its peace and prosperity.
The United States on the other hand needs the alliance with Japan for its global
influence as an offshore balancer: even without the alliance Washington would not face
life or death consequences for its own national security. There is a huge difference
between each sense of the dependence on the alliance. It is not a fifty-fifty partnership.
While it is true that Americans initially forced the abnormally constraining constitution
on Japan after Word War II, it is also a fact that the majority of Japanese remain
strongly attached to the pacifism of Article 9: thus the constitutional amendment
process is unusually troublesome.

The Navy-to-Navy Friendship as the Core of the Maritime Alliance
The U.S.–Japan alliance therefore focuses on mutual national interests, taking into
consideration their respective standpoints as maritime states. Relations are based on
their navies and the navy-to-navy relations that can be built by the trust of each
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individual sailor. In fact, the original friendships have made innumerable contributions
to the stability and preservation of the maritime alliance.

As the Master and the Apprentice
Although the U.S. Navy had been terribly damaged by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor and then repeatedly engaged in fierce naval battles, it was sympathetic toward
the former foe right after the end of the war. Compared to the U.S. Army, which
conducted an occupation policy to remove the “evil” elements of Japanese political
society, the U.S. Navy was much less vengeful. This posture became even more
conspicuous with time. 308 Additionally, both navies realized just after the Second World
War that they had commonalities that they had learned from the Royal Navy and they
came to respect each other through exchanges and naval cooperation-building in the
post-War era. 309 The original form of the executive training system was descended from
the IJN; however, the JMSDF made some reference to the U.S. Navy’s education course.
In March 1955, the JMSDF’s educational concepts were declared at the enrolment
ceremony of the senior staff college that opened in September 1954. One was to follow
the U.S. and the Royal Navy, and catch up with and overtake them. Another was to
keep assistance from the U.S. Navy in various fields in mind and to maintain close
liaison with the U.S. Navy as much as possible in order to focus on increasing its
training efficiency in the future. 310 The U.S. Navy took the JMSDF by the hand and
taught it step-by-step, and Japanese were fast enough learners to surprise their American
trainers. 311

Arleigh Burke
Well-known as the symbol of the friendship between the two navies, Admiral Arleigh
Burke, called “the father of the JMSDF”, is held in high esteem as the benefactor of the
JMSDF. Burke had experienced intense naval battles against the IJN during the war and
used to be famously anti-Japanese until he first arrived in Japan, but he warmed to the
Japanese people once he became acquainted with Vice-Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, who
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fought against Burke as the commander in the Solomon Sea. 312 Above all, the encounter
with Admiral Nomura had a great impact on him. Just after the Korean War broke out,
Burke asked his Naval Academy classmate to introduce a teacher to learn about Japan.
After Nomura had taught Japan’s history and its relationships with China and Korea
since October 1950, ultimately Burke came to consider Japan and Japanese people in a
favourable light. 313

Burke applied himself to the goal of arming the JMSDF and even sometimes overcame
opposition to this alliance objective. Before Japan became the first buyer of the Aegis
system that the JMSDF longed to possess, Burke acted as an intermediary again for the
JMSDF in the early 1980s. 314 Later, JMSDF personnel went to the United States to
undergo training programmes for the Aegis system. After he passed away, in
accordance with his will, although Burke received many decorations from numerous
countries, only the Japanese decoration from the Japanese emperor, “Grand Cordon of
the Order of the Rising Sun,” was displayed on his military uniform covering his body.
The story is of symbolic significance in reflection of the close friendship between the
JMSDF and the U.S. Navy. 315

As a Friend
Even after the end of the Cold War, naval drills with the U.S. Navy make a significant
contribution to mutual security, because Beijing has been enhancing its naval power to
confront the U.S. 7th Fleet. Since the establishment of the JMSDF, the Japanese
government has taken over, borrowed and bought naval ships from the United States, it
has been trained by and with the U.S. Navy and American officials concerned have
praised the high level of JMSDF capability and skill. Although the JMSDF has surely
observed some traditions of the IJN, it is also true that the Japanese navy partakes of the
body and blood of the American navy. The JMSDF is so connected to the maritime
forces of its U.S. counterpart, that it is in effect not really a self-contained and
independent organization at all.
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In the post-Cold War period, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, following the
honeymoon period between the two countries during the Reagan-Nakasone relationship,
U.S.-Japan relations became obviously strained because of economic and trade issues.
In the first Clinton presidential term, the U.S.-Japan relationship fell into its worst shape.
Above all, it was damaged badly by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative’s tactics of pressing Japan to buy U.S. products with a focus on
achieving particular numerical goals. Meanwhile, people in charge of security affairs in
both states shared a common sense of crisis about the situation. Ultimately, such people
were able to save the day for the alliance due to the relation of trust between the
Pentagon and the JSDF built by the large number of combined exercises. 316

Even though the main potential enemy changed from Russia to China, the alliance and
relations between the two navies remained strong. In March 2004, The Bush
administration made its position clear on the dispute over the territorial dispute with
China over the Senkakus. 317 U.S. official deputy spokesman, expressed that the U.S.Japan Security Treaty applied to all territories under the jurisdiction of the Japanese
government, including the Senkaku archipelago. This statement meant that the United
States had changed its publicly announced policy on this dispute from that of the
Clinton administration, which took an equivocal attitude. 318 In addition, in January 2005,
the JGSDF sent 125 personnel based in Nagasaki Prefecture to San Diego, California, to
participate in an island defence combined exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps on the
assumption of a possibility that China might invade the Senkaku islands. 319 Furthermore,
in November 2006, the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy conducted a military exercise to
simulate an operation to regain a chain of islands in the East China Sea. 320
Approximately 90 JMSDF ships and 170 aircraft and more than ten U.S. vessels,
including the carrier Kitty Hawk, joined this politically significant drill. 321
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It is notable that many pro-Japan Americans who make exertions to improve U.S-Japan
relations are from the navy or have naval backgrounds, 322 such as James E. Auer and
Richard L. Armitage. Naturally, armed forces that assume the role of national defence
are vital organizations, even though many Japanese cannot understand it, or quite the
contrary, reject the value of military forces. If maritime forces from states that strongly
rely on seapower are able to deepen the bilateral bond between their own countries
through their cooperation, as matter of course their relations and alliance based on such
forces are more likely to be solid and dependable. Such is the nature of the maritime
alliance.

Conclusion
In spite of the above observation, it is hard to argue that Japan has taken full advantage
of seapower throughout its history, despite the fact that it has had to live together with
the sea as an island country and was aggressive with an expanding navy during its era of
colonial expansion. Yet American-led allied powers destroyed the Japanese Empire
after it got too involved with the Eurasian continent. After Japan was defeated, the
Japanese people lost the traditional spirit that did not fear death. On the contrary, the
Japanese became people who place life above anything else and pacifists who cannot
even conceive of a state of war, because of the backlash from its experiences of the
Pacific War and a result of the victorious nations’ post-War policies towards the
occupied Japanese nation. This confirmed mentality has been a heavy drag on Japan’s
seapower and maritime strategy, which requires quick responses in diplomacy. Japanese
thus needed a sense of balance on security and military matters, not something extreme.
It therefore concluded its alliance with the United States, choosing to live as a maritime
state under the umbrella of U.S. naval mastery. After the Second World War, during the
Korean conflict and the Vietnam War, the United Sates was preoccupied in East Asia to
contain the Soviet Union and communism. Fortunately, Japan was geographically
situated to hold the trump card, allowing the recovery of the economy as a result; with
the U.S. quickly providing assistance to its former adversary in order to bolster its own
global Cold War defences.
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Whilst the U.S. Navy crushed the IJN, it was also instrumental in establishing the
JMSDF after the war. As a genuine maritime state in terms of geography, Japan needs
an autonomous naval force but still the Japanese lack the will to change the inflexible
security policy of the post-War era, symbolized by the certain legal restriction of Article
9 of the constitution. In practice, the JMSDF was originally created based on the
premise of combined operations with U.S. forces. Unless the situation changes, Japan
undoubtedly cannot live without its maritime alliance with the United States based on
close navy-to-navy relations between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy. Japan and the
JSDF heavily count on the offensive capabilities of the United States to maintain the
balance of power in East Asia due to the constraints on its own force development under
Article 9. Even though the bond of friendship between the two navies is the root of the
enduring alliance, it is nevertheless hard to provide the JMSDF with an opportunity to
be active on the international stage due to these limitations based on prevailing
interpretations of the constitution.

At any rate, as long as the U.S. maintains its global power projection capability as the
offshore balancer, and does not hesitate to commit forces to the World Island, Japan
faces no choice but to maintain the close alliance for its continued survival and
prosperity as a genuinely isolated country, geographically and culturally. In practice, it
is essential for maritime states to have such close alliances because seapower networks
cannot be maintained without strongly interdependent relations among the networked
maritime states. Above all, collaborative relations with the greatest maritime state are
priceless in a wide range of fields related to seapower. However, although the Japanese
islands are essential geo-strategic bases for U.S. global strategy focusing on sea control
and power projection capabilities throughout the Asia-Pacific region and potential
confrontation with Eurasian continental powers, it remains something of a “unilateral”
alliance, whereby a Japan that is unable or unwilling to exercise the right of the
collective self-defence in a crisis might lead the alliance to collapse, taking the reality of
international politics into account. The issue could ultimately be deadly to a sea-girt
Japan faced with a number of actual or potential threats from continental Eurasia and to
its vital sea lanes.
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CHAPTER 6
Japan and Maritime Coalition Building in the Asia-Pacific Region

Introduction
This chapter describes Japan’s maritime coalition-building activities conducted in the
Asia-Pacific region as a response to a variety of often disparate threats described in
Chapters 3 and 4. As already established, these range from low-level non-traditional
security concerns with general good order at sea and to the types of unconventional
threats to global supply chains posed by pirates and terrorist groups, as identified in
Chapter 4, through to hedging against strategic pressures from state-based competitors
driven by territorial or other maritime disputes and even the seaward expansion of
would-be continental great power hegemons, as outlined in Chapter 3.

The process of maritime coalition building undertaken by Japan follows something of a
hedging pattern: the relationships being forged are relevant to most, or even the entire,
spectrum of threats and challenges faced by Tokyo. These coalition relationships thus
often are equally valuable in dealing with the less strategically dangerous good order at
sea issues through the “collective navies” type of approach, yet may also have utility as
ways of building deeper security relationships with states with similar strategic interests
at sea in guarding against the emergence of an aggressive continental challenger to
geopolitical order, including on the oceans. In this latter sense, the relationships being
developed with the likes of Australia and India, outlined below, may be viewed as
building blocks towards strengthening Japan’s strategic position and adding further
layers of security relationship around the core of the deep alliance partnership with
Washington described in the previous chapter.

The discussion that follows thus outlines the following aspects of Japan’s coalitionbuilding and alignment-strengthening activity: the developing maritime quasi-alignment
with Australia, a valued friendly country for both Japan and the United States; the other
developing quasi-alignment with India, which has a strong influence on the Indian
Ocean as the world’s maritime highway; the deepening engagement with the Rim of the
Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) as a traditional naval coalition activity amidst ongoing
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globalization; participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative “coalition of the
willing” for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); Japan’s
regional initiatives against piracy; and participation in the multinational naval coalition
against Somali pirates.

The Quasi-Alignment with Australia
Australia and Japan share a number of similar values and strategic interests.
Geographically, Australia is located in the southern hemisphere opposite Japan. Being
alliance partners of the dominant maritime power, both countries can potentially derive
mutual benefits from closer maritime strategic cooperation.

Australia: the Alliance-dependent Maritime State
Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region
Australia is the only nation that occupies a whole continent and its remote location lies
far from the current main theatres of war and potential major armed conflict. It is not
easy for adversaries to dispatch an expedition to Australia given the maritime
characteristic of its security environment. 1 Australia, as an island continent, needs
guaranteed access to efficient shipping to secure its survival and prosperity. However,
there are some scholars who question calling it a maritime state in terms of its national
character, arguing instead that “Australians are a coastal people with a continental
outlook, an island-nation with an inward focus.” 2 In the past, such a perspective set up a
confrontation in Australian military thinking between continentalists who valued a
defence policy and strategy focused on physical defence of the territory of the continent
itself and its immediate maritime approaches, and navalists and maritime strategists
who valued a maritime-focused defence. 3 In recent years, however, the Australian
government has seemed to well analyse and understand the security environment since
1
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the end of the Cold War and “know themselves,” namely, its status as a “medium sea
power” and what that means for its overall defence posture and force structure
development. Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper solidifies the trend towards a more
capable, mobile, naval and maritime-capable defence force. 4

In Australia’s Maritime Doctrine, the importance of the security and stability of the
Asia Pacific have been emphasised for Australia’s national interests, considering that
major powers such as the United States, China and Japan have been regarded as the key
players which have strongly influenced the regional arena. Also, the security and
stability of maritime Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific have been considered
direct factors relevant to Australia’s security interests. Above all, relations with adjacent
countries, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, are deemed to be permanent factors that
are crucial matters for ensuring the security and stability of Australia’s strategic
environment. 5 In maritime Asia-Pacific, in terms of security, Australia strategically
understands that some points should be carefully handled: avoidance of unnecessarily
stimulating strategic rivalry between the United States, China and Japan; prevention of
the emergence of any dominant actor that threatens Australian strategic interests;
maintenance of a benign environment in Southeast Asia, mainly in the maritime arena;
prevention of the presence of extra-regional military forces that might hamper the
pursuit of Australia’s strategic interests; and prevention of the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. 6 Also, the 2009 Defence White Paper develops a perspective on the
regional strategic environment similar to those mentioned above and emphasizes the
threat of non-state actors, the rise of India, and implicitly pinpoints the role of China’s
strategic development as a primary risk factor for overall regional stability. 7
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Australia and the Alliance
In view of Australia’s geopolitical environment, including its vast territory and
dependence on the maritime network for economic prosperity, security, and defence, the
government must attentively cope with the allocation of its limited population and
demography for defence. Moreover, it seems obviously difficult for Australia alone to
maintain all aspects of military technological capabilities and developments. 8 Australia
has been under the formal protection of the super state, the United States, since the
signing of the ANZUS Treaty of 1952. In the 1980s, Australian defence policy put an
emphasis on “self-reliance” and reduced dependence on great powers for national
defence, but it was insufficient to match the scale or variety of actual or potential threats
and challenges faced by Australia to its national security interests. 9

A medium power such as Australia needs effective cooperation with other countries for
the sake of reasonably obtaining sufficient technology, manufacturing and logistic
support, without the excessive exhaustion of national strength, in order to secure enough
national strategic capability in case of war. 10 It is difficult to imagine Australia
dominating a significant opponent alone as a military power either in wartime or in
peacetime. As a consequence, the stability of its security environment and the pursuit
and maintenance of national interests depends on finely honed teamwork with allies and
friends. The Australian government shows no compromise on its principle of
contributions to coalition operations by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on issues
or conflicts involving national interests. Actually, the Australian government repeatedly
emphasises the significance of relations with the United States as a super power: “The
United States will remain the dominant global economic, technological and military
power at least for some decades … Through its military presence in the region and its
bilateral and alliance relationships with key players.” 11 The ADF, without access to U.S.
capabilities, technology, and training, simply could not be the advanced force that it is
today, and must be in the future, without the expenditure of considerably more money. 12
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Also, in terms of the maritime aspect, the Australian government emphasizes the
greatness of U.S. seapower and the alliance with the United States.

Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership as Part of the U.S. Maritime Alliance
Network
The History of Australia-Japan Relations
Australia’s concern over the rise of Japan as a military power started after the SinoJapanese War (1894-1895). As might be expected, the emergence of Japan as the victor
in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) further aggravated Australia’s concerns with
respect to Japan. 13 During World War I, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) assigned the
battlecruiser Ibuki to the Indian Ocean to search for German naval vessels. The ship, at
the request of its British ally, then escorted Australian and New Zealand troops heading
to reinforce the war effort in Europe as far as the Suez Canal. In World War II, however,
Japan and Australia were on opposing sides. Australian memories of Japanese air raids
on Darwin in the northern part of Australia, the Japanese midget submarine attack on
Sydney Harbour, Japanese treatment of prisoners and the Battle of Rabaul, in particular,
are still remembered, especially in Australian public consciousness.

After the Second World War, while Australia was wary of China and Indonesia, Japan
gradually emerged as a friendly power. 14 Each became important pillars of the U.S.
anti-Soviet and anti-Communist alliance system in the Pacific. Although erasing war
memories may be difficult for Australia, especially for the older generation of
Australians, its relationship with Japan is currently becoming closer and more mature at
the strategic level than at any time since it was forged during beginnings of the San
Francisco alliance system in 1952, despite lower level diplomatic frictions over issues
such as whaling and conservation of tuna stocks. The same is true of the economic
relations between the two countries. In the 1960s, Japan concluded a long-term contract
for importing raw materials from Australia. After Australia became estranged from
Britain in terms of the economic relationship once Britain joined the European
Economic Community in 1973, Australia placed greater emphasis on further improving

13

D. C. S. Sissions, “Australia and Japan,” in J.D.B. Miller ed., India, Japan, Australia, Australian
National University Press, Canberra, 1968, p. 59.
14
See, ibid., pp. 59-65.

235

relations with Japan. 15 In 1976, the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between
Australia and Japan was concluded.

In July 1996, the United States attempted to invigorate the alliance with its “closest ally,”
Australia. The purpose of the United States was not only for the reinforcement of its
alliances with Japan and Australia, but also due to its desire to enable a revolution in
military affairs (RMA) and its programme of defence “transformation”. Since 1996, the
strengthening of Japan-Australia relations was encouraged. Indeed, their dialogue on
security was raised to a higher level of conference. 16

In 1997, the Japan-Australia Partnership Agenda was formally adopted, a concrete
achievement of the cooperation process. Among the items listed in the Agenda included
expansion of exchanges between the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and the
Australian Defence Force, and Australia’s expression of strong support for Japan's
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. In April 2001, the
Australia-Japan Conference for the 21st Century was held in Sydney. The “Sydney
Declaration for Australia-Japan Creative Partnership” reconfirming the significance of
the reinforcement of strategic and political relations was announced at the Conference. 17
Their connection thus began to develop into an indirect coalition through close mutual
alliance security ties with the United States.

The U.S.-Japan-Australia relationship has been shaped by cooperation in the war
against terrorism and the Indian Ocean tsunami relief operations in 2004. There was
ground breaking security cooperation between Japan and Australia in Iraq. The
Australian government sent hundreds of troops in order to protect members of the JSDF
deployed in Iraq involved in reconstruction efforts in the city of Samawah, because of
the limitation imposed upon the JSDF’s activities by Article 9 of the Japanese
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constitution. 18 Australia’s decision to dispatch troops to Iraq to protect Japanese military
engineers did not just assist in the rebuilding of Iraq, but probably more significantly,
also served to build a much stronger relationship between Australia and Japan. 19

Eventually, in a March 2007 meeting in Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
and Australian Prime Minister John Howard signed an agreement to reinforce security
cooperation. This is a milestone for Japan, being the first defence pact of any kind other
than the U.S. alliance. The agreement with Australia established an annual meeting
among the defence and foreign ministers of the two states. As is general knowledge,
there was a close relationship between Japan and the United States, on the basis of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; while the United States and Australia have the ANZUS
Treaty. The prime ministers of Japan and Australia declared that “the strategic
partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a commitment
to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests.” 20
After the joint declaration the first Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense
Ministerial (“two-plus-two”) Meeting was held in Tokyo in June 2007, when the
Japanese and Australian foreign and defence ministers reaffirmed their cooperation with
the United States and for regional security. The meeting especially focused on North
Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes and North Korea’s abductions of Japanese
citizens; the significance of close cooperation to press China to contribute to the
stability of the international system and promote disclosure of information on the
reinforcement of its military strength; and on continuing work to address urgent
international security challenges such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea. 21

Shared Values
There exist reasons, advantages and links relevant to account for the close ties between
Australia and Japan, with the U.S. connection constituting the core. Most importantly,
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Japan and Australia are both maritime-dependent countries that have placed relations
with the greatest sea power, the United States, at the centre of their national strategies.
Taking into consideration the fact that Japan and Australia both rely to a high degree on
the sea, there is no doubt that maintaining close relations with the United States, which
continues to impart a strong influence on the world’s oceans on the basis of
overwhelming maritime power, is a crucial factor in their respective national strategic
thinking. Indeed, they have been essential partners for the United States in the security
framework in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan and Australia have been referred to as the
northern and southern anchors of the free world, at least in the western Pacific. 22 In
addition to being highly sea dependent and part of a maritime-based American alliance
network, they are also both democratic states which respect Western political values. It
has been said that war seldom breaks out between mature democracies. Accordingly, the
establishment of sophisticated democratic alliances seem to be an effective means by
which to promote the maintenance of peace amongst their members. 23

Both Japan and Australia presently share a number of common interests brought by
safely utilizing major choke points and SLOC guaranteed by the protection afforded by
U.S. military power. 24 Among major sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific region linked to Japan,
the Oceania, South Pacific, and eastern Pacific regions are comparatively safer than
others, because the influence of U.S. maritime power together with close allies such as
Australia and Canada pervades the ocean space of these regions, and contributing to the
overall security of sea lanes. 25 In addition, Australia and Japan work together to
enhance maritime border safety and counter-terrorism efforts, and to address disaster
relief through international cooperation and security frameworks. Australia’s
geographical location, a relatively short distance to Southeast Asia’s major straits and to
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the South Pacific (compared to Japan), places where Japan also has important national
interests, is strategically significant from a Japanese perspective.

In terms of technology, they both depend upon sophisticated military technology
developed with and provided by the United States. Both states are also among the few
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, perhaps the only ones, which can fully adjust to, or
successfully develop, RMA-capable defence forces. 26 These three nations possess
highly capable, modern military forces, while many Asia-Pacific countries cannot afford
such military-technological prowess in terms of both quality and quantity, and also lack
the technical expertise or sophistication even to contemplate such modern capabilities.
In a region dominated by the seas, composed largely of such maritime geographical
features as vast sea areas and a large number of islands, the three maritime states are
increasingly willing and able to work together as team for the safety and security of the
region as a whole. For example, they conducted prompt international relief operations
after the Asian Tsunami at the end of 2004. 27

Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear and missile strategies are common threats for both
Japan and Australia. The diplomatic attitude of the former liberal regime of President
Roh in South Korea, which tended to distance itself from the United States and Japan,
seems to be one of the reasons that led Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra to form their
trilateral security arrangement. Other common concerns that probably prompted the
formalization of trilateral talks into the Trilateral Security Dialogue were uncertainty
over China’s strategic path, WMD proliferation and maritime security. The potential
threat of the use of ballistic missiles in a range of different scenarios, but particularly
linked to North Korea, clearly was an important factor. With respect to this threat,
Australia hosts shared military surveillance and intelligence gathering centres with the
United States which, among other things, receive information from early warning
satellites used for ballistic missile defence. Sharing significant information is one of the
most important factors in maintaining close relations in an alliance and, through such
centres Australia contributes to the U.S.-led project to establish operational missile

26
27

Lim, Australia and Maritime Security.
Kaneda, “A Maritime Coalition Centred on the Japan–Australia–US Trilateral Alliance,” p. 11.

239

defence systems. 28 Given the common concern, however, amongst all three states with
North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes, there surely exists the potential to
deepen the trilateral relationship in the future to also involve missile defence
cooperation.

Australia, however, has had some political reservations about the Trilateral Security
Dialogue with respect to avoiding offending China. This created some difficulties when
the possibility was raised of expanding the dialogue into a quadrilateral mechanism
involving India as the fourth party. Australia, sensitive of China’s reaction, especially
after taking part in multilateral naval exercises involving the four prospective parties,
was quite clumsy in its undiplomatic rejection of the idea, potentially offending Japan
and India instead. 29 Nonetheless, the deeper naval and maritime security cooperation
already set in train seems set to continue.
Cooperation for the Pacific Islands
Australia is geographically the key player in the context of strategic interests in the
southwest Pacific, which Japan also regards as important for its own national interests.
The Japanese government regards its relations with Pacific island states as significant
for several reasons. Historically, the island states have tended to be pro-Japan and to
support Japan in international organizations and forums. Because Japan was formerly
the mandate power for Micronesia, there are a sizable number of Japanese descendents
in those islands. This region is popular with Japanese tourists. In addition, about 80 per
cent of the tuna and bonito consumed in Japan is caught in the exclusive economic
zones of the Pacific island states, a huge area which in total is twice the size of China’s
land territory. These waters include vital sea lanes for the maritime transport of natural
resources from Australia to Japan. The security and stability of this region is important
because of its pelagic fisheries and its SLOC role in marine transport. As a result of this
significance for Japan, in 2008, Japan’s bilateral development aid to Pacific island
nations reached a total of about US$70 million. 30 In the fifth Pacific Islands Leaders
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Meeting, held in Hokkaido in 2009, the Japanese government announced that it will
carry out an approximately 50 billion yen cooperation programme with the Pacific
islands states over the next three years. 31

Also, for Australia, the southwest Pacific region is a neighbourhood whose stability and
security are connected directly to its national interests; hence, relations with such island
countries are vital matters for Canberra. As a consequence, Australia, together with
New Zealand, makes considerable efforts to preserve friendly relations with the region,
exercising initiatives to encourage peace, stability, development, and to exert Australian
influence and promote other Western interests in the region. 32 In the southwest and
central Pacific, the Australian government has attempted to build cooperative relations
with, and capacity within, each island country, especially emphasizing the importance
of maritime surveillance and enforcement for the national and economic security of all
regional states. Australia has implemented this policy primarily by using the Pacific
Patrol Boat project run by its Defence Cooperation Programme, whereby Australia built,
and assists in the maintenance and training for, 22 patrol boats gifted to twelve island
states for fisheries enforcement, as well as providing ongoing maritime surveillance
support. 33

In addition, Australia has placed considerable importance upon stability operations in
the region, especially in the wake of 9/11, with a focus on the RAMSI mission in the
Solomon Islands. Relations with its adjacent country, Papua New Guinea, which
occupies about 80 per cent of the total land area of the southwest Pacific, is crucial for
Australia’s national security. The Australian government cooperates with the Papua
New Guinea government to promote law and order, enhance border security and
improve economic management capacity. 34
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In the Pacific Islands Forum summit held in Okinawa in 2006, the Japanese government
emphasized the significance of relations with countries that are pro-Japan, which
constitute important partners for the consolidation of Japan’s diplomatic power base in
the international arena. The summit was attended by 14 countries and two districts,
including Australia and New Zealand. The Japanese government set four areas of
priority as its objectives to support the Pacific island nations based on the “Pacific Plan”
adopted at the 2005 summit held in Papua New Guinea: namely “economic
development”, “sustainable development”, “good governance” and “security”; and to
these four areas was added “people to people communication and exchange” as Japan’s
fifth priority. 35

The Quasi-Alignment with India
The Indian Ocean is of great strategic importance, and in recent years has drawn
unprecedented attention from the international community. As a consequence of this
importance and growing maritime security concerns and regional naval developments,
the Indian Ocean littoral’s leading power, India, aspires to be a major naval power to a
greater extent than ever before. Japan, as a maritime state, has been watchful of the
situation of the Indian Ocean as the world’s maritime highway in the context of the rise
of India and China and its own SLOC security. Thus, developing a security partnership
with India could be of enormous functional benefit for Japan for geo-strategic reasons.

The Indian Ocean and Indian Maritime Power
The Significance of the Indian Ocean in the International Arena
It is clear that the Indian Ocean maritime theatres of littoral South Asia, Southeast Asia,
and southwest Asia and the Middle East, have emerged as vital strategic maritime choke
points which cannot be ignored. Since the late fifteenth century, the great European
seafaring powers, Portugal, the Dutch and the English (eventually the British), secured
naval supremacy over the Indian Ocean. Seaborne trading between these European
powers and their Indian colonies was strategically important for their status as naval
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super powers. It has certainly been the case that Mahan’s theory of maritime strategy
has been applied to the Indian Ocean. 36

As established by the Indian analyst, Lawrence Prabhakar, the regional maritime
dynamics of South Asia can be defined in terms of five factors. First, the geopolitical
significance of the South Asia region has increased to encompass the whole of the
Indian Ocean, as a zone of actual and potential conflict and resources. In addition, this
region is located as a central geo-strategic position, control of which might allow the
exertion of a strong strategic influence on Central Asia, continental China, and maritime
Southeast Asia and the oceanic SLOC. 37

Second, its contiguity with the Indian Ocean and its sea lanes, which are paths used for
an enormous amount of seaborne trade, make the region highly strategically
significant. 38 Its security environment is a matter of life and death not only for AsiaPacific countries, but also for the whole of the global economy. The gross area of the
Indian Ocean is 73.44 million square kilometres. The Indian Ocean region is comprised
of 30 littoral states, eleven landlocked states and 1,286 islands, containing a third of the
world’s population, and a quarter of its land mass. Indian Ocean region states possess
three-fourths of world oil reserves, mostly controlled by just five Persian Gulf states.
The region is also the location of 70 per cent of the world’s natural disasters. 39

In this region, the Indian subcontinent juts out into the ocean and the South Asian giant,
India, holds an ever growing geo-strategic influence over the Indian Ocean. The waters
of the Indian Ocean hosts the passage of almost half of the world’s seaborne trade. 40
From a geo-strategic view, India is located between the regions of production and
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consumption, with the major oil suppliers, the Gulf Arab states, as the origin of the
maritime traffic. Half of the world’s containerized cargo, one-third of its bulk cargo and
two-thirds of its oil shipments transit the waters of the Indian Ocean. It has been posited
that in the event that one major Indian port is closed for three months because of
terrorist activities, US$5 billion would be lost in overseas trade. 41

Third, there is wide-ranging littoral space around the Indian Ocean region that holds
enormous promise for maritime access and basing. 42 The location of India is able to
bring strategic benefits to India. This geo-strategic advantage enables Indian forces to
observe the widespread area from its Lakeshwadeep Islands in the west to the Great
Nicobar Island in the east, and to deploy Indian naval forces for long-range military
operations. 43 Small Indian archipelagos in the Andaman Sea, the Andaman and the
Nicobar Islands, enable the Indian Navy to be able to block the Malacca Strait, if it ever
wanted to. The Chagos archipelago, including the island of Diego Garcia, is home to the
largest U.S. naval base outside of the United States, which includes a logistics hub and a
strategic air base surrounded by the ocean area. 44 In the northwestern part of the region,
the Arabian Sea connects two of the world’s most significant choke points: the Strait of
Hormuz, the only sea passage available to transport oil from the Persian Gulf; and the
Red Sea, the route from Asia to Europe through the Suez Canal and contains the major
oil port of Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. 45

Fourth, intense competition in nuclear and missile deployments between India and
Pakistan has increased the level of tension within this region and has brought the
attention of extra-regional powers in a combination of both diplomatic and strategic
intervention. The development of nuclear and missile strategies in this region have led
extra-regional actors to develop and apply strategies to counter WMD proliferation and
build missile defence capabilities. 46
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Fifth, extra-regional naval presence aims to pursue one or a combination of the
following objectives: regional power projection capability, the securing of seabed
resources, SLOC security, sea-based nuclear deterrence, or sea-based missile defence. 47
The external powers which have shown significant interest in the Indian Ocean are the
United States, France, Russia, Great Britain, China and Japan. These players understand
that deploying considerable maritime power is essential to support and protect the
benefit they derive from merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean region. 48

The Rise of India as a Maritime State
In recent years, as the strategic significance of India has been broadly acknowledged,
controversy has arisen as to whether it is primarily a land power or a sea power state. In
India’s history, aggressors have always invaded the country by force. Ever since the
country gained independence from its suzerain in 1947, India has been fighting a land
war in the north. In fact, the Indian government adjusts the departmental budgets to the
end that its land force budget receives far more than what the navy and air force receive.
Indeed, the Indian Army has a reserve force of about one million, making it the second
largest land force after China’s approximately 1.1 million.49 In these years, however, the
current Indian navy has increasingly captured the attention of the international
community. India’s increasing naval budget shows that its strategic directions have
changed to some extent to the ocean and the SLOC from concentrating almost solely on
the territorial defence of its Himalayan borders. 50 The Indian Navy now possesses about
150 ships, totaling 344,000 tons. 51

India is the only industrial nation and the overwhelming regional power in South Asia.
India possesses nuclear weapons and medium-range ballistic missiles. It has been
pursuing an ambitious space strategy focusing on the future. 52 The Indian Navy is the
only regional seagoing force in the Indian Ocean region with organic fixed-wing air
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power; and has operated carriers for decades. 53 India is nine times larger than Japan in
terms of land area and its population is the second largest in the world. The situations
strongly linked to the maritime arena in the Asia-Pacific region radically elevate India’s
international status and the significance of the Indian Navy. Unless they are strategic
competitors, states which have stakes in the Indian Ocean by necessity are required to
forge a better relationship with India and its maritime forces: as explained in earlier
chapters, there is a strong interdependence character that shapes the international
relations of seapower. The Indian Navy is aiming to become a blue water navy by
establishing a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) based at Port Blair in the Andaman
Islands, located between the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait. 54 FENC plans to
have a chain of anchor stations and three main bases larger than the former U.S. base at
Subic Bay in the Philippines. India has plans to expand its naval capability by
increasing its number of major surface combatants from 39 to 46 by 2015. 55

India has been advancing its naval expansion plans by modernizing its conventional
submarine force and developing nuclear powered submarines which may eventually
carry part of New Delhi’s nuclear deterrent; buying and building new aircraft carriers;
and several classes of missile-equipped surface combatants. There are two major
reasons why India has been focusing on strengthening its navy. First, India shares
maritime boundaries with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, the
Maldives and Sri Lanka. There are outstanding boundary issues with two of them,
Pakistan and Bangladesh. 56 Second, securing SLOC from the energy-rich Middle East
to the energy hungry nations of East Asia is crucial as a naval mission. 57 Compared to
Japan, India is a rich country in terms of natural resources; however, India’s domestic
natural resources and energy cannot meet domestic consumption.
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topography of the northern India borders makes India almost like an insular continental
country which must heavily depend on the shipping routes for economic activity.
Political friction with Pakistan also means that India’s SLOC with the Persian Gulf is
potentially vulnerable to disruption by its neighbour. Ninety-seven per cent of India’s
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trade by volume and 70 per cent of its energy imports rely on marine transportation.59
Therefore, although the sea lane from the Middle East to India is becoming more
significant, the SLOC is located to the south of Pakistan and has been a vulnerable point
for India’s security. 60

India as a Counter Balance against China
Still the Long Time Competitor
On the one hand, in recent years, relations between India and China have become closer
due to their economic relations. In fact, the two Asian giants agreed a “strategic
partnership” for peace and prosperity on 11 April 2005. 61 In May 2006, a Memorandum
of Understanding of Defence Cooperation was concluded by their respective defence
ministers, and the Indian and Chinese navies conducted a low-level combined naval
exercise at sea. There has also been exchange of high level military visits. 62 On the
other hand, there have been long-standing issues which continue to create tension
between the two countries. China illicitly transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan,
including the supply of reactor designs, weapon grade plutonium, 5,000 ring magnets
and the Khusba reactor, which has helped to train hundreds of Pakistani nuclear
engineers. 63 An industrial furnace has been built to cast the bomb core. Furthermore,
China consistently opposes the Indian bid for permanent membership of the U.N.
Security Council.

Importantly, there has been the continuation of the long-pending issue of the territorial
dispute between the two nations over Arunachal Pradesh. 64 Relations between India and
China might be improved in some respects, but still the fact of their competitive
strategic relationship is undeniable. American security experts have steadily accepted
the perception of the importance of a confident India as a U.S. strategic partner in the
Indian Ocean region to act as a counterweight to the rise of Chinese regional hegemony.
India can be anticipated to play a balancing role as a continental power against China.
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Both scenarios hold serious concerns about the rise of a China which has ambitions to
increase its naval power projection capability and space power for military use,
including an increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Geo-strategically, the
location of the Indian subcontinent is significant for any maritime-based coalition that
may wish to constrain Russia or China, two formidable continental powers. 65

Building a navy creates huge costs, which make it difficult to also increase the land and
air power of the state without substantial extra amounts being dedicated to the defence
budget. But China’s naval expansion has almost reached the level whereby its capability
is sufficient to exert its influence upon the Indian Ocean. For India, the gross naval
power of the JMSDF and the U.S. Seventh Fleet compared with China’s maritime
capability is effective for the stability of its security environment. Nevertheless, as a
rising great power with its own ambitions for regional influence, India is unlikely to
want to cede responsibility for its maritime security to foreign powers, even potential
coalition partners. For China, close relations between India and Japan can be compared
to placing it in a position between the devil and the deep blue sea: a strategic dilemma
on at least two fronts.

Sino-India Stand off at Sea
India is concerned over an increasing Chinese naval presence because ports in Burma
could threaten India’s naval position and operations around the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, as part of China’s “string of pearls” maritime strategy. 66 A number of Indian
naval experts and commentators expressed serious concern about the possibility of
naval facilities and ports under development by China being capable of enabling the
Chinese navy to achieve a sea denial capability against India. 67 The growth of China’s
trade volume with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan has increased in pace and
China has steadily developed relations with the four South Asian countries in various
areas during the last decade. 68 In order to deal with the maritime strategy of the great
continental power, China, which is rapidly strengthening its naval power and engaging
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Indian Ocean littoral and insular states to secure its SLOC, the Indian Navy has been
aiming to become a genuine blue water navy. China’s forging ahead in the Indian Ocean
is without doubt a serious problem for India. 69

Additionally, it is becoming more important for the rising two Asian giants, India and
China, to extend their influence to the Malacca Strait for geo-strategic reasons.
Currently, about 40 per cent of India’s maritime trade navigates through the Malacca
Straits. 70 The Indian government is keen to send its naval forces to ports in Southeast
Asian countries as part of its naval diplomacy and conduct combined naval exercises
with the navies of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. 71 India is the longestinvolved outside power in conducting activities around the Malacca Strait. The Indian
and Singaporean navies operate naval anti-piracy drills annually. India has carried out
combined exercises with Indonesia since 2004 and with Thailand in 2005. India has
been forging closer ties with Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, Japan and the United States,
and increasing its naval presence around the Andaman Sea. 72 In fact, in recent years,
India has vigorously pursued an omni-directional foreign policy through the use of its
navy. In 2005 and 2007, the Indian naval task groups even deployed to the Far East and
conducted naval drills with Japan, South Korea and Russia. 73 In 2000 and 2007, the
Indian Navy conducted combined exercises with the Vietnamese navy and with the
navies of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines in 2007. Such naval
diplomacy fuels Beijing’s suspicions “with respect to the implications of New Delhi’s
‘Look East’ policy, often described in anti-Chinese terms.” 74

The Development of India-Japan Relations and Maritime Cooperation
There are a large number of common interests with which to promote friendly relations
between India and Japan. 75 Both remain on friendly terms with the United States at the
moment, although the international situation of the Cold War jeopardized such relations
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between India and the United States in the past. For Japan, so highly dependent on
American seapower, this point is essential to its approach towards India. Furthermore,
historically, cultural exchanges between India and Japan have been advanced since
ancient times, such as the introduction of Buddhism from India. 76 Even though India
waged war against Japan during “the Greater East Asia War” as a part of the British
Empire, India’s attitude towards Japan has been consistently magnanimous since the
end of the war. 77

Both states can cooperate closely in mutual support in order to increase the number of
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council; and seek the position, together with
Brazil and Germany, as the Group of Four (G4). Japan is willing to support India’s
civilian nuclear programme. Since 2003, India has been the biggest recipient of
Japanese yen loans. 78 In 2008, yen loans to India totalled 236 billion yen. 79 Besides, a
number of joint projects involving a vast amount of money, including construction of a
railway and road network between New Delhi and Mumbai, are in the planning stage.80
In addition, both are democracies and possess highly advanced judicial systems.

For Japan, the importance of relations with India has rapidly increased in all aspects: for
diplomatic, economic, and security reasons. As mentioned above, geo-strategically, the
location of the Indian subcontinent is important for their mutual strategic relationship
with respect to China. Both hold serious concerns about the rise of China, particularly
its naval ambitions, and both are able to join hands in pressing ahead with the threats to
maritime security. 81 Securing sea lanes in the Indian Ocean as an essential leg of the
world’s most vital maritime expressway is extremely important for Japan. This sea lane
lies well outside of the 1983 concept of 1,000 nautical mile sea lane defence. In earlier
times, Japan had agreed within the context of its alliance to take responsibility to secure
sea lanes within the area of 1,000 miles from the Japanese archipelago. Beyond 1,000
nautical miles, Japan relied on U.S. seapower and the efforts of other American allies.
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During the Cold War, there was a perception of cool relations between India and Japan,
but steadily the two countries have opened up new opportunities for maritime security
cooperation. First, Japan’s dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991 and
participation in the U.S.-led coalition left a good impression on India, which is
geographically close to the Persian Gulf and builds bilateral naval cooperation with its
neighbouring countries. 82

India and Japan began to cooperate on sea lane security stretching back to the ASEAN
Regional Forum of 1996. 83 Although India’s nuclear test in 1998 seriously damaged
diplomatic relations momentarily, the recognition of the importance of India as a
potential strategic partner meant that the collaborative relationship has since normalized
and further developed. For example, in 1999, when the Japanese cargo vessel Alondra
Rainbow was hijacked, the Indian Coast Guard cooperated closely with the Japan Coast
Guard. In fact, this occasion was the first instance of teamwork between the maritime
forces of the two countries. 84

In August 2000, when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori made a visit to India, the
two countries agreed to build up a “Japan-India Global Partnership in the 21st Century.”
In December 2001, when the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Japan, the two
countries signed the “Japan-India Joint Declaration”, which consists of high-level
dialogue, exchanges in the information and communication technology field, joint
counter-action against the proliferation of WMD and terrorism. 85 As a matter of fact,
Japan sent JMSDF ships to the Indian Ocean with India’s assistance to counter the
threat of terrorism, following the 9/11 attacks against the United States. 86 Furthermore,
some sorts of naval cooperation such as port visits and regular visits and combined
exercises between the two maritime safety authorities (coast guards) began. Surely, both
countries have a deep mutual understanding of how the safety and security of the
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international sea routes are significant and beneficial to each state’s interests. 87
Moreover, the two countries’ maritime forces have slowly but surely intensified
bilateral cooperation through warship port visits, senior officials’ visits, training
exchanges and the five coast guard exercises based on the Asia Maritime Security
Initiative 2004. 88

Recently, India and the United States have sustained and deepened their good bilateral
relationship by conducting a number of combined military exercises, such as “Cope
India” and “Malabar.” This tendency in Indo-U.S. relations has encouraged a
cooperative relationship between India and Japan. Thus, in December 2004, just after
the Indian Ocean tsunami, Indian, Japanese, Australian and U.S. forces cooperated in
disaster relief operations as a team. In April 2005, at the Japan-India summit meeting in
India, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh signed the Japan-India Partnership in the New Asian Era: Strategic
Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership Joint Statement, which included a
recognition of the significance of maritime security and the cooperation between the
Indian Navy and the JMSDF. 89 It has been argued that “[T]he most significant
achievement of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to India in 2005 is the paradigm shift
with regard to the positioning of India within Japan’s Asian diplomacy.” 90

In December 2006, Indian Prime Minister Singh and the Japanese prime minister,
Shinzo Abe, confirmed that because the two countries both have enormous EEZs and
wide-ranging maritime interests, they can cooperate together toward curbing piracy by
building capability, developing technology and sharing information between their
maritime forces. They approved regular exchanges between the two coast guards
through meetings of the heads of the coast guard organizations, reciprocal visits of coast
guard ships and combined exercises. The two leaders also welcomed the signing of a
Memorandum on Cooperation between the Coast Guards and Regional Cooperation
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Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP). 91 In the words of Abe:

The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic
coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A “broader Asia” that broke
away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.
Our two countries have the ability - and the responsibility - to ensure that it
broadens yet further and to nurture and enrich these seas to become seas of
clearest transparence. 92
In April 2007, Japan, India and the United States held a trilateral naval exercise off
Tokyo for the first time. Five months later, adding Australia and Singapore to the group
of three, they had major war games in the Bay of Bengal. 93 In 2007, the Malabar war
games were hosted by India and also involved Australia, the United States, Singapore
and Japan. In Tokyo, on 22 October 2008, Taro Aso and Manmohan Singh announced
the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India, and emphasized
the importance of the relations between the two countries and their common
commitment to democracy, open society, human rights and the rule of law. The security
agreement involves information exchange, cooperation between maritime forces, the
safety of sea lanes, and the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. In this
security cooperation agreement, notably, the role of both maritime forces has been
regarded as significant to secure SLOC. 94 Previously, only the United States and
Australia have had such a security pact with Japan. And, in April 2009, the Indian Navy
launched a high-skilled exercise, “Malabar 09”, with their counterparts from the United
States and Japan in the waters off eastern Okinawa. 95

On 29 December 2009, in India, The two prime ministers, Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced a joint
statement, the “New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership,” to confirm
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that the two countries would push forward the development of the “Strategic and Global
Partnership” signed in April 2005. The two governments also forged the Action Plan to
advance security cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
between Japan and India issued in October 2008. 96 The Action Plan includes: the
reinforcement of the Global and Strategic Partnership; annual sub-cabinet/senior
officials 2+2 dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Japan
and the Indian counterparts); Maritime Security Dialogue; Regular meetings between
the Ministers of Defence; annual bilateral naval exercises; multilateral naval exercises;
cooperation in anti-piracy operations between the Indian Navy and the Japan Self
Defense Force, Coast Guard operation; and a shipping policy forum. 97
Nevertheless, despite these developments, it is unclear how the JMSDF can develop
cooperation with the Indian Navy outside of goodwill visits and combined naval
training due to the constraints of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.

RIMPAC
The Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise is a large-scale multinational naval and
maritime exercise hosted by the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, involving navies from
allied and other Pacific nations. In 2008, the world’s largest maritime exercise, which
was the twenty-first RIMPAC exercise since 1971, brought together maritime, air and
ground forces from the following ten countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, the
Netherlands, Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Britain and the United States; and
involved the participation of over 35 ships, six submarines, and more than 150
aircraft. 98 In the exercise, participating warships and aircraft conducted reconnaissance,
minesweeping, maritime interception, amphibious warfare, air defence, and anti-ship
and anti-submarine attack missions.99

RIMPAC and Japan
Joining RIMPAC offers four advantages to the JMSDF. First, it enables the JMSDF to
be able to conduct training in circumstances where there is a possibility of being
“attacked” from multiple threats composed of aircraft, submarine and surface forces.
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Second, it promotes tactical skills by allowing the JMSDF to learn new tactics and
fighting methods from the U.S. Navy. The third advantage imparted by participation in
RIMPAC is that it offers the opportunity to analyse the ability of relevant weaponry and
up skill relevant personnel by conducting missile firing and torpedo launching exercises
using evaluation facilities for guided weapons which are much larger and provide more
flexibility for live-firing than areas surrounding Japan. Finally, it promotes not only a
common operational doctrine and combined operations behaviour with the U.S. Navy,
but also friendly ties with the navies of other countries. 100 Participant countries are thus
able to build not only naval capabilities, but also mutual relationships of trust. 101 This is
the true value of multilateral naval exercises.

In general, RIMPAC has planned to enhance the tactical capabilities and interoperability
among participating forces in various maritime operations. Importantly, participating
countries are able to improve capabilities for SLOC security and their combined
response capabilities in various conflicts at sea. 102 This U.S.-led large-scale drill has
been conducted biennially since 1971, when the Vietnam War was coming to an end, in
order to prevent the Soviet Union’s attempt to expand southward. The JMSDF first
participated in the exercises in 1980. RIMPAC had two main purposes during the Cold
War: to enhance the solidarity of the U.S.-led maritime alliance system and the strategic
potential of participant navies. 103

After the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces shifted their attention to regional conflicts,
mainly to so-called military operations other than war (MOOTW) or “peace operations,”
including rescue missions and ship inspections, in order to make a display of solidarity
amongst its global maritime coalition and to practice the protection of maritime order in
the Pacific Ocean region. Immediately after the Cold War, the United States regarded
“rogue states” as potential enemies, such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran. The scenario of
the military exercise therefore changed from assuming the likelihood of large-scale wars
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to that of regional conflicts like the Gulf War of 1991. 104 According to then U.S. Vice
Admiral Jerry Unruh, the experience of the RIMPAC 1990 was actually useful for the
Gulf War in 1991, because multilateral exercises like RIMPAC had focused on the
enhancement coalition interoperability, thus improving the ease of cooperation among
navies participating in the conflict. 105 Although about 50,000 personnel on the average
joined the RIMPAC exercise from 1980 to 1990, the number declined to about 30,000
in 1992, reflecting Cold War drawdowns and a lowered threat environment. 106

However, the JMSDF could only undertake cooperation relevant to U.S. forces, and
could not join multinational force cooperation during RIMPAC because of the
government’s interpretation of the constitution, arguing that to do so would represent
the exercising of the right to collective defence, which is forbidden in the prevailing
constitutional interpretation. 107 For example, in RIMPAC 2000, the JMSDF did not take
part in a drill to rescue refugees, despite the drill including not only U.S. soldiers and
other countries’ doctors, but also the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and U.N.
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), because conducting such activities could fall within the
definition of the exercise of the right of collective defence if a scenario of conflict were
to erupt during the exercise requiring the use of force. As a result of the re-examination
of this controversy, the JMSDF was able to join multilateral humanitarian mission
exercise scenarios in 2002 with the approval of the government. 108 Still, however, there
are a great number of similar legal limitations applying to Japanese forces in
multinational activities.

RIMPAC as a Traditional Maritime Coalition
Although a long time has already passed since the end of the Cold War, RIMPAC has
not lost its original meaning of a multinational coalition maritime exercise against
unfriendly states. North Korea has criticized the Americans for still continuing
RIMPAC even though the Cold War has long finished and the Soviet Union is no more,
and has observed that it has been becoming larger in scale under the guise of fighting
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terrorism. According to North Korea, the true purpose of the military exercise is to
crush “anti-imperialist” independent countries, including of course North Korea itself as
the first target, to maintain the hegemonic status of the United States. 109 Just before
RIMPAC 1994, Pyongyang’s media daily Minju Choson criticized the United States,
Japan and South Korea for enhancing their solidarity through the exercise to counter
North Korea and its nuclear proliferation strategy. Even though American and Japanese
officials stated that the exercise is a regular naval exercise, and not a special one, two
U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, along with Japanese and South Korean forces, were
on the same side and operated a tactical exercise against the opponent, a fleet of
Canadian and Australian warships and aircraft. 110

RIMPAC’s North Korea-targeted exercises in these years have made a contribution to
improving relations between the United States, Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile,
when Japan teamed up with South Korea in the war game for the first time, it was
viewed with suspicion because of the suspicion that it represented a violation of the
Japanese constitutional ban on the exercise of the right to collective defence. 111 Despite
this, defence cooperation guidelines between the United States and Japan were revised
in 1997 to include emergency inspection of ships on the high seas by the JMSDF.
However, the JMSDF could not carry out such operations, because the Diet in Japan
had yet to pass legislation to allow Japan to provide help to the United States for
military emergencies in the area surrounding Japan. 112

RIMPAC 1998 was based on the following scenario. The Hawaiian islands were
divided into two countries: the so-called “Blueland,” a small wealthy nation and a
democracy with an economy based on tourism and international trade; and “Orangeland,”
a large agrarian nation and a dictatorship with a weak economy. 113 Orangeland’s huge
military forces were equipped with Russian, Chinese and Western weaponry, with large
air forces including both strike and air defence aircraft, a navy with a medium-size
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surface ship force and a large submarine force, and a highly mobile medium-sized army.
The weakness of Orangeland’s forces was a static, centralized command structure. 114 In
the exercise scenario, the area around the two countries was unstable because
Orangeland had ambitions to seize the territory of Blueland for geopolitical and
economic benefits and unify it with Orangeland, insisting that they share a common
culture. 115 In these exercises, the Japanese forces assayed their ability to assist in
enforcing a naval blockade as part of the revised U.S.-Japan strategic guidelines. The
implications of the scenario were that a U.S.-led coalition could use some of these skills
in order to break a future Chinese blockade of Taiwan. 116

Despite the fact that the United States arranges a large number of regular exercises in
the Pacific region, most of them are not open to non-allies or non-coalition member
outsiders, especially China and Russia. 117 In particular, China was not even invited to
observe the large-scale drill in 2008. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, China, in
particular, and potentially Russia, are the main imagined opponents for some maritime
or air manoeuvres hosted by the U.S. armed forces. Chinese and Russian aircraft and
submarines are assumed as warning targets for the U.S.-oriented maritime coalition. In
fact, during RIMPAC in years past, a Taiwan Strait crisis scenario was assumed in the
drills.
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Additionally, the Americans regard information leaks about advanced

technology and tactics as a matter of grave concern. Indeed, the United States has
become nervous about such issues because weapons which are products of highlyadvanced technology have been deployed to the Pacific region, such as stealth fighters,
cruise missiles, Aegis destroyers and the newest nuclear submarines. 119 In 1998, China
and Russia sent senior officers as observers to RIMPAC for the first time since
RIMPAC began. Although Russia was invited to join RIMPAC as an observer in 2004
and 2006, it did not send any personnel. In 2008, Russia finally accepted the invitation.
Meanwhile, China was not invited to RIMPAC in 2008. In practice, for U.S. Pacific
Command, direct military-to-military contact with China has been forbidden because of
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the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-65), except for
humanitarian assistance and search-and-rescue operations. 120

The Evolution of the Maritime Coalition
The Japanese government initially avoided participating in RIMPAC, due to the issue of
the right of collective-defence, since not only the United States but several other
counties participate in the exercise. In May 1979, the United States approached the
JMSDF to garner its interest in taking part in the war game. 121 The Maritime Staff
Office asked the United States the scenario for the naval drill, and stated that if the
JMSDF participated in RIMPAC, it would team up only with U.S. forces, and the
communication system had to be prepared with this point in mind. After repeated
negotiations, the United States accepted these conditions. After considerable discussion
between the Japan Defense Agency and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, it was
concluded that even if other countries’ forces participated in the military training, as
long as it was genuine combat training, the participation of the JSDF would not violate
the Japanese constitution and the Self-Defense Forces Law. 122 After the vehement
argument over whether it was unconstitutional or not in the Diet, the government
overcome the situation by submitting its official view based on the aforementioned
advice from its bureaucrats. 123

In recent years, Japan has become less sensitive to the JMSDF’s activities within
RIMPAC. For example, in RIMPAC 2006, there was an important step to promote
interoperability among participant navies by using the Combined Enterprise Regional
Information Exchange System, which enabled all ships involved in the exercise to
access a common information network. Prior to 2006, the JMSDF had to use a separate
communications channel to limit its participation to bilateral cooperation with the
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United States only, but since 2006 it has been using the common system to
communicate with all other participants. 124

Proliferation Security Initiative
There are various rules pertaining to each of the maritime jurisdictional zones under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), such as the territorial sea,
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas. In order to maintain law and
order at sea, every state and organization is required to promote close multinational and
bilateral cooperation. Each authority concerned must foster mutual cooperation based
on relations of trust with regional countries for the prevention of transnational crime and
terrorism. Since September 11, the United States has played a strong leadership role in
order to fight terrorism globally through the organs of the U.N. and the G8; through
regional bodies such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); and through bilateral cooperation. 125

In December 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush proposed the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) as a security framework for international cooperation to prevent the
transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and materials and technology related
to WMD, including nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, in accordance with international
law and each country’s domestic laws. As outlined by Michael Richardson, the PSI was
intended to:
•

•

expand the reach and effectiveness of this effort, not only
geographically, but across the diplomatic, intelligence, law
enforcement and military communities, and within the private
sector; improve the quality exchange of information related to
illicit WMD shipments
enhance practical cooperation to disrupt shipments. 126
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PSI activities are classified into two general categories: meeting (general meetings and
expert’s meeting) and training for Maritime Interception Operations. The initiative was
launched with eleven countries in May 2003. Currently, more than 90 countries have
reputedly announced their support for the PSI and joined PSI-related activities. Despite
the more than 90 countries that take part in the initiative, still a number of countries
including China, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia are unwilling to join the security
framework for the alleged reason that the PSI might contravene international law and
because the United States has not ratified the LOSC. 127 The initiative is acutely aware
of the issue of North Korea’s proliferation activities, and also those of Pakistan and Iran.
Actually, the PSI has arguably already achieved success, for example, dismantling the
A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network in 2004.

The PSI and North Korea
North Korea announced its intention to unilaterally withdraw from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. It became known that Iran had built largescale atomic energy plants in August 2002 and also that it repeated uranium enrichment
and plutonium separation without informing the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Investigations uncovered Pakistan’s Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network of
nuclear proliferation activities, feeding and swapping technologies and materials
between rogue state proliferators such as North Korea, Iran and Libya for profit. As a
result, the presence of an established black market for nuclear weapon technology
became apparent and the existing non-proliferation regime proved inadequate. The PSI
therefore was advocated by the Bush administration as one tool with which to solve this
pressing issue. 128 Especially, North Korea was suspected of being involved in Khan’s
black market of nuclear-weapons technology, and exported its ballistic missiles to
Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). To
make matters worse, it is reported North Korea exported uranium hexafluoride to Iran
and Libya. 129
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Indeed, it is said that Pakistan’s Ghauri ballistic missile and Iran’s Shahab-3 are based
on North Korea’s Nodong. Promotion of the PSI by the United States has been one way
to apply pressure to prevent the proliferation of North Korean mass-destruction
weapons and has evidently played a successful role in making Libya, Egypt and Yemen
exercise their self-control not to purchase missile-related technology from North Korea.
North Korea has used exports of missile technology to bolster its foreign currency
earnings; hence, the PSI could damage a significant source of its income. 130

Japan and the PSI
Japan has the opportunity to contribute to the suppression of the spread of WMD in East
Asia and thus also contribute towards regional stability by taking part in PSI activities.
The United States has particularly large expectations for the alliance with Japan
regarding PSI activities in the region, while attempting to reduce its own military forces
on the Korean peninsula through its technology-driven process of defence
transformation. For the sake of strengthening the maritime alliance, Japan’s active
participation in PSI is unmistakably valuable. 131 The Japanese government has thus
been making concrete efforts to support the PSI by hosting international exercises for
PSI maritime interception operations, actively participating in multilateral PSI exercises
hosted by member countries as much as possible and urging Asian countries to support
the PSI through its diplomatic outreach activities. 132

North Korea and Japan
On 20 May 2003, at a U.S. Senate committee hearing, North Korean defector, Bok Koo
Lee, who used to work at a munitions plant testified as follows: 1) ninety per cent of
North Korean missile parts originated in Japan; 2) the General Association of Korean
Residents in Japan was concerned with the development of North Korean missiles; 3)
the North Koreans imported these parts from Japan using a passenger ship called Man
Gyong Bon every three months, which shuttled between Niigata in Japan and Wonsan in
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North Korea. 133 Although the Japanese government half expected that the Man Gyong
Bon carried money, technology, and goods, as open secrets, it never took effective
precautionary measures and failed to tighten its security procedures against such activity.
After the North Korean abduction issue offended Japanese public opinion, the Japanese
government enacted the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in
February 2004 to control the flow of money and a special law regarding a ban on port
calls by specific ships in June 2004, while it was reinforcing Port State Control powers
aimed at Man Gyong Bon’s activities. 134 Consequently, it was significant that Japan
itself, with its close geographical position to North Korea, hosted multinational
exercises from the perspective of international cooperation to strengthen the counterproliferation regime. 135

Japan and Multinational Cooperation for the PSI
In April 2003, Australian navy, police, customs and special forces, using a helicopter
and boats, investigated a 4,480-ton freighter named Pong Su off the New South Wales
coast involved in a plot to smuggle 125 kilograms of heroin worth 16.7 billion yen. 136
This ship was built in Japan in 1980 and belonged to a shipping company under the
control of the operations division of the Workers Party of Korea, which has been linked
to the abductions of Japanese nationals. Ship records of the Pong Su showed that it has
changed ownership several times and it seems that North Korea bought it in the latter
part of the 1990s. 137 Since at least 1976, North Korea has had a hand in the international
drug trade to earn foreign exchange, such as methamphetamine and heroin sneaked into
Japan, Taiwan, China and Russia. 138 Even though no WMD material was found on the
Pong Su, income illegally obtained from drug trafficking and counterfeiting activities
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has became the main resource for North Korea to develop its nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes. 139

In September 2003, the U.S.-led maritime interdiction exercise named “Pacific
Protector” was conducted in the Coral Sea, off Australia’s north-eastern coast. The
exercises were aimed at training PSI member countries to stop and board suspicious
ships carrying illegal weapons or component materials for WMD. 140 The United States,
Japan, France and Australia actively participated in the exercise, and Britain, Spain,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal were observers, while South
Korea and Russia declined to join. According to participant countries, this initiative is
not aimed at any specific target although one of its main purposes has clearly been
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and proliferation activities. 141 Australia regarded
Japan’s participation as essential, especially in the face of the need to inspect Japaneseregistered vessels outside its territorial waters and avoid any legal issues between the
countries. Actually, the Japanese government sent a JCG boat to conduct multilateral
ship survey exercises with other coast guard and naval ships for the first time. At this
time, the Japan Coast Guard encountered a problem of not possessing an eavesdropresistant communication line with other forces. 142

In October 2004, the Japanese government hosted, with the JCG and JMSDF, a threeday maritime-interdiction exercise named “Team Samurai 04” off the coast of Sagami
Bay and near the Port of Yokosuka. It was the first PSI exercise in Asia, focusing on
law enforcement activities, and to be conducted in accordance with national legal
authorities and relevant international legal frameworks. Vessels and aircraft from
Australia, France, Japan and the United States joined the drills and 18 countries
observed the exercises. 143 Nevertheless, China and the South Korea turned down the
139
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invitation to join the drill to prevent the relationship with North Korea from being
irreparably damaged. In Team Samurai 04, the scenario for the drill assumed an
American-registered ship attempted to tranship sarin-related material to a Japaneseregistered ship. First, JMSDF P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft spotted the suspicious
ship, and then a JCG patrol ship chased and brought the Japanese ship into a nearby port.
Finally, warships from Australia, France and the United States confiscated the goods. 144
The participation of a JMSDF escort ship in the PSI for the first time was well received
by the international community. Also, in Team-Samurai 04, New Zealand, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Cambodia from the Asia-Pacific region took part in PSI training
activities for the first time. The participation of four non-core-group countries was
welcomed for the purpose of promoting understanding of the PSI among other
countries. 145

A three-day maritime exercise called “Pacific Shield 07” was hosted by Japan in 2007
involving seven countries, Japan, Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Singapore
and the United States, and involved ten vessels and four aircraft off Izu-Oshima Island
and at the Ports of Yokosuka and Yokohama. This exercise was conducted as part of the
PSI. Although China and South Korea declined again to participate in the drill in
consideration of relations with North Korea, senior officials from about 40 countries
observed it. From Japan, a total of 650 JMSDF and JASDF personnel with a destroyer,
a P-3C patrol aircraft, and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft took
part in the drill. The exercise was conducted based on a scenario of chasing suspicious
vessels, boarding and inspecting them and seizing the alleged chemical materials. 146

In addition, the annual Asian Export Control Seminar has been held in Tokyo since
1993 in order to promote international cooperation countermeasures against WMD
proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region through strengthening export controls. Japan has
also hosted the Asian Senior Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) since 2003.
Additionally, on 18 June 2004, Asian coast guard agencies unanimously adopted the
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Asian Maritime Security Initiative 2004 (Amarsective 2004) at the Heads of Asian
Coast Guard Agencies meeting in Tokyo. The Amarsective 2004 meeting announced
pledges and responsibilities of coast guards and areas of regional and technical
assistance and information sharing, in order to address issues of piracy, terrorism and
criminal acts at sea. 147

Problems
Japan has to play the leading role in promoting the PSI to contribute towards the
stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which faces the potential threat of maritime
terrorism using WMD and the actual threat of North Korea’s WMD, particularly its
nuclear weapons programme. As a regional maritime power, it is incumbent upon Japan
to exercise a leadership role in the PSI in both the operational and outreach activities.148
Nevertheless, there are major problems for Tokyo to resolve such as legal issues and
organizational structures so that Japan can contribute effectively to the PSI and the
solidarity of the maritime “coalition of the willing”. At the international level, the
international legal framework against WMD proliferation is constrained by political
factors and it is difficult to criminalize such activities internationally by the
strengthening of related international law using multilateral treaties and effective U.N.
Security Council resolutions. 149 China, in particular, and Russia to a lesser extent, have
generally opposed strong international legal measures that may materially harm the
interests of their client states such as North Korea and Iran. Washington also, whilst in
favour of stronger measures, has opposed formal treaties due to the political
compromises and time factors involved; hence, its preference for informal mechanisms
such as the PSI. 150

Domestically, as a practical matter, the JCG takes the lead role in putting the PSI into
action and the JMSDF provides indirect support, but there has been a delay in enacting
the necessary domestic legislation. For instance, unless a suspected ship is Japanese, the
JCG cannot take action on the high seas or in another state’s waters based on the
147
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principle of flag state jurisdiction. Many longstanding problems must be resolved for
Japan to conduct defensive action on the seas. 151 The JMSDF can conduct boardings
and ship inspections only after it has been ordered to take defensive action on the seas
and if the activity is based on the “Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in
Areas Surrounding Japan” rules.

In Team Samurai-04, the JCG could chase and inspect only Japanese-registered ships on
the high seas; otherwise it would be considered an infringement of flag state jurisdiction.
While the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
in 2000 was enacted, the JMSDF has never had experience with inspecting ships and it
was not allowed to fire warning shots with live ammunition and conduct combined
international actions. 152 In Team Samurai 04, it assumed the scenario of the training
without the declaration of defensive action on the seas, but not at the time of actual
crisis. Besides, only hypothetical Japanese and U.S.–registered ships were inspected,
not flag of convenience ships. In the exercise, the Japanese government could not
contribute realistically to the multilateral PSI exercise scenario because it was the first
time undertaking such activities and it had to be carefully coordinated across
governmental offices and ministries. 153

Legal limitations apply not only on the sea, but also in the airspace, as the Japan Air
Self-Defense Force (JASDF) can only take measures against the encroachment of
Japanese airspace in the context of the legal constraints applying to the PSI. The JASDF
can deal with foreign aircraft that invade Japanese air space, not Japanese aircraft or
foreign aircraft once they have left Japanese airspace. Despite the general appearance of
a unified position by the Japanese government, related government ministries and
agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Defense Agency and the
JCG, found it difficult to compromise in the details of the PSI. 154
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Maritime Coalitions against Non-state Threats
As the countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been gaining economic strength, it
seems that the extent of interdependence among them has also grown. The stability of
the sea lanes is a matter of life or death for regional states, but the SLOC are a huge and
fragile network. Littoral naval operations have become crucial to deal with threats posed
by non-state actors. Illegal acts on the sea usually occur in coastal waters or in narrow
channels. Without a sophisticated and networked system of surveillance and response
for operations in real time, maritime enforcement authorities cannot respond to such
incidents. Moreover, taking “the transnational nature of such crimes and the differing
approaches and capabilities of littoral nations,” without cooperation among the
countries concerned, it would be difficult to combat such maritime threats. 155

The Japan Coast Guard and Piracy
IMO
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was established as a specialized agency
of the United Nations to deal with maritime safety and the prevention of marine
pollution. In response to increasing concerns over the escalation in the number of piracy
incidents, the IMO established a working group in 1993 which consisted of experts
from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to investigate the situation of damage incurred
as a result of piratical acts in maritime Southeast Asia. This group filed a report on
measures to prevent piracy, sea patrol by the littoral states along the Malacca Strait, to
the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee. 156 The Committee as a result drew up
“MSC/Circ. 622—Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing
piracy and armed robbery against ships” and “MSC/Circ. 623—Guidance to shipowners
and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery against ship”, and circulated them to member states. 157 Furthermore,
an IMO Assembly resolution on anti-piracy cooperation was adopted at the IMO
Congress held in September 1993. Whilst the number of piratical acts decreased in the
short term, piracy intensified again in 1995. 158 As a consequence, MSC/ Circ. 622 and
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623 were revised and the “Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships” was issued at the seventy-third Maritime Safety
Committee meeting in December 2000 and circulated to members as MSC/Circ. 984. 159

Japan’s Efforts
As part of Japan’s efforts to support international efforts to improve the safety and
security of shipping and push its own security concerns as a highly maritime-dependent
state, the JCG endeavoured to establish events for communication with multilateral
institutions. These events have included periodic high-level meetings among maritime
safety authorities in the Asia-Pacific region and under the auspices of the North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF). 160 Meanwhile, there are deficiencies in the capacity of
many regional coastal states to take effective action to secure their maritime zones and
even to cooperate effectively with other states in the fight against piracy and other seabased or ship-related crime. This is especially the case with respect to the region’s
developing states with large maritime zones of jurisdiction such as the archipelagic
states of Indonesia and the Philippines, which are so important for international (and
Japanese) seaborne trade, and it will take time to improve the situation. Therefore, it
becomes essential for a country which depends very heavily on SLOC for its survival,
like Japan, to assist littoral states in this effort. Maritime capacity-building thus has
become an important part of Japan’s regional diplomacy and security-related
cooperative activity in consideration of the benefits which accrue to Japan, given its
own sea dependence, and due to its ability to positively contribute to a regional and
international maritime-based order which features such a high

degree of

interdependence; and nowhere is this more so than in its own wider region. 161

Japan has played a prominent role in regional anti-piracy initiatives and assisted in the
establishment of the security framework that enables Japan at the same time to exert
political influence from a broad foreign policy standpoint. As is well known, JSDF
activities have been strictly limited because of the limitations of the Japanese
constitution. In practice, just as it is difficult for Japan still to behave like a “normal”
159
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power in world politics, it is logically also difficult for the JMSDF to operate “normal”
naval diplomacy. Therefore, instead of using its armed forces, the JCG has been the
Japanese government’s preferred instrument with which to actively engage in regional
security diplomacy and capacity building through cooperation with the region’s littoral
states for improved maritime safety and security.

Japan’s efforts against piracy have in part been aimed at enhancing Japan’s security role
in the regional and international spheres as part of a broader process to achieve the
ardent wish of Japanese political conservatives and nationalists to promote Japanese
power and influence as a “normal” great power and to guard against the maritime
challenge posed by rival states, especially China. However, China has been unwilling to
participate in any regional multilateral security framework which facilitates the
normalization of Japanese foreign and military policy; 162 although it did join the
multilateral ReCAAP anti-piracy agreement and organization, discussed below.

In spite of this, Japan faces the usual difficulty in attempting to construct an effective
multilateral security framework, whereas its policy towards bilateral initiatives has been
paying off little by little, such as bilateral exchanges of aid and training exercises with
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. 163 Each regional country recognizes the need for
the establishment of a maritime law-enforcement agency like the Japan Coast Guard or
the U.S. Coast Guard. On 30 November 2005, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency (MMEA), modelled on the JCG, was established. 164 As a countermeasure
against piracy in the sea areas around Southeast Asia, Japan dispatches JCG experts
facilitated by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to individual
countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia to support the
establishment or development of maritime law-enforcement agencies and the nurturing
of talented people. 165
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When the Tenyu incident occurred in 1998, as discussed earlier in chapter 4, although
the international shipping division of the Maritime Bureau in the Ministry of Transport
took charge of dealing with the issue of piracy, it was difficult to gather adequate
information. The number of Japanese ships affected by piracy according to the
international shipping division’s data was only two, but the actual number was twenty
according to the results of the questionnaire survey of Japanese shipping companies
conducted by the Nippon Foundation. 166 Furthermore, the Nippon Foundation came to
cooperate with the Iinternational Maritme Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, for intelligence ties. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the Alondra
Rainbow incident from happening in October 1999. This incident involved at least eight
nations: Japan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and
China. Through the investigation of this incident, the international community
established the existence of international piracy syndicates and realized at the same time
the need for international cooperation to deal with the issue.

167

The Japanese

government saw this case as a serious problem. The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizou
Obuchi, tasked Youhei Sasagawa, the administrative director of the Nippon Foundation
with establishing options to cope with the issue of piracy. In November 1999, at the
ASEAN summit in Manila, Obuchi advocated holding a conference among coast guards
from every regional country. 168

In April 2000, the Foreign Affairs Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships was held in Tokyo. 169 Representatives from coast guard
organizations and maritime industry from Asian countries participated in this
conference, and come to an agreement, issuing the Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000,
focusing on coordination and cooperation with other countries to share information
toward anti-piracy efforts, implement increased security cooperation and strengthen
human resource development. After the conference, cooperative relations were forged
among Asian coast guard organizations. The JCG has in fact been taking a pivotal role
in anti-piracy experts’ meetings held in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and
166
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Thailand. 170 In fact, in November 2000, a JCG patrol boat made port calls to India and
Malaysia and bilateral anti-piracy exercises conducted. Since then, bilateral cooperation
of this sort has certainly been making progress. 171

In September 2001, at the initiative of then Japanese Foreign Minister Kohno, for the
sake of following up the conference, the Japanese government sent a mission on piracy
and armed robbery against ships as a government research group composed of members
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, the JCG, and JICA, to the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. The mission exchanged views on
regional cooperation to deal with such threats, following up on the international
conference held in Tokyo, and discussing the issue of closer at-sea patrol
cooperation. 172 In addition, it proposed a plan for cooperation and support for measures
against piracy and solicited the reaction of each nation about the demand for such
measures. As a consequence, the following forms of cooperation were carried out:
mutual visits by patrol boats, meetings among experts, the exchange and nurturing of
talented people, technological support, hosting officers from regional coast guards at the
Japan Coast Guard Academy, and holding seminars on regulations against offences at
sea. 173

Furthermore, in November 2001, the then Prime Minister Mori appealed to participating
nations at the ASEAN+3 summit in Singapore to convene an Asian cooperation
conference on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships. 174 As a result, in
October 2001, a conference was held in Tokyo. In addition, at a later ASEAN+3 summit
in Brunei, the then Prime Minister Koizumi advanced the idea of constructing a legal
framework to promote regional cooperation as a counter to piracy. Afterwards, the
ASEAN countries, China, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh began to negotiate
on drafting a cooperative agreement under the leadership of Japan. 175 In 2004, a highlevel marine police conference that discussed the entire gamut of maritime security
170
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issues, including anti-piracy and maritime terrorism, was held in Tokyo. The Nippon
Foundation, which has developed an awareness of the problems of securing Japan’s
SLOC, defrayed the expenses for the meeting. 176
ReCAAP
A process of several years of political lobbying and diplomacy by successive Japanese
leaders culminated in November 2004, with the conclusion of the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP). The result of several international conferences over the past several years,
the ReCAAP agreement has subsequently been ratified by 17 countries: Bangladesh,
Brunei, Burma. Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Laos, the Netherlands,
Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. 177
This agreement creates an information sharing system on piracy and attempts to
strengthen partnerships among coast guard organizations through building an
international cooperation network. In addition, regarding information sharing, it was
decided that the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) would be established in
Singapore.

ReCAAP was the first-ever large-scale cooperation by Asian countries to counter piracy
and to establish an official operations centre administered by full-time permanent staff
members. 178 Malaysia supports the concept of ReCAAP, nevertheless it opposed the
location of the ISC in Singapore, which could rival the position of the Piracy Reporting
Centre in Kuala Lumpur, which is managed by the International Maritime Bureau in
London. 179 Although Malaysia and Indonesia were included in the 16 countries that
agreed the framework of the ReCAAP in 2004, they have not ratified it because they
have lingering concerns that the agreement might violate their sovereignty within the
Malacca Strait, located largely between peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island
of Sumatra. 180
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In September 2006, ReCAAP came into force, after being ratified by the eleventh
country. The ReCAAP ISC has made significant progress in research and analysis,
capacity building, and engagement and cooperation with other organizations that handle
piracy and armed robbery. 181 As a result, the ReCAAP ISC is highly-regarded
internationally by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization as a
model of intergovernmental cooperation that the rest of world could follow to counter
piracy. 182 The cost of running the centre is financed largely by Singapore. Japan is the
second largest contributor. 183 In practice, IMO Secretary-General Mitropoulos has said
that,
The ReCAAP ISC, in collaboration with the IMO, have a role to play in
addressing the situation off the coast of Somalia, for instance in raising
regional awareness, sharing its experience in Asia in promoting regional
cooperation at the government-to-government level; and promoting regional
capacity-building efforts, including the facilitation of technical assistance from
regional governments. 184
However, the sense of caution and existing rivalries among the littoral states are major
impediments to sharing information regarding counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts.
There was also much debate and competition among the littoral states over the issue of
where the ReCAAP ISC should be built.185 The information sources of ReCAAP are 15
Focal Points (one place in each of the 14 member countries and one in Hong Kong),
which are linked to the ISC in Singapore. In addition, the ReCAAP Information Sharing
Web is composed of Focal Points that exchange information each other. Each Focal
Point is placed in the Coast Guard, Maritime Police, Ministry or Agency in charge of
marine transportation and maritime affairs or navy. 186

The ReCAAP ISC president is currently from Japan’s foreign ministry. Japan has been
playing a leadership role in terms of anti-piracy countermeasures. Serving as the Centre
president means that Japan has been shouldering weighty responsibility for maritime
security in the region. To carry out this role, Japan must maintain reliable maritime
181
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security enforcement capability. Also, Japan needs to use its diplomatic power to
encourage Indonesia and Malaysia to join the arrangement. 187 Although this has yet to
occur, in May 2005, in Tokyo, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Indonesian
President Yudhoyono, after discussions on maritime affairs which focused on matters
relevant to the Strait of Malacca, announced the Japan-Indonesia Joint Announcement
on Maritime Affairs which confirmed the significance of the security and safety of the
Strait of Malacca, and cooperative maritime security against piracy and criminal acts at
sea. 188 And in December 2006, at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting, member
countries agreed to start a dialogue against terrorism, and then at a following meeting in
June 2007, the Japanese government announced that it would make a major contribution
to regional stability and maritime security which was regarded as one of the biggest
concerns in the region. 189

Japan and the Maritime Coalition against Somali Pirates
International Cooperation for the Maritime Security
In response to threats from piracy off Somalia, on 2 June 2008, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1816 authorizing maritime security operations in Somali waters conducted
by other countries was adopted. This resolution was formulated by France and the
United States, and co-sponsored by Australia, Canada, Denmark France, Greece,
Holland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Panama, Spain, and Britain. Furthermore,
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1838 to strengthen Resolution 1816 was adopted on 7
October 2007. It aimed to press for each country to send warships and maritime patrol
aircraft for anti-piracy efforts off Somalia. As a result, members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) dispatched seven warships to escort the transport vessels
of the U.N. World Food Programme on 24 October 2007. On 8 December 2007, the
European Union decided to send a flotilla to the area. It seems that the maritime security
operation was not only against piracy, but also against terrorism because narcotics
produced in Afghanistan were smuggled to Somalia via Pakistan. Dispatching naval
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ships to waters off Somalia aims to thwart the activities of the Taliban and other
terrorist groups and to choke off funds to these groups. 190

A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), composed of Britain, Canada, France, Germany,
Pakistan and the United States, focused on protecting merchant ships around the Gulf of
Aden. 191 In October 2007, a North Korean ship called the MV Dai Hong Dan traded
gunfire with pirates but was outnumbered. The U.S. Navy saved the North Korean ship.
The United States won international acclaim because it rescued the ship regardless of
whether is was a friend or foe. 192 Canada sent naval vessels to the sea off the coast of
Somalia to protect ships transporting the World Food Programme’s supplies for
refugees. Germany, which constrains the use of force by law, send a maritime patrol
aircraft to the U.S. base located in Somalia’s neighbour, Djibouti, and the German
Shipowner’s Association urged the German government to ease conditions for the use
of weapons by the German Navy. 193 On 21 April 2008, a Japanese crude oil tanker,
Takayama, was rescued by a German Navy destroyer. On 26 December 2008, China
dispatched two destroyers and a replenishment vessel to the sea off Somalia. It was
reported that China’s operational dispatch of warships to across oceanic distances was
the first time since Zheng He in the Ming Dynasty. On 12 January 2009, Chinese navy
destroyers escorted a Taiwanese merchant ship. It was a great opportunity to make an
appeal to the international community for the “One China Policy”. Also, on 30 January,
the Chinese navy repelled Somali pirates to rescue a Greek ship. Through such
international contributions by its navy, China showed its presence in the Indian Ocean
as a great power. 194 According to Chinese media, as of 1 June 2010, the Chinese navy
deployed off Somalia had escorted a total of 803 ships, and saved 13 foreign merchant
ships from pirate attacks. 195
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Debate over the Law
While other countries actively contributed to maritime security in the area, Japan had to
wrestle with domestic legal disputes. The Japanese Communist Party insisted that
missions against Somali pirates should be operated by law enforcement bodies and that
the dispatch of the JMSDF would contravene the constitution. The Social Democratic
Party also insisted that the JCG rather than the JMSDF should be deployed. 196 Despite
these arguments, in March 2009, Japan participated in the international task forces
involving the United States, China, Russia and India, with the deployment of two
JMSDF destroyers equipped with two patrol helicopters and two speed boats and about
400 JMSDF personnel and eight JCG officers. The mission was to counter pirates who
attack ships in the Gulf of Aden, which connects to the Suez Canal, based on the
Maritime Patrol Activities provision in Article 82 of the Self-Defence Forces Law in
situations beyond the capabilities of the JCG.197 The eight JCG officers embarked to
process judicial matters should they need to stop and arrest pirates, including gathering
evidence and legally processing suspects. 198

As usual, the debate on the war-renouncing Article 9 of the constitution in the Diet had
to be heatedly conducted in order to be able to dispatch the two destroyers to waters off
Somalia to join the international maritime coalition against piracy. The Japanese
government insists that the operations against Somali pirates do not violate the
constitutional ban on using force to settle international disputes. 199 Regarding an
international contribution, the government would always be pushed to constitutionally
interpret the difference between the use of arms and the use of force. 200 The mission of
JMSDF vessels off Somalia to deal with pirates was completely different from
operations that it had undertaken before. It means that the role of the JSDF is changing
from “rear area support” to “front line support” in overseas missions. 201
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Somali pirates possess rifles, machine guns and rocket launchers that have a range of
more than two kilometres. The rules of engagement of most other countries allow these
states to counter such pirates. Meanwhile, the JMSDF has serious disadvantages in
terms of using weapons. Japanese destroyers escorted Japanese ships and drove away
suspicious boats coming close to foreign ships with their loudspeakers and
searchlights. 202 Supposing that a suspected pirate boat approaches a Japanese ship,
JMSDF vessels were told to contact and warn the boat to change course or fire a
warning shot. Nevertheless, there were guidelines such as the firing of warning shots by
a machine gun on the surface of the water about 50 metres in front of a pirate vessel. 203
JMSDF personnel were concerned about the possibility that warning shots fired at the
water’s surface could ricochet. Actually, there is a high probability that close-range
shooting would injure or kill people. 204

Importantly, there were serious problems related to international cooperation for Japan
from a moral standpoint. JMSDF vessels are only allowed to guard Japan-related ships
which meet any of the following four conditions: a Japan-registered ship; a ship
operated by Japanese shipping companies; a ship carrying Japanese cargo; or a ship
with Japanese nationals on board. 205 In 2007, the Golden Nori, a Panama-registered
chemical tanker owned by a Japanese company, was hijacked by pirates. A U.S. Navy
destroyer received a distress signal from the Golden Nori and could, if necessary, sink
the offending pirate boats. Meanwhile, if the JMSDF destroyers received a distress call
from a non-Japan-related ship, the destroyers would send a helicopter for a
reconnaissance mission in the first place but they can only use arms for a shot in selfdefence or an emergency evacuation. It was difficult for the JMSDF destroyers to deal
with ships boarded by pirates. Even if a JMSDF destroyer encountered pirate ships
attacking a civilian ship without Japanese links, it would only be able to alert the
situation to the naval ships of other countries. 206
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Need for More Cooperation
According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, it takes about five days for the JMSDF
to conduct a round trip escort of ships in the extensive patrol zone. The JMSDF is able
to guard five or so ships at any given time as best as it can. In brief, supposing JMSDF
vessels carry on guarding about five ships in each operation, it will be able to escort a
total of ten ships in five days or about 730 ships a year. However, according to the
Japanese Shipowner’s Association, 2,103 ships Japanese-related ships navigated the
area in 2008. Therefore, the JMSDF has an ability to escort, at best, only one-third of
these ships. 207 In practice, the Japanese Shipowner’s Association consistently asked the
Japanese government to dispatch JMSDF vessels to waters off Somalia for the sake of
contributing to the safety of its ships on the high seas. It seems obvious that Japan, so
greatly reliant on maritime transportation for its economic activities and overall national
security, has to contribute to maritime security in the area with more cooperation with
other maritime forces. 208

The government further decided to deploy at least two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft
with 100 JMSDF and 50 GSDF personnel to patrol waters off Somalia. 209 In practice,
both the U.N. and the IMO, as well as the informal international coalition, seemed to
need and accommodate the P-3C aircraft, of which the JMSDF possesses over 100. 210 In
fact, the JMSDF needed to protect a broader area effectively such as the route via Cape
Town, a sea lane in which the Jasmine Ace was attacked by pirates. In order to monitor
this vast area, the Japanese government decided to send P-3C aircraft that provide
surveillance information to navies participating in the anti-piracy operations. The
Japanese government had to promote mutual cooperation with a large number of navies,
including the navies of Turkey and Kenya, with which the JMSDF has never held
exercises. 211 In such a framework of maritime policing actions, the building of trustful
relations is significant, with the accumulation of persistent efforts for mutual
cooperation for the stability of the maritime arena. 212 Thus, on 11 June 2009, the two P-
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3C aircraft started warning and surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, which has
accounted more than 75 percent of such operations by aircraft there. 213

Also in June 2009, the Anti-piracy Measures Law was newly enacted in Japan to send
two destroyers to Somalia, legally enabled to protect any vessels, and not only Japanaffiliated ships. 214 In comparison with the Maritime Patrol Activities provisions in terms
of use of weapons, under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law the MSDF can use weapons for
the self protection, the protection of others, and preventing interference with official
duties. In addition to Maritime Patrol Activities, weapons can be used to forcepirated
vessels to stop under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law. However, it is extremely difficult
to interpret and distinguish between such laws, which have created a certain legal
uncertainty.
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso exercised personal leadership to promote the act,
despite a great number of opposition politicians who expressed concern that maritime
operations carried out under the new law would be unconstitutional. 215
Table 11. Use of Weapon

Maritime Patrol Activities
By applying Article 7 of the Act concerning
Execution of Official Police Duties, the use of
weapons can be allowed only when it is used for
self-protection, the protection of others, or for
preventing interference with official duties, to
such an extent as is considered reasonably
necessary in accordance with the situation

Counter-piracy Operations
In addition (to Maritime Patrol Activities), when
countering acts of piracy, including such acts as
approaching excessively close to a ship or
following a ship, if any party perpetrating such
acts of piracy continues their acts despite the
countermeasures of others, and there are
reasonable grounds to believe that no other
means are available to stop the passage of the
ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted
to such an extent that is considered reasonably
necessary in accordance with the situation

Conclusion
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Australia is geopolitically important for allies such as Japan and the United States
because of its geographical location. Australia’s strategic proximity to the Pacific island
nations, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean is important for allies for the securing of
SLOC. Australia is one of the few mature and developed countries in the Asia-Pacific
region and a reliable member of the U.S. alliance network. Australia also could become
a more reliable partner for Japan, including within the context of the emerging trilateral
relationship. And India is increasing its national strength and naval power steadily like
China, and it enjoys a highly advantageous position within the Indian Ocean. Regarding
balance of power strategy, India is the only nation in Asia that Japan can expect to be
opposed to China, the great land power heading for the sea. Japan therefore has a great
opportunity to forge a bilateral relationship of trust with India based on their
interdependence as sea powers.

Japan has demonstrated that, despite the limitations of its constitution, it has still been
prepared to increasingly utilize its seapower to participate in and build coalitions to both
enhance good order at sea and general maritime security, and also to hedge against
unfolding strategic dangers from rogue states and potentially from the expansionist
Chinese continental giant. It has been shown in this chapter that Japan has been active
in establishing its seapower credentials to push its national interests and influence in a
number of ways and in a number of forums, including in informal coalitions such those
related to the PSI and anti-piracy cooperation off Somalia, deepening its cooperation
with other navies in multilateral settings, such as in Malabar and RIMPAC exercises,
and taking the lead in establishing multilateral anti-piracy measures and maritime
security capacity building in Southeast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, for example, the Japanese government has led with the JCG to urge
littoral states to cooperate for anti-piracy since the 1990s. The fruits of this diplomatic
activity are ably demonstrated by ReCAAP, which produces a steady flow of successful
effects. In practice, the number of piracy incidents has decreased in waters around the
Malacca Strait since the system of ReCAAP started to work.

On the whole, the maritime coalitions are working well and are so essential for Japanese
security. Nevertheless, Japan’s post-War pacifism and legal restraints upon the use of its
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military rooted in Article 9 of the constitution still hampers and disrupts Japan’s naval
diplomacy, including in the course of confidence-building within maritime coalitions.
This domestic political inertia leaves Japan potentially vulnerable to a great variety of
threats at or from the sea. Thus, while Japan has taken some strides to use its seapower
to engage more widely with the outside world as a normal great power, its effectiveness
in doing so remains hampered, both leaving gaps in its provisions for national security
and potentially frustrating its ally and a growing number of international security
partners.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion

Findings
The value of ocean space cannot be overestimated. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to
develop and maintain the power derived from exploitation of the sea. This thesis
clarifies seapower’s structure, viewed as an abstract concept, demonstrating its realworld application, and so modernizing the concept that was originally advocated by
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Seapower is composed of a number of factors across specialized
areas, which mutually affect each other, as conceptually developed in Chapter 2. In
order to comprehensively grasp seapower, a state must consider various strategic
thought and relationships, the theory of geopolitics, and other various factors.

This research has also attempted to discuss the relationship between seapower and
alliances and coalitions, a topic which has not been discussed adequately in recent years.
One of the most important features of maritime states is mutual dependence. Maritime
states have shaped this character through a long history of mutual economic interaction,
developing, using and protecting the vast network of seaborne trade. In the realm of
security issues, in addition to a traditional threat from a great continental power that
attempts to attain a far more prominent seapower status, the emergence of new non-state
threats have increased the value of maritime coalitions in the age of globalization. Even
though building maritime alliance networks or coalitions seems the best way to deal
with such various security problems, it is no simple task. Whether the coalition will
work or not largely depends on the leadership of the leading maritime state, which is
naturally qualified to be the leading power of the coalition. In the contemporary world
that equates to America, as discussed in Chapter 2.

In terms of both economic and security aspects, no single actor can control the ocean
and deal with all problems facing the global maritime system. A genuine sea-girt state,
Japan, is no exception. Northeast Asia, the location of the Japanese archipelago, is
definitely a potential conflict zone. And the safe and successful function of Japan’s huge
sea lines of communication (SLOC) network in the Asia-Pacific region is unable to
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operate without cooperation with a large number of other stakeholders. As a response to
such maritime challenges to its fundamental well-being and security, Japan’s national
strategy in this security environment has been to initiate a process of maritime coalition
building involving not only its traditional American ally but also new strategic and
security partners.

Since the end of the Second World War, however, Japan’s peace constitution has
severely restricted its use of military operations. This was not especially problematic
during the Cold War as Japan focused on its economic recovery under the protection of
the U.S.-led alliance network. In the later stages of the Cold War, though, as Japanese
economic strength grew, it was increasingly required to contribute to the safety of the
region through its military contribution to its alliance with the United States. In this
process, with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) as a pillar, the
complementary military relationship with the United States was strengthened.

In terms of the elements of seapower discussed in Chapter 1, the United States has
provided a number of the components of seapower: military technology in the post-War
era; landpower such as the deployment of its Marines and providing military training to
the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to enable them to acquire the ability of marine
forces; land and sea-based airpower; spacepower, which brings global communications
capability; sea control capabilities which help secure Japan’s huge SLOC network; and
security frame works such as the construction of maritime coalitions. The United States
remains the greatest seapower, providing leadership for maritime coalitions. On the
other hand, Japan provides its great location to act as a power projection hub for U.S.
seapower. The United Sates and Japan both regard a rising China as a potential menace
and securing SLOC in the Asia-Pacific region continues to be a vital factor for their
economic activities. Relations between the two nations are thoroughly complementary
and they share mutual interests as democratic maritime states.

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy has functioned as the “father” of
the JMSDF, has provided various weaponry, technology and fighting ships, has trained
Japanese sailors for modern warfare, and has established strong cooperative ties with
the JMSDF to confront formidable enemies. Relations between the two navies are
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similar to a blood relationship. Their cooperation has strengthened the alliance on many
occasions, and extricated the alliance from critical situations. As discussed in Chapter 2,
their relations have proved that the navy-to-navy relationship is at the core of alliances
between maritime states.

Still, in the different strategic circumstances now confronting Japan, the old constraints
have limited Japan’s ability to pursue its national interests and its use of seapower for
those ends. Thus Japan continued to limit its participation in the defence of the
international maritime system even after the end of the Cold War, despite being highly
dependent upon that system. This stance did not enhance Japan’s international
reputation. However, slow change started to occur as Tokyo increasingly understood
how its reputation was being eroded and as the security situation at sea began to
deteriorate, both as a result of growing disorder on the oceans as shipping
vulnerabilities to non-state threats increased, and as strategic factors changed, with the
rise of new naval powers placing particular pressure on Japan to defend its own
maritime rights and interests. As a result of this process, Japan’s security policy is
showing change towards a more “normal” direction. The Japan Self-Defense Force has
even been frequently allowed to be deployed overseas.

This process has been extensively documented in this thesis, and it is the argument of
this study that Japan will need to continue and deepen this process of naval and
maritime engagement and coalition building in order to safeguard its national security
as the century unfolds. The number and potential seriousness of the challenges Japan
faces at sea make this process a strategic necessity. Such engagement may even serve to
ameliorate some of the rivalries currently under way.

For example, there are grave bilateral issues between Japan and South Korea, and the
South Korean navy also has long-simmering rivalry with the JMSDF. However, if the
two countries re-establish a common perception of threats and the two navies deepen
exchanges through maritime coalition-building activities such as RIMPAC exercises
and even bilateral processes, they could more effectively face common challenges
together.
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In a geo-strategic sense, reliable, long-time friend Australia and rising India could be
potentially significant allies for Japan. In the Asia Pacific region, many stakeholders
have been jolted by China’s military expansion and its gains in influence. Precisely
because Japan is in such a situation, it has to intensify relations with such like-minded
states and needs to move the relationships to another level from the slowly developing
“quasi-alignments” described in Chapter 6 in order to solidify its position as a maritime
state. Japan has increasingly used not only the JMSDF, but also the Japan Coast Guard
in a strategy of maritime-centred international diplomacy to further Japanese security
interests and contribute to the maintenance of the international maritime system in a
way that befits the world’s second largest economy, a leading member of the democratic
West and a major power in its own right.

Implications
This thesis has made the current situation of Japanese seapower easily understood by
analysing it within the context of the broader concept of seapower. The analysis has
revealed serious and widespread problems for Japan as a seapower, which have been
very complicated to overcome. Such issues are summarized in the following tasks.

Cooperation with Anglo-Saxon Seapower
Japanese diplomatic analyst Hisahiko Okazaki insists that in past centuries AngloSaxon seapower has broken down rivals since it defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588.
In the twentieth century, Anglo-American alliances have defeated Germany twice,
Japan and the Soviet Union. They have embodied the superiority of seapower in the
maritime world of the Columbus Era. Nations which choose to become a partner of the
Anglo-Saxon seapower states also have been blessed with prosperity, including Japan
and Germany after their defeat in World War II, France in the 20th century, and Holland
after the Anglo-Dutch Wars. 216 On the basis of learning from the history, it seems
obvious that Japan must cooperate with the rest of the world and make the core of its
existence a geopolitical orientation as a maritime state. It seems that following a geostrategic alliance as a sea power state is the road to success for Japan. Okazaki asserts
that Japan has enjoyed the prosperity and the peace of the Pacific Ocean, maintained
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once as part of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and then under the Japan-U.S. security
arrangements in the post-War era. 217

According to Robyn Lim, Japan has to select from among three options for its security
policy: 218 deepening alliance with the United Sates by taking a major role in the
maritime coalition; gaining China’s favour as a tributary state; or going down a path
towards independence. Taking the history and the actual situation of Japan, the Japanese
appear to have only one choice, as argued throughout this thesis.

Two Issues in Japan’s Maritime Policy
Mainly, two issues are pointed out in Japan’s maritime policy. One is related to Japan’s
administrative organization. The Japanese government has taken a long time to
construct a comprehensive approach in establishing a framework to deal with issues
relevant to its ocean space, since Japan’s policy toward the sea was captured by
vertically-segmented administrative system. Traditionally, the development of
comprehensive maritime policy came very late when compared with its Asian
neighbours. 219 The Basic Act on Ocean Policy was enacted in 2007 and a Headquarters
for Ocean Policy launched, demonstrating how far the Japanese government had moved
in giving maritime issues the prompt attention required of a maritime state.

Mahan stressed the importance of “character of the government:

The government by its policy can favour the natural growth of a people’s
industries and its tendencies to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea;
or it can try to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when they
do not naturally exist; or, on the other hand, the government may by
mistaken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to
themselves would make. 220
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Mahan believed that the rise and fall of sea powers strongly depended on the
governmental factor, because he knows some countries were not able to achieve naval
adequacy, in spite of favourable geographical conditions: “the final outcome had not
been geographically determined but decided by human action.” 221

The other issue is more fundamental. The Japanese public have obviously only a limited
interest in ocean space. In order to nurture maritime-mindedness among the people, the
fundamental review of education to bring the existence of the sea closer to young
Japanese is essential through elementary and secondary school education. The research
system of university and graduate school has to be improved for the deeper exchange of
military personnel and the academic community. 222 The concept and theory of seapower
can be difficult to study because of its multidisciplinary nature. In particular, Japanese
educational institutions do not have in place the kind of environment necessary to study
fields of research related to seapower such as geopolitics and military strategy.

Most importantly of all, the Japanese government must clearly present long and midterm concepts and strategies to integrate all of the various aspects of seapower into a
discernable whole.

Wake to Reality
Above all else, the greatest problem for Japan’s seapower is its Community Factor
discussed in Chapter 2, especially Character of the People and Character of the
Government. In fact, these are the elements among elements, the source of seapower
and Japan’s orientation as a sea power state. The reason why Japanese maritime forces
are imposed with tremendous constraints on promoting maritime coalition-building and
confidence-building measures among navies is that the Japanese government cannot
change the interpretation of the right of collective defence, and the majority of Japanese
remain preoccupied with unrealistic one-country pacifism under the protection of
America’s formidable military power: this cannot avoid being labelled irresponsible.
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The Japanese people thus need to promote changes in the national consciousness, even
though there would be considerable difficulty in the realization of this objective. A bill
for an “Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan” was passed into
law under the Abe administration in 2007 and the law comes into effect in May 2010,
but the controversial issue on the revision of Article 9 of the constitution would be kept
on the shelf for the foreseeable future, unless there were to be extreme circumstances.

Japan as a nation deeply reflects on the defeat of the Second World War and has been in
self-imposed chains of post-War pacifism. Yet the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific
region is changing, where rising nations expand and modernize their military strength,
and a great number of potential roots of conflict exist, perhaps to upset Japan’s interests
and even its own sovereign territory. Japan has not performed its duty as a major power
sharing in the great responsibility to secure international society. It is difficult for
people from other countries to understand the atmosphere created by the post-War
pacifism in Japan’s society. It is not so easy for Japanese to officially speak about the
realism of international relations and the importance of military preparedness. In general,
it is difficult and regarded as a kind of taboo for Japanese to study military affairs, and
the type of geopolitical thought that many blame for the Japanese Empire’s headlong
rush to war.

Additionally, as a major problem, not only are most ordinary Japanese unaware of the
gravity of the situation, but also there are some who want Japan to remain in the trap of
unrealistic pacifism, both domestically and abroad. There has been an invisible “Berlin
Wall” within Japan. It is probably true to say that the “Cold War” is not over yet for
Japan and the Japanese. In this circumstance, how can Japanese people know the
significance of seapower and maritime strategy?

Chapter 2 argues that the general theory advocated by J.C. Wylie could be used to
integrate a variety of factors to operate seapower effectively. Nevertheless, in Japan’s
case, far from being just a theoretical construction for seapower, it is a very practical
and urgent matter. Without a response based on seapower and maritime coalition
building to its unfolding international circumstances, Japan will be severely challenged
in the coming decades.
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If Japan becomes more conscious of being a maritime power, it would be forced to open
its eyes to global realities, including current and emerging difficulties and threats in the
maritime arena. Such a situation would require Japan to enhance international
collaboration and increase its own contributions, in both economic and security terms,
as a member of a maritime-oriented coalition.

Despite his image as an aggressive strategic thinker, Mahan noticed that it was
“improbable that control [over the seas] ever again will be exercised, as once it was, by
a single nation.” 223 According to Jon Sumida’s analysis, Mahan thought that democracy
makes it difficult for governments to win enormous military appropriations because
popular governments have a tendency to adjust their budgets for prosperity during
peacetime, unlike during the height of the British Empire. 224 Indeed, the economic and
commercial form of seapower states tends to cultivate democratic forms of government.
Considering not only military might, but also geographical factors, a single maritime
state cannot achieve sufficient capabilities to satisfy sea control alone. Japan must
therefore attain the various factors of seapower across the broad spectrum of attributes
discussed in this thesis. In particular, Japan must enhance its maritime coalitionbuilding and its alliance with the United States, factors which could enable it to build a
prosperous and stable Asia, and maritime and naval cooperation with other states which
also respect an open economic, and free political and legal order, in preparation for a
new maritime age that may promote prosperity and globalisation, and prevent the
morass of conflict.
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